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Although completing a dissertation is certainly a cause for celebration it should 
also a humbling experience. Rare is the young scholar that is so self-possessed and whose 
work is so intellectually mature that he or she did not benefit from a multitude of helping 
hands. My debts are indeed many, and it is with the utmost sincerity that I hope that I can 
repay those who have so generously invested their time and energy in me.         
 Steve Usselman‘s contributions to my intellectual development are incalculable. I 
vividly recall a seminar session during my first semester at Georgia Tech when I began to 
think out loud about some of the implications of David Landes‘s magnum opus The 
Unbound Prometheus. It was one of my first encounters with the daunting literature in 
the history of technology and, unsure of my observation and hesitant to make a fool of 
myself, I paused mid-sentence. I sheepishly looked across the table and made eye contact 
with Steve, who was listening intently at the far end. He nodded slowly and then gestured 
reassuringly, as if to say ―you‘re on solid ground, don‘t be afraid to take the next step.‖ It 
would not be the last time he would shepherd me in this way. During my time at Georgia 
Tech I have had the good fortune to observe and engage Steve from a number of vantage 
points, as his seminar student, teaching assistance, and dissertation advisee. He has 
shown infinite patience with me as I have tried to complete the dissertation while living 
in New Orleans and juggling a full-time teaching load and the responsibilities of a 
husband and father. His wisdom and wit are greatly appreciated, and I firmly believe that 
I will be a better historian and educator because I was under his wing.   
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I would also like to express my earnest appreciation to the other members of my 
dissertation committee for their critiques and suggestions. My time spent as a student of 
and teaching assistant for Ron Bayor, Greg Nobles, and Doug Flaming convinced me that 
their respective insights into urban history, environmental history, and southern history 
would be indispensible to this research project. Ron, whose scholarship on racial politics 
in Atlanta initially led me to consider graduate studies at Georgia Tech, has been a 
steadfast supporter of my interest in urban history as it expanded beyond issues of race 
and ethnicity to include technology and the environment. This interest in the environment 
was fostered in a seminar conducted by Greg Nobles, who encouraged me to consider the 
importance of geography and that use of Chattahoochee River did not simply begin with 
urban development in Atlanta. Greg and his wife Anne‘s satisfaction in seeing me 
complete the dissertation was truly touching. Doug Flamming‘s interest in social history 
has prodded me to never lose sight of what happens ―on the corner of First and Main,‖ 
while his warmth and commitment to teaching has produced a rapport with his students 
that is worthy of emulation. Lastly, I am grateful to Martin Melosi for sharing his deep 
knowledge in the evolution of urban infrastructure and environmentalism and look 
forward to continuing what I hope will be a mutually beneficial dialogue. 
Thanks go out to numerous members of the HTS community for their continued 
support. Bill Winders has been fountain of good humor and advice while LaDonna 
Bowen has been an invaluable administrative resource. I would like to include a special 
note of appreciation for John Krige. John essentially put the dissertation topic in my lap 
and arranged a key meeting with former Georgia President G. Wayne Clough that yielded 
my first set of primary documents. John additionally helped me secure a one –semester 
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teaching position at Georgia-Tech Lorraine, a post that allowed me and my wife and 
daughter to travel extensively throughout Western Europe.  Lastly, John‘s willingness to 
visit me in New Orleans to witness firsthand the ravages of Katrina (and share his fried 
crawfish with Simone) was impressive beyond words.  
I would also like to thank the many individuals outside of Georgia Tech for their 
continued support. Renatta Milner at the Georgia Archives, Richard Parker and John 
Reinhardt with the Department of Watershed Management, and Justin Wiedeman of 
Wiedeman and Singleton are but a few that deserve recognition for helping me locate 
scattered records and documents. Three of my former professors from the University of 
New Orleans—Arnold Hirsch, Raphael Cassimere, and Jack O‘Connor—have remained 
guiding lights as scholars and educators and welcomed guests in my home. Thanks also 
to David Moore, the chair of the History Department at Loyola University, for agreeing 
to hire an ABD and creating a schedule flexible enough for me to teach and write. Dean 
Jo Ann Cruz‘s interest in my interdisciplinary training and thoughtful inquiries into my 
progression has been equally reassuring. The encouragement of Loyola University 
colleagues such as Rian Thum, Adrian De Gifis, Justin Nystrom, and Behrooz Moazami 
in the History Department and Chris Schaberg and Laura Murphy in the English 
Department was a substantial boost when the work load was heavy. Scott Farrin‘s close 
friendship has been immeasurable satisfying, particularly in moments when I thought the 
world was about to cave in.  I am also appreciative of John and Anne Levert, my in-laws, 
for their abiding enthusiasm and support and for Jamey and Greg (my younger brothers) 
for keeping me grounded. I am especially thankful to my father, Jerry Hardy, for teaching 
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me the value of hard work and for my mother, Dorothy Hardy, who has demonstrated an 
unshakable faith in me despite every indication that I was a lost cause.  
 My deepest appreciation is reserved for my wife Lee and daughter Simone, who 
have been my companions through the ups and downs and years of graduate study. 
Simone‘s boundless curiosity about the world has been an infinite source of inspiration to 
me and reminder of the need to stop and enjoy the moment. Lee has endured more lonely 
nights than any wife should and has deferred her dreams while I pursued mine. She has 
remained, nevertheless, my biggest advocate and my best friend. For that I am eternally 
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  By the dawn of the twenty-first century the City of Atlanta was facing a crisis of 
water quantity and water quality. It was involved in two-decades worth of litigation with 
the states of Alabama and Florida over access to surface waters that originate within 
Georgia, a legal dispute that threatened to severely reduce the city‘ ability to provide 
water to its growing metropolitan population. In addition, city officials were in the 
beginning stages of a four-billion dollar, court-ordered program of improvements to its 
wastewater infrastructure that was intended to reduce the amount of pollution that spewed 
into its local rivers and streams.  
This dissertation examines the origins of these water-related problems by 
exploring the challenges that Atlanta‘s public officials, engineers, and activists faced in 
planning and implementing an effective environmental policy, with particular emphasis 
placed on the era of post-World War II metropolitan development.  Specifically, it 
focuses on the city‘s historical efforts to achieve the comprehensive management of the 
area‘s water resources, the technological systems adopted and solutions proposed, and the 
political and social milieu that facilitated or hampered these endeavors.    
Comprehensive water resources management was a neglected and delayed policy 
approach that was undertaken in the City of Atlanta only after overt threats of federal 
intervention. This study argues that although the area‘s mid-century regional planners 
advocated for intergovernmental cooperation in order to manage Atlanta‘s limited water 
supplies, their recommendations were undermined by fragmented local governance, timid 
political leadership, and public indifference. It further suggests that Atlanta‘s water 
supply managers, through increases in the scale and scope of their operations and a 
xvi 
 
reluctance to increase customer rates, facilitated and encouraged greater water 
consumption, which, in turn, placed intense burdens on both the natural hydraulic cycle 
and the city‘s wastewater facilities. Lastly, it argues the citizen activists as well as state 
and federal regulators have utilized the federal court system as a blunt planning 
instrument when Atlanta‘s leaders displayed their seeming incapacity to handle the 






With respect to the founding of Atlanta, Georgia, two pieces of information may 
be regarded as incontrovertible facts. The first is that those involved in choosing the 
southern ―Terminus‖ of the Western and Atlantic (W&A) railroad in 1837 could scarcely 
have envisioned that the site would eventually become the core of the largest 
metropolitan region in the southeastern United States. That few believed the rustic 
location would evolve into anything other than a small ―grain depot‖ is made clear by the 
1841 actions of John Thrasher, the contractor assigned the task of grading the terrain 
upon which the W&A and the Monroe Railroad would intersect. When Thrasher 
discovered that a depot and ancillary buildings were to be constructed a mere 1200 feet 
southeast of the originally proposed junction, he immediately sold off—at half the price 
paid—the surrounding 100 acres he had previously purchased because he feared the land 
too distant from the planned structures to be useful!
1
 
 The second verity, which stems from the first, is that the area‘s water resources 
did not factor into the site selection, or at least not in any typical way. In fact, it was the 
appreciable absence of a major interior river or harbor site that contributed to the 
founding of the city, a point that stands in stark contrast to virtually every major urban 
area to emerge in the United States. Due to the presence of numerous shoals and rock 
outcroppings, the Chattahoochee River, the state‘s lengthiest internal river, was 
considered un-navigable above Columbus, Georgia, a fact which made railroads 
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particularly attractive to nineteenth-century commercial interests. Stephen Harriman 
Long selected the location because a nearby ridge provided an ideal turnaround spot for a 
web of railroads that were to link Georgia to the markets of the western United States.  
What is more, the ridge‘s gently falling slope was oriented towards the river that was 
eight miles to the northwest. The region, moreover, was sparsely inhabited and those few 
people living in the area could obtain fresh water supplies from numerous natural springs 
and streams. Ironically, the Chattahoochee River, which now supplies metropolitan 
Atlanta with nearly 80 percent of its daily water needs, was no more than an obstacle to 
hurdle for the benefit of the state‘s previously established cities.
2
   
These overlooked facets of Atlanta‘s early history—unanticipated population 
growth and the limited amount of total water resources—have continued to be defining 
elements of the region‘s more recent development. Presently, the ten-county metropolitan 
Atlanta region is home to more than 4.1 million residents and this figure is expected to 
increase to at least 5.25 million over the next twenty years. More than 3 million of these 
people, fully one-third of Georgia‘s population, depend on the Chattahoochee River basin 
as their principal water source. Not only is Atlanta dependent on surface water for an 
astounding 98 percent of its total water needs, it is reportedly the country‘s largest 
metropolitan region to rely on a watershed so small.
3
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The difficulties of sustaining a metropolis with limited water resources have been 
numerous. Although Atlanta receives an average of 48 inches of rainfall per year, only 
about 18 inches is available to serve as a source for stream flow after evaporation and 
transpiration occurs. In addition, while periodic droughts have frequently reduced the 
total quantity of water reaching the metropolitan region, the area‘s numerous ridges and 
valleys has created a myriad of drainage basins that divert water withdrawn from the 
Chattahoochee River for purposes of water supply into different watersheds. This flow of 
water away from the Chattahoochee River has in turn limited the Chattahoochee River‘s 
ability to dilute increased amounts of effluent and has made wastewater management a 
more problematic and expensive endeavor.   
Haphazard regional planning and lax environmental programs have exacerbated 
the constraints nature has imposed. Since the end of the Second World War, Atlanta‘s 
civic leaders have pushed for dams and reservoirs to impound the Chattahoochee‘s 
meager flows while at the same time engaging in policies that seemingly encouraged 
decentralized population growth and proliferate water consumption. For example, the 
average water customer for the City of Atlanta, who may reside anywhere within the 
city‘s 650 square mile service area, consumes 168 gallons per day while the average 
American uses between 80 to 100 gallons per day. Meanwhile, Atlanta continued to 
dump millions of gallons of untreated municipal sewage into its local waterways because 
it consistently delayed making necessary improvements to its wastewater system, which 
has prompted federal and state regulatory agencies to levy nearly $20 million dollars in 
fines against the city and repeatedly threaten it with construction moratoriums.
4
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 Metropolitan North Georgia Water Planning District. Water Supply and Water Conservation Management 
Plan (Atlanta, May 2009), Table 3-2, p. 3-7, 
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This combination of aggressive water use and persistent pollution ultimately led 
downstream water users and environmental activists to seek court action to force the city 
to confront the external costs of its lumbering approach to metropolitan development. In 
1990, the states of Alabama and Florida, fearful that Atlanta‘s great thirst would severely 
affect their own economic well-being, initiated more than twenty years of litigation to 
decide whether metro Atlantans have the right to withdraw increased amounts of water 
from the federally-operated Buford Dam for purposes of water supply. And though a 
recent appellate court decision determined that water supply is an authorized purpose of 
the dam, and thereby overturned a previous ruling that threatened to reduce withdrawal 
amounts to mid-1970s levels and potentially halt future growth, the three-judge panel 
instructed the Corps of Engineers to define how much water can be allocated for supply 
purposes. Meanwhile, Alabama and Florida vowed to challenge this decision before the 
U.S. Supreme Court. In a separate case, citizen activists successfully sued the City of 
Atlanta in 1995 for its failure to meet federal and state water pollution control standards. 
The resulting Consent Decree, which was signed by the City of Atlanta in 1998, 
committed the city to an accelerated program of activities designed to further improve 
water quality in metro Atlanta streams and rivers. Consequently, Atlanta citizens are 
currently paying the highest water and sewage rates in the country in order to resolve 
more than a generation of environmental neglect.
5
 Clearly, the issue is not simply the 
amount of rain that falls from the sky, but how that amount has been managed over time.      
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PURPOSE OF STUDY 
This dissertation explores the challenges Atlanta‘s public officials, engineers, and 
activists faced in planning and implementing an effective environmental policy, with 
particular emphasis placed on the era of post-World War II metropolitan development. 
Specifically, it focuses on historical efforts to achieve the comprehensive management of 
the area‘s water resources, the technological systems adopted and solutions proposed, and 
the political and social milieu that facilitated or hampered these endeavors.    
At its heart, the dissertation asks two fundamental questions: 1) How adequately 
can urban leaders plan for metropolitan growth and its resource requirements?; and 2) 
Can the participating institutions engage in long-term environmental management and 
still remain responsive to a seemingly atomistic public?  Offering detailed analysis of 
four illustrative episodes in the history of Atlanta‘s post-war development, this 
dissertation demonstrates that comprehensive water resources management was a 
neglected and delayed policy approach that was undertaken only under overt threat of 
federal intervention. It argues that although the area‘s regional planning body, the Atlanta 
Regional Commission, advocated for intergovernmental cooperation with respect to 
managing Metropolitan Atlanta‘s total water needs, these calls were undermined at 
various times by fragmented local governance, timid political leadership, and a largely 
indifferent public. It further suggests that Atlanta‘s water supply managers, through 
increases in the scale and scope of their operations and a reluctance to increase customer 
rates, facilitated and encouraged greater water consumption, which, in turn, placed 
intense burdens on both the natural hydraulic cycle and the city‘s wastewater facilities. 
                                                                                                                                                              
city, San Francisco, pays about $116 per month.  See Miami-Dade Water and Sewer Department. ―Rate 
Comparison,‖  http://www.metro-dade.com/wasd/rate-compare.asp.  (accessed September 8, 2011). 
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Lastly, it argues the citizen activists as well as state and federal regulators have utilized 
the federal court system as a blunt planning instrument when Atlanta‘s leaders displayed 
their seeming incapacity to handle the environmental strains of uncoordinated 
metropolitan development.  
 
SCHOLARLY CONTRIBUTIONS 
By exploring Atlanta‘s response to a number of water-related problems, this 
dissertation broadens our understanding of technology in the urban environment in two 
important ways.  First, by focusing on what historian Richard White calls ―the everyday 
consequences of environmental change induced by humans,‖ it seeks to provoke 
reconsideration of seemingly mundane but interrelated water and land-use policies and 
practices that have threatened to derail the city‘s economic development. Second, it will 
provide insights into how federal water pollution control programs strengthened the 
mandates of embryonic state regulatory agencies, empowered local environmental 




RELEVANT BACKGROUND MATERIAL 
Well before Atlanta‘s public officials attempted to define a coherent water policy, 
its earliest residents were cognizant of the advantages and disadvantages of their natural 
environment. Nestled within the favorable elevations of the Appalachian piedmont, the 
area enjoyed an abundant amount of annual rainfall. In addition, not only did the rolling 
hills present a picturesque landscape but the swiftly moving streams that careened 
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through the area‘s narrow valleys and fed the Chattahoochee River showcased a latent 
industrial potential as well. As cotton production spread into the interior of the state, 
enterprising men set about constructing dams, raceways, and equipment to harness the 
power of water and establish a regional textile industry.  
And while the tumbling topography allowed for the marriage of cotton production 
and cotton manufacturing, the crystalline bedrock that under-girded the region also meant 
that trade routes were circumscribed. Few roads existed over the hilly terrain and the 
Chattahoochee River remained virtually un-navigable due to the visible rock 
outcroppings above the Fall Line, the geographic region of Georgia where the Piedmont‘s 
crystalline bedrock meets the Coastal Plain‘s unconsolidated sedimentary rock. After 
proposals to connect Georgia to Western trade routes via a system of canals were deemed 
impractical, a state-financed railroad network facilitated access to the distant markets that 
water-bound traffic could not. People, like goods, began to ride the rails into the 
burgeoning distribution center and many settled permanently. Although little more than a 
depot and a few crude structures in the 1840s, Atlanta‘s population climbed steadily, 
reaching just under 8,000 by the dawn of Civil War.  
 
Municipal Water Supply 
As population densities increased, springs, wells, & cisterns proved to be 
insufficient sources of water for what was becoming the regional shipping center of the 
post-Civil War South. Local residents were chastened by Sherman‘s recent torching and 
fearful of being struck by the water-borne diseases plaguing other southern cities. They 
reacted in 1870 by authorizing the City of Atlanta to finance and construct a municipal 
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water works. But this 2 million gallons per day (MGD) water supply station, located on 
the headwaters of the South River, some five miles south of downtown Atlanta, was a 
virtual stillborn. From the outset it lacked the necessary pressure to perform even its 
intended functions, namely fire protection and street and sewer cleansing for the business 
district. Moreover, because the city‘s natural drainage courses were little more than open 
sewers that emptied rain washings into the system‘s reservoir, the South River facility‘s 
untreated water supply output was considered undrinkable by the 1870s. Similarly, an 
artesian well, bored in 1884 to supplement the South River system, was quickly declared 
unsafe by the local board of health because the city chemist found that surface drainage 
had also contaminated the well.
7
 
Until city officials followed the recommendation of noted sanitary engineer 
Rudolph Hering and chose the Chattahoochee River as the source of supply in the early-
1890s, Atlantans lacked a centralized system to provide its citizens with potable water. 
Completed in 1893, the new system had a 20 MGD capacity and was composed of two 
interconnected complexes. Water was withdrawn, roughly six miles above downtown 
Atlanta, at the Chattahoochee River Intake and Pumping Station and thrust uphill through 
a 30 inch main to a 176 million gallon reservoir at the Hemphill Water Treatment Plant. 
The raw water was then sent through settling basins and mechanical filters before 
ultimately entering the distribution system for public consumption.  
Despite having both the largest reservoir in the South and the best filtering 
technology available at the time, the Atlanta Water Works‘ (AWW) production of 
potable water could barely keep pace with the city‘s skyrocketing population and 
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 John Ellis and Stuart Galishoff, ―Atlanta‘s Water Supply, 1865-1918‖ The Maryland Historian 8 no1 
(Spring 1977): 6-8.  
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demands for ever-cleaner water.  Coagulating basins and chlorination were soon added to 
further enhance quality. A second reservoir was constructed by 1923, making the 
capacity of the two reservoirs 500 million gallons, and treated capacity at Hemphill was 
increased to 62 MGD. After a third major expansion initiated in 1941 was completed, 
total system capacity reached 72 MGD. 
In 1952, the City of Atlanta initiated its ―Plan of Improvement,‖ a massive 
overhaul of county and city government functions that resulted in the city increasing in 
size from 36 to 118 square miles and gaining an estimated 100, 000 new citizens. In an 
effort to meet the immediate and future water needs of the newly annexed areas, the 
AWW embarked upon a 10-year program of expansion that rivaled any in the country. 
Divided into two, five-year periods, the program was to cost one million dollars per year. 
Aimed at establishing a 600 square mile service area by the mid-1960s, plans called for 
distribution piping extensions, additional storage tanks, and the construction of an 
additional treatment facility near the Chattahoochee River. Upon the completion of the 
Chattahoochee Water Treatment Plant in 1960, Atlanta became the only city in the nation 
to have two, independently operating water systems.
8
 
Furthermore, throughout the early 1950s, city leaders and the cadre of engineers 
at the helm of the AWW pushed for federal construction of Buford Dam and Lake Lanier 
as an impoundment to regulate the flow of the Chattahoochee River and assure sufficient 
water for the city at all times. With this supply secured just prior to the onset of Sun Belt 
development, the AWW fashioned itself into a wholesale supplier of treated water to a 
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Water System‖ (1975), 13-14 (herafter cited as AWW, ―A Century of Progress); ― Two Water Systems for 




burgeoning metro population. In fact, by 2007, when the entire Atlanta metropolitan 
region topped the 5 million-person mark and the City of Atlanta‘s population remained 
below 500,000, the AWW‘s system alone had grown to a rated capacity of over 200 
MDG, which equaled over one-third of the entire water withdrawn daily from the 
Chattahoochee.
9
 These developments, without a doubt, aggravated decades-old tensions 
between Georgia, Alabama, and Florida about how the river‘s water should be allocated 
for the benefit of all. 
 
Wastewater Systems 
If Atlanta‘s water suppliers were hard-pressed to stay ahead of population growth 
curves, its sewer service providers may have had it doubly hard. Unlike the revenue-
generating water supply system, sewers are generally considered an obligation. Whereas 
the water supply system appears to have been a major element in accommodating and 
anticipating Atlanta‘s explosive growth, construction of wastewater treatment facilities 
seems to have been sluggishly reactive and have repeatedly threatened to derail further 
economic development. Secondly, and again in contrast to water supply, the problems of 
wastewater treatment were not confined to increases in scale and the refinement of 
technique. Instead, they have been continually redefined as our understanding of 
environmental processes has changed and have thus required Atlanta‘s policymakers to 
make hard choices about their reliance on accepted theories as well as the efficacy of 
particular capital intensive technologies. These debates were often centered on whether to 
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 ―Atlanta Growth Tops in Nation‖ AJC, 5 April, 10 November 2007. This figure does not include the 90 
million gallons per day (MGD) capacity of the Atlanta-Fulton County Treatment Plant, which is jointly 
owned by the city and county but operated by the City of Atlanta. 
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utilize combined versus separate sewers, to dilute or treat increased amounts of sewage, 
to pursue lofty goals of ―zero‖ pollution discharges, or how to address the growing 
concern over non-point sources of pollution.
10
             
Although Atlanta was certainly not alone in confronting these major dilemmas, its 
history remains instructive. Atlanta‘s sewerage system lacked anything approaching 
coherence until the late 1890s, despite the increased amounts of water entering and 
exiting homes after the first municipal water supply was established. Adopted in an 
atmosphere of southern fiscal conservatism, local leaders chose the wastewater system as 
a means to shift household and street pollution to outlying watercourses and to delay 
treatment until future population growth required it. 
 The needed changes came sooner that anyone anticipated. Not only was the 
population swelling, but local watercourses, due to the city‘s uneven topography, did not 
always contain the volume necessary to dilute the increased sewage amounts. Under 
mounting pressure from the business community and the local press to address the 
unsanitary conditions, city leaders in 1910 authorized the construction of three 
wastewater treatment plants—which were completed in 1916 with a total combined 
treatment capacity of 16 MGD—and the extension of trunk lines and interceptor sewers. 
 Despite periodic infusions of federal money, most notably in the mid-1930s and 
again during the 1970s, the Chattahoochee River and other metro waterways had become, 
by the last decades of the twentieth century, a stinking reminder of Atlanta‘s failed water 
pollution control policies. Years of unchecked phosphate discharges, excessive sewer 
overflows, and numerous other federal water quality violations led local activists, the 
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Environmental Protection Agency, and the Georgia Environmental Protection Division to 
jointly file suit against the City of Atlanta in 1995. The resulting Consent Decree, which 
was signed later that year, prompted the city of Atlanta to undertake a massive sewer 
improvement program estimated to cost nearly $4 billion. 
 What is, perhaps, most striking about Atlanta‘s history of water resources 
management is that the city ostensibly had a chance to enjoy a ―free lunch‖ of the 
previous experiences and problems of other older urban areas. New technologies were 
certainly utilized. For example, Atlanta‘s early adoption of Hyatt-type filters, a settled 
solids facility, and Imhoff tanks between 1912 and 1916 were some of the first large scale 
applications of these technologies in the country. But the range of technologies 
employed, most of which are complex in their detail but simple in their essence, could 
not be the only solution to its water woes.  Some techniques and practices were clearly 
beneficial, while others inevitably created larger problems. Atlanta, for various reasons to 
be explored, painted itself into the proverbial corner with respect to environmental policy. 
The principal task of this dissertation is to analyze the policies that contributed to this 
situation.    
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
As previously stated, the way in which the natural environment and technology 
have factored into Atlanta‘s metropolitan development is a theme that has been largely 
under-examined by historians. This is not to suggest that land and water should be 
considered the primary catalysts for the region‘s overall development, but it is important 
that they be brought to the fore and analyzed. Although this work might be of interest to 
13 
 
researchers in tangential disciplines, it will be primarily drawn from and directed to 
historians interested in technology and the urban environment. This sub-field of history, 
which has coalesced after decades of individualized works, has tremendously enriched 
our understanding of the reciprocal relationship between the built and natural 




 Because technological and environmental problems must be understood in the 
context of related urban concerns, it is important to recognize several outstanding 
interpretive histories of Atlanta and how the proposed study builds upon but shall 
ultimately depart from them.
12
  For instance, Don Doyle‘s outstanding comparative study 
of ―the city-building process‖ of nineteenth-century Atlanta, Nashville, Charleston, and 
Mobile, like Michael Russell‘s Atlanta, 1847-1890, recognizes the presence of a growth-
oriented business class as a defining element in Atlanta‘s post-Civil War success. In 
Doyle‘s view, Atlanta‘s merchants, industrialists, financiers, and newsmen stressed 
integration with the national economy and endeavored to create local institutions to 
achieve those ends. But whereas Russell emphasizes the considerable continuities 
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between the Old South and New, Doyle takes a different tack.
13
 He suggests that 
Atlanta‘s business class adopted a particular set of attitudes and practices, predicated on 
seeing the Civil War as a challenge to overcome, that ―strengthened the city‘s role as the 
gateway of the South.‖
14
      
Despite Doyle and Russell‘s assertion that Atlanta‘s commercial elites understood 
that regional success depended, in part, on a measure of racial progress, the authors also 
demonstrate that ―the spirit of self-sacrifice‖ was only minimally extended to the city‘s 
African American population. And by illustrating that Atlanta‘s antebellum racial caste 
system was reified in public service and housing patterns of the period, Doyle and 
Russell anticipate themes explored more thoroughly by historians Ronald Bayor and 
Kevin Kruse.   
Interested in dissecting the phenomena of prejudice and discrimination in urban 
public policy, Bayor analyzes race as the key variable in Atlanta‘s twentieth century 
development. He argues that although boosters labeled Atlanta as a ―city too busy to 
hate,‖ rigid racial attitudes overwhelmingly affected the contours of urban development. 
Atlanta‘s settlement patterns, housing and employment opportunities, health care and 
recreational facilities, and city services such as police, fire protection, and mass transit 
were all tainted by racial biases. Similarly, Kevin Kruse‘s White Flight: Atlanta and the 
Making of Modern Conservativism, attempts to explode the myth of Atlanta‘s racial 
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moderation by showing how outright attempts to derail the Civil Rights movement were 
later reconstituted into subtler forms of discrimination such as suburban exclusion, tax 
revolts, school vouchers, and privatization of public services.
15
     
While these monographs have much to teach us about the ways in which 
collective entrepreneurship and racial prejudice informed the city building process, urban 
infrastructure remains a secondary concern. As a result, the built environment— the 
synthesizing of technologies and the physical environment and the methods by which 
these take place—remains in the black box. Although various communities are shown to 
have utilized transit systems or street configurations for purposes of commercial 
development and/or racial exclusion, for the authors in question, it seems urban 
technologies are simply available to be deployed.  Absent from their analysis are the 
messy compromises that normally appear in initial phases of design and application. 
Technological policy, much like environmental impact, requires sustained analysis, 
which this proposed study intends to provide. 
Historian Stuart Galishoff tries to strike that elusive balance between urban 
boosterism, racial politics, public health, and technology. He argues that efforts to secure 
municipal water supply and wastewater systems in Progressive-era Atlanta were 
motivated by amalgamated desires: to avoid water-borne diseases; to shield the business 
and residential districts from conflagration; and to protect the city‘s reputation for 
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salubrity. Galishoff notes that Atlanta‘s black population, lacking easy access to the 
municipal water supply and living in the lowest, most-poorly drained sections of the city, 
had mortality rates nearly 70 percent higher than their white counterparts. Public officials 
extended water and sanitary lines into the black community, he insists, only after the slow 
realization that ―germs know no color line,‖ i.e., the potential for black domestics to bring 
diseases into white homes.
16
   
Although Galishoff‘s studies focus almost exclusively on Atlanta‘s political and 
commercial elite, and depict a seemingly static environment, he nonetheless joins a 
growing community of scholars who center attention on technology in the urban setting. 
Many researchers highlight issues involving urban planning and urban ecology; some 
provide insights into ongoing public health and pollution concerns. Still others analyze 
the evolving connections between cities and their hinterlands.     
As to the first set of themes—urban planning and ecology—numerous scholars, 
after noting the ways in which cities seemingly inhale/intake, transform and consume, 
and then exhale/exhaust resources, have flirted with treating urban areas as natural 
organic systems. But as historian Martin Melosi notes, this approach is potentially 
constraining. On the one hand it highlights issues of rational functioning and 
reorganization of resources, but on the other it often casts the natural environment as a 
fixed backdrop to human activity. He suggests, rather, that we view cities as ―open 
systems,‖ which exhibit the complex interplay between human society and the outside 
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world. This analytical method, he contends, better equips us to recognize the animating 
forces in the growth and development of cities.
17
  
Analyzing cities in terms of evolving open systems also illuminates the extent to 
which human agents consciously manipulate the spaces and materials surrounding them, 
and how those early technological decisions may constraint future options. Urban 
planning and engineering practices are necessarily large factors in these activities. 
Thomas Hughes has been the preeminent advocate of this approach. Although best 
known for his work on electric utility networks, his numerous publications on large 
technical systems have contributed to our understanding of how engineers, managers, and 
politicians integrated technological, scientific, economic, and social criteria into the 
―seamless web‖ of urban infrastructure. Similarly, Martin Melosi‘s synthesis, The 
Sanitary City, chronicles the way in which changes in disease theory brought about new 
environmental paradigms and consequently re-shaped the ways in which physicians, 
politicians, and engineers grappled with water, wastewater and garbage collection 
systems in American cities.
18
 
With respect to urban planning and infrastructure, water supply systems have 
drawn the most attention. This is because urban residents and industries need water to 
survive, and securing this resource has required the use of increasingly larger 
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 Nelson M. Blake‘s Water for the Cities was a pioneering work 
in this field.  Published in 1956, well before the Hughesian systems outlook gained 
academic traction, he examined the issues New York, Philadelphia, Boston, and 
Baltimore overcame to establish reliable water supplies. And though successive 
generations of monographs and case studies added depth to Blake‘s comparisons, his 
narration of public versus private ownership controversies, fear of epidemics and fire, and 
partisan politics is one of inestimable value.
20
 
Two of Blake‘s most noteworthy successors are Norris M. Hundley and Sara 
Elkind.  Hundley‘s The Great Thirst is perhaps the quintessential discussion of the 
myriad motivations and ways by which Californians obtained water for purposes of urban 
water supply and agricultural irrigation. Eschewing Donald Worster‘s Marxian overtones 
of conquest and of ―hydraulic empires‖ created simply for the benefit of the propertied 
elites, Hundley instead emphasizes mediation and consensus. He argues that although 
California‘s water projects were constructed by the state, they were also embraced by 
most citizens because they offered a chance at greater economic prosperity and a better 
life for all through the redistribution of water from places of abundance to places of 
scarcity.
21
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Likewise, in her comparisons of ―the Battle for Resources in Boston and 
Oakland,‖ Sara Elkind shows how these two areas enthusiastically embraced special 
metropolitan districts during the Progressive period to ensure the regional management of 
both their water supply and wastewater systems. She convincingly argues that although 
each city moved toward these institutions for different reasons—urban sewage in Boston 
and unreliable water sources in Oakland—both, in time, chafed under these political 
decisions because of diminished local control and persistent environmental concerns.
22
   
While both of the above authors privilege decisions made by political and civic 
leaders, each demonstrates how technological choices can lead to unforeseen 
environmental dilemmas. Historian Joel Tarr has arrived at similar conclusions in his 
groundbreaking investigations of urban sewer technologies and the sanitary engineers 
who designed them. For instance, he has shown that the adoption of municipal water 
supplies during the nineteenth century overwhelmed the capacity of privy vaults, which 
in turn led city engineers to construct water-carriage systems that ultimately deposited 
untreated sewage into distant streams for dilution. Suggesting that benign environmental 
results may be possible, Joann Abel Goldman splits the difference between Tarr‘s experts 
on the one hand and Hundley and Elkind‘s political machinations on the other. Her 
analysis of ―mechanisms of management,‖ i.e., municipal financing capabilities, 
professional engineers, and political institutions, help explain how New York City‘s 
                                                     
22
 Sara S. Elkind, Bay Cities and Water Politics: The Battle for Resources in Boston and Oakland 




sewers grew from patchwork efforts to a centralized system operated and controlled by 
professional sanitarians/engineers rather than popularly elected officials.
23
      
Despite minimal treatment of both the urban environment and water 
infrastructure, there is one last set of scholars whose works should be recognized for the 
influence they have had on my own thinking about Atlanta. William Cronon‘s Nature 
Metropolis explores the interconnections between city and countryside and how 
commodities of Chicago‘s hinterland—grain, lumber, and beef—were transported to the 
city for processing and shipment to other distant markets. Cronon argues that 
technologies that made such activities possible transformed ―first nature‖ into ―second 
nature‖ and thereby obscured, for most urbanites, the reciprocal relationship that the city 
has with its countryside.
24
   
Adam Rome‘s The Bulldozer in the Countryside also analyzes consumptive 
patterns, but in a slightly different way. Rome takes aim at the environmental 
consequences of post-WWII affluence: how suburban sanitary technologies (septic tanks) 
and land-use and housing patterns (electrically heated and cooled homes, bulldozed 
landscapes) caused groundwater and stream pollution, soil erosion, and loss of animal life 
and habitat. Anticipating an ostensibly inexorable desire for Americans to move from the 
confines of the city, residential developers, he argues, ignored environmental 
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considerations in favor of single-family dwellings that utilized highways, open spaces, 
and copious amounts of natural resources. But, as Rome demonstrates, these actions 
spawned a new environment ethic that was promoted by the most unlikely partners, 
namely government agencies and suburban residents. In doing so, Rome adds a wrinkle 
to the historiographic fabric that suggests that the environmental movement was simply 
the result of urbanites taking progressive steps toward cleaning up their either own 
backyards or protecting untrammeled ―wilderness‖ landscapes.
25
   
 
ORGANIZATION OF STUDY, SOURCES, & METHODOLOGY 
  This dissertation is concerned with broadly defined issues of political economy, 
particularly the role of local and federal institutions in shaping urban environmental 
policy and technology. To address these issues, it bases its analysis around four 
representative periods: 1) the city‘s regional development plans of the 1950s and 1960s 
that included the construction of Buford Dam and the water supply expansion programs 
contained within the annexation program known as the ―Plan of Improvement‖; 2) the 
federally-financed Three Rivers Water Quality Management Program, which began in 
1972 and was completed in 1985, and was designed to return treated wastewater back to 
the Chattahoochee River; 3) the public backlash and legal actions of the 1980s and 1990s 
directed at ending the city‘s repeated violations of federal water quality standards; 4) 
ongoing legal disputes, dating back to the mid-1960s, between Georgia, Alabama, and 
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Florida, over whether metropolitan Atlanta‘s increased size and daily water withdraws 
have deprived its downstream neighbors of their rights to the waters of the Chattahoochee 
River.       
The study is composed of an introduction, five chapters, and a conclusion. These 
sections are arranged chrono-thematically for full coverage of the respective water supply 
and wastewater issues but do contain some significant temporal overlap. The introductory 
and concluding chapters are used for discussions of historiographical and thematic 




As a work that explores the nexus between political organizations, technical 
experts, and civic activists, this dissertation draws heavily on archived, primary sources 
in addition to secondary literature and local newspaper accounts. These former sources 
include federal, state, and city agency correspondence and policy statements, individual 
manuscript collections, relevant organization documents, engineering reports, operation 
and maintenance manuals, and city department records.   
 Following the Introduction that presents the thesis and relevant literature, 
Chapter One provides a sweeping summary of Atlanta‘s development up to the First 
World War. Synthesizing literature from geology, climatology, and other physical 
sciences, it explains the natural processes and transformations that pre-dated human 
settlement in the region in order to create a context for understanding the environmental 
opportunities and constraints that would later affect the region‘s inhabitants. This chapter 
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also includes an examination of the differing worldviews of Native American and white 
settlers and how each group related to the region‘s water resources by drawing upon both 
ethno-historical scholarship as well as existing primary evidence. Lastly, it details 
Atlanta‘s transition from decentralized and rudimentary water and wastewater systems to 




In addition to its use of relevant secondary literature, this chapter uses various 
primary sources located at the Atlanta History Center (AHC). In particular, the journal 
entries and manuscripts from Samuel P. Richards and Sarah Huff‘s respective archival 
collections offer first-hand accounts of Atlanta‘s transformation from a rural hamlet 
whose water was supplied by wells and springs to a bustling town that required municipal 
water and sewer services.  
   Chapter Two focuses on the city‘s mid-twentieth century attempts to reconcile 
the limited supplies of a natural watershed with the ambitions of a regional metropolis. 
As the region entered the post-war years, local residents recognized that the natural flow 
of the Chattahoochee River was insufficient to meet the demands of a growing 
population. Eager to foster economic development, the region‘s political and civic leaders 
lobbied for the construction of the federally-financed Buford Dam in order to secure 
needed water supplies. At the same time, however, Atlanta‘s politicians, planners, and 
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business community showed their determination to solidify their city‘s position as the 
premier urban center of the southeastern United States. To that end they developed plans 
whereby Atlanta could both triple its corporate size by annexing its unincorporated 
suburban fringe and serve as an anchor for future metropolitan development.  
Chapter Two includes material that was obtained from a variety of repositories 
and is both technical and political in content. The civil and environmental engineering 
firm of Wiedeman and Singleton (W&S), which served as the consulting firm for the City 
of Atlanta for most of the twentieth century, has provided this researcher with access to 
its entire inventory of reports and drawings. The Atlanta History Center also contains 
primary materials to be used for Chapter Two. Among them are nine reports, published 
by the Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC) between 1952 and 1973, dealing with 
regional water and land use planning. Virtually every Comprehensive Development 
Report written by consulting engineers and executed by municipal engineers for Atlanta 
is based upon demographic projections created by the ARC, the first publicly-supported, 
multi-county planning agency in the United States. A bevy of Annual Reports created by 
the Atlanta Water Works are also used. Published and distributed to the public between 
the years 1952 and 1973, these pamphlets, which contained the mantra ―Atlanta Grows 
Where Water Goes,‖ help to link the technical dynamics of the water supply system to 
the political and economic context of Atlanta‘s metropolitan growth. These public 
relations reports will be supplemented by documents from the manuscript collection of 
former Atlanta mayor William Hartsfield, which are located in the Emory University 
Library Special Collection division.  Selected inaugural speeches and correspondence 
demonstrate that Hartsfield, who oversaw the 1952 annexations and championed federal 
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construction of Buford Dam and Lake Lanier, was a vocal advocate of regional 
development that vigorously supported AWW extension plans.  
   Chapter Three explores Atlanta‘s fitful efforts to address its water pollution 
problems. It emphasizes the preponderant role of federal and state regulatory agencies in 
pressuring the City of Atlanta to make improvements to its wastewater treatment system, 
which culminated in completion of the federally-financed Three Rivers Water Quality 
Management Program.  Initiated after passage of the Water Pollution Control Act of 
1972, this project was aimed at diminishing discharges in three small waterways located 
southeast of Atlanta and reducing pollution levels entering the Chattahoochee River. 
Ambitious in scale, it called for conveying better treated effluent back across the Eastern 
Continental Divide via a tunnel, ten feet in diameter, and dumping it into the larger 
Chattahoochee River, the water course from which it was originally drawn.
28
   
Informed by Adam Rome‘s analysis of how certain federal agencies put 
environmental concerns on the public agenda, this chapter follows the activities of 
various state agencies, such as the Georgia Water Quality Control Board, before the 
establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Clean Water Act. 
It therefore illuminates the difficulties that state agencies and commissions had, prior to 
federal intervention, in compelling cities such as Atlanta to abate water pollution. 
Furthermore, by examining the new communication and coordination that was created 
between state and federal bodies, it suggests that state-directed initiatives were the 
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primary instruments by which the federal government initially advanced a new 
environmental paradigm.       
Chapter Three also makes use of reports, official correspondence, and public 
statements produced by a wide range of agencies and individuals concerned with water 
pollution control.  Dating as far back as the late-1950s, these records help demonstrate a 
level of communication on the federal, state, & city level that often goes unnoticed. 
Among the approximately thirty records groups reviewed at the Georgia State Archives 
that pertain to water quality, the researcher has focused upon activities and reports of: the 
Georgia Water Quality Control Council (1959-1971); the Georgia Department of Natural 
Resources, Environmental Protection Division, Water Quality Control Section; (1972 and 
beyond); Interstate Conference on Water Problems (1980-1983), and the federal Water 
Resources Council (1965-1983). 
The City of Atlanta‘s Department of Watershed Management, Wastewater 
Facilities Design Group, has made available thirty-eight reports, dating back to 1965, on 
water pollution in metro Atlanta.  Of those, eight specifically concern the original intent 
and subsequent design changes for the Atlanta Three Rivers Project. Similarly, five 
separate technical studies, published by the Atlanta Regional Commission between 1952 
and 1969, focus on the problems of water pollution and convey the importance of 
sustained coordinated and sustained regional planning. 
Water pollution control is also the guiding theme of Chapter Four, which 
focuses attention upon environmental activism that surrounded the city‘s problematic 
attempts to reduce the pollution caused by its Combined Sewer Overflows (CSOs) and 
phosphate discharges. For years, the Atlanta‘s CSOs released millions of gallons of 
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sewage, street runoff, and other chemicals into the Chattahoochee and other local 
waterways during periods of heavy rainfall, racking up millions of dollars in fines. Local 
activists organized and were joined by state and federal environmental agencies in filing 
suit to force the city to sign Consent Decrees in order to accelerate court-ordered 
pollution abatement plans.   
This chapter will also broach the subject of environmentalism in a post-civil rights 
southern city and will engage the literature on the rise of suburbia and racial politics. 
Although ostensibly a story of persistent and successful activism in the face of 
environmental degradation, this section examines how issues of race and class became a 
complicating feature in determining the most appropriate pollution control technology. 
Due to the culmination of these events, Chapter Four blends media commentary 
with primary sources derived from court proceedings as well as City of Atlanta 
engineering reports and Department of Watershed Management program updates. For 
example, former Georgia Tech president G. Wayne Clough, who chaired Mayor Shirley 
Franklin‘s ―Clean Water Advisory Panel,‖ provided a large portion of the primary 
documents that will inform much of the analysis in Chapter Four.  Dr. Clough offered the 
researcher complete access to the documents, reports, transcripts, and presentations that 
the panel considered for its CSO Remedial Measures recommendations. This task force 
not only reviewed various CSO remedial options but also held public hearings in which 
opponents of the city‘s environmental policies were given a forum to air grievances and 
propose alternative solutions 
 While retaining focus on the role of federal courts as de facto planning 
instruments, Chapter Five returns readers to regional water supply issues that have 
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become known as the Tri-State Water Wars. As the metro population quickly swelled in 
the post-war years, Atlanta water providers and the Atlanta Regional Commission 
worked with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to secure greater amounts of water from 
Buford Dam. In 1989 the Corps recommended that some of the water stored in Lake 
Lanier for hydropower use be reallocated for water supply. The following year Alabama 
and Florida filed suit contending that Buford Dam was authorized solely for purposes of 
hydroelectric power, flood control, and navigation, which prompted a two-decade long 
legal imbroglio that threatened to reduce metropolitan Atlanta‘s access to this regulated 
water supply.  
While Chapter Five narrates much of the Tri-State Water Wars through extensive 
use of Atlanta‘s major daily newspaper, the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, it also delves 
into the origins of the dispute by using a series of ―Regional Water Use Plans‖ prepared 
by the Atlanta Regional Commission from 1972-1997. Among other things, these 
documents show the Commission working collaboratively with the Corps to create a 
long-term water supply plan to provide adequate water supplies for projected population 
increases while at the same time unsuccessfully attempting to implement water 
conservation programs among the local water-providing government. In addition, this 
chapter relies on the work of legal scholars as well as published court decisions in order 
to synthesize and explain the various theories, laws, and policies that have animated the 
inter-state litigation.  
 The dissertation‘s Conclusion presents a re-evaluation of the historical themes in 
light of the evidence offered and assesses recent developments toward achieving 




DRAWING WATER FROM ROCK: WATER RESOURCES AND EARLY 
SETTLEMENT IN THE ATLANTA REGION 
 
 
Human history is not acted out in a vacuum but against the background of an 




Within any human society, the cultural and the physical environments interact, a process 




During the mid-1880s, Atlanta officials concerned with providing adequate 
sources of drinking water commissioned an independent contractor to bore an artesian 
well in the downtown area of the city. Completed in 1884 and reaching a depth of 2,044 
feet, this second installation of the municipally owned water supply system was capable 
of yielding two hundred thousand gallons per day through six-and-a-half miles of 
distribution pipes. Yet, within three short years the strains of continued population 
growth and fears of ground water contamination prompted city leaders to abandon the 
city‘s well and auxiliary supply source, the South River, for the more plentiful and clearer 
waters of the Chattahoochee River.
3
 
Although an upstart city of perhaps no more than 30,000 people, Atlanta had 
nonetheless crossed an environmental threshold that indicated the difficulties of 
sustaining an expanding population in an area with limited water supplies. This chapter 
steps back in time to uncover the geological forces that shaped the physical environment 
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upon which Atlanta now rests and offers insights into the ways its earliest settlers 
conceived of and interacted with the natural environment. For the groups that established 
communities within this region, water was not simply a matter of biological necessity but 
also proved to be socially and economically nourishing as well. For instance, Native 
Americans established settlements along rich alluvial plains and conjured myths about 
river ways that articulated a highly integrated involvement with the environment. Early 
white settlers, who generally viewed the natural world in a more hierarchical fashion, 
utilized natural springs, dug wells, and built cisterns but also devised more sophisticated 
technologies related to the relative presence or absence of water to address greater 
economic development and public health issues. In exploring Atlanta‘s early 
development, this chapter offers insights into the complex mingling of Atlanta‘s pre-
human landscape with social and economic systems of resource exploitation and provides 
some context for understanding ensuing difficulties of water resource management. 
 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF ATLANTA‘S GEOLOGIC TIME 
Operators who drilled the artesian well near downtown Atlanta in 1884 probably 
cared little about how or why the Piedmont rock they encountered came to be. They 
simply understood that the municipal supply from the nearby South River was 
unsatisfactory and that a steam engine could help them secure the requisite amounts of 
water. But the rocks lying beneath Georgia are like a history book, narrating the timing 
and events that have led to the geological present. Learning to read that terrestrial 
alphabet is what the science of geology is all about. The crystalline material that the drill 
perforated was perhaps more than 500 million years old, dating back to the Proterozoic 
31 
 
Eon when there was but one supercontinent on Earth. Taking time to reflect on the 
geological forces that created that bedrock enlightens us to why the metro Atlanta area 




  The Georgia terrain is the product of a spectacular series of natural developments 
that were no less brutal in their effects than they were unhurried in their culmination. The 
Appalachian Mountains and the Piedmont and Coastal Plains provinces that lay within 
Georgia evolved through a series of accordion-like motions of the Earth‘s crust that 
began about 480 million years ago. Over time, oceans opened and closed as massive 
lithospheric plates crashed together, were pulled apart, or sideswiped one another like 
cars in a demolition derby. Periodically, the future southeastern portion of North America 
was overtaken by shallow seas, existed as volcanic islands, and at times displayed 
towering peaks not unlike the present Himalayan Alps.
5
  As writer John McPhee 
explains, ―The rocks not only had been compressed like a carpet shoved across the floor 
but in places had been squeezed and shoved until folds tumbled forward into recumbent 
positions. Some folds had been broken. Some entire regions had been picked up and 
thrust many miles northwest.‖
6
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The plate collisions, faulting, and varying degrees of rock consolidation that they 
produced have had a profound impact on Georgia‘s available water resources. Surface 
water provides approximately 78 percent of the total freshwater used throughout the state. 
But Georgia‘s surface hydrology is somewhat unique in that runoff from the Blue Ridge 
Mountains (situated in Georgia‘s northeastern corner) and upper Piedmont forms most of 
the rivers providing that water.
7
  Identifying the headwaters and following the course of 
Georgia‘s most important waterway, the Chattahoochee River, provides further insight 
into the importance of geologic factors. 
The crystalline rocks that were thrust skyward during the mountain-building 
period enjoy higher levels of precipitation. Geologists estimate that, of these sixty or so 
inches of annual rainfall, only about ten percent is absorbed into the groundwater regime. 
Driven by gravity, the water seeks pores in which it can move to lower elevations. This 
infiltrating water confronts the bedrock of the Blue Ridge Mountains, which contains 
little pore space and has very low permeability. These igneous and metamorphic rocks 
are broken by cracks, fissures, and faults that allow the water molecules to continue their 
journey, albeit in much a lower quantity and at a much slower pace. As pressure to find 
egress builds the water eventually spreads laterally until it intersects land surfaces where 
erosion or some other disturbance has lowered the topography to the water's level. 
Canyon springs often serve as these outlets.
8
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Figure 1.1 – Georgia‘s Geologic Provinces. (Source: William J. Frazier, ―Georgia 
Geologic Regions.‖ The New Georgia Encyclopedia, 2006, 
http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/nge/Multimedia.jsp?id=m-9031 (accessed 
November 3, 2007) 








The Chattahoochee River emerges from such a freshwater spring, no more than 
two to three inches wide, that is nestled in the rugged mountain terrain of the Blue Ridge.   
Beginning as a small trickle at about 3,500 feet, the streamlet then plummets at a steep 
gradient of 230 feet per mile and gains momentum as it merges with other unnamed 
tributaries and tumbles south through the Nacoochee Valley.
9
  One nineteenth century 
observer noted the hasty change from headwater to river. ―In less than a mile the 
Chattahoochee develops itself into a rippling rivulet; a few yards further down it makes a 
branch; next you find it a bold creek, and by the time the bottom of the pass is reached 
you find your way blocked by a swift little river.‖
10
  
With most of the Blue Ridge in its rear view, it enters the Piedmont at an 
elevation of nearly 1,700 feet and, just northeast of current Lake Lanier, it glances off an 
escarpment known as the Brevard Fault. This slip-strike lineament, which is a 400-mile 
horizontal incision in the Earth‘s crust caused by continental rifting, is traditionally 
considered to be the dividing line between the Blue Ridge and Piedmont provinces. The 
Brevard Fault‘s medium-grade metamorphic rock then provides a 100-mile southwesterly 
channel for the river‘s 540-mile trek.
11
   
Moving along the Brevard corridor, the Chattahoochee gathers the flow of Sope, 
Vickory, and Rottenwood Creek and rumbles over shoals below that dip 36 degrees to the 
southeast before calming and integrating the waters of Nancy, Utoy, and Peachtree 
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Creek. After passing the northeasterly reaches of Atlanta, the ―Hooch‖ encounters 
weakness in the Brevard geography and, like a point guard penetrating the lane through 
the holes of a zone defense, it breaks south to deliver its goods into the Gulf of Mexico.  
Free of the escarpment, the river flows through rolling Piedmont hills that gradually 
decrease in elevation. Although the river becomes accordingly less energetic as its 
average gradient drops to about 25 feet per square mile, it nonetheless maintains a 
generally narrow floodplain due to the influence of resistant and well-jointed bedrock.
12
 
 Progressing toward the Coastal Plain and Florida, the river approaches another 
relic of the ancient geological past: the Fall Line, a jagged, 20-mile wide geographic 
barrier that divides the crystalline rocks of the Piedmont from the largely unconsolidated 
sedimentary rocks of the Coastal Plain. The Fall Line‘s significance is threefold. First, the 
Piedmont‘s crystalline rocks expose shoals and falls that represent a blockage to upstream 
navigation, a fact that would make railroad travel above the line increasingly attractive 
during the nineteenth century. The name was given to this area, which extends from 
Columbus to Augusta, Georgia, by early settlers who traveled by river from the coast to 
frontier areas of the north and west. Because waterways were a major source of 
commercial transportation during this period, cities such as Columbus, Macon, and 
Augusta were located near the termination of upstream traffic. 
 Second, the porous sediment found south of the Fall Line allows for aquifers that 
are far more productive than those above, which somewhat reduces the Coastal Plain‘s 
reliance on surface water.  The Floridan Aquifer, for example, is composed of a thick 
sequence of Tertiary carbonate rocks that are hydraulically connected in varying degrees. 
                                                     
12
 Costello, 3. 
36 
 
In water table aquifers such as these, water may move readily from surface sources such 
as rivers and streams to ground water and vice-versa. 
 Last, as the Chattahoochee enters the Coastal Plain it slows considerably and 
widens because its course is no longer directed by rigid bedrock. Loosened from its 
geologic shackles, the river then spreads out across a wider floodplain. This alluvial fan 
laid down by the Chattahoochee would prove attractive to both Native Americans tribes 
and later European settlers attempting to impose a ―second‖ nature atop the pre-historic 
landscape they encountered. 
NATIVE TERRITORY 
 The Native American and whites that settled along the Chattahoochee River 
found a natural environment brimming with potential. Over time, as population densities 
increased, both groups showed distinct patterns of engaging the landscape for their own 
ends.  
As European settlers increasingly spilled into the interior of Georgia after the 
mid-sixteenth century, they encountered what ethno-historian Charles Hudson has labeled 
―the richest culture of any of the native people north of Mexico.‖
13
  Scattered along the 
alluvial plains of numerous rivers and streams, these Native Americans had developed a 
large system of towns and satellite villages that combined farming with hunting and 
gathering. In addition, these tribes were organized into complex political units that 
convened regularly to both perform elaborate ceremonies and conduct trade. 
 An indigenous social organization of this type was obviously centuries in the 
making. Anthropologists and archaeologists explain that during the last Ice Age, between 
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25,000 to 14,000 years ago, lowered sea levels exposed a strip of land, the so-called 
Bering Land Bridge, which connected Siberia to Alaska. With much of the earth‘s water 
detained, humans and animals were able to cross into North America. No one is sure of 
the direction taken or level of interaction among these early American immigrants, 




Although the details of the migration remain uncertain, as do the quotidian 
practices and beliefs of these pre-historic migrants, experts are reasonably certain that 
small bands of hunters and gatherers followed their Pleistocene quarry into the 
Chattahoochee River Valley roughly 11,000 years ago. There they found within the 
valleys and ridges a natural landscape that provided a means of survival for those with 
the capacity for adaptation. Hunters utilized local sources of flint, chert, and quartz to 
make fluted or ―Clovis‖ spears for hunting large prey such as wholly mammoths, 
American mastodons, and giant sloths, which were attracted to the Piedmont‘s rolling, 
evergreen-covered hills. When temperatures finally rose, and the deciduous forests began 
to crowd out the conifers, foraging groups were then able to search the forest floors 
during the fall season for nuts. Enterprising Indians similarly modified their hunting 
strategies and began to manufacture smaller, lighter weapons to kill the rabbits, squirrels, 
and white-tail deer that had replaced those Pleistocene mammals that became extinct.
15
   
Rivers proved to be an important feature of the landscape as well. Anthropologist 
Max White points out that many known Paleoindian (11,000 - 8,000 B.C.E.) sites in 
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Georgia were located on hilltops or ridges overlooking valleys or stream confluences, 
ideal vantage points for spotting game or studying their movements. In areas with no 
hills, Paleoindian sites lie near shoals or at other locations where game trails crossed the 
river. These sites yield the characteristic fluted points, scrappers, choppers, and other 
tools associated with butchering and processing and are thus believed to be short-term 
hunting stations, as opposed to long-term settlement sites, which would not appear for 
another 7,000 to 8,000 years. 
The significance of shoals and low-river crossings are also evidenced in the large 
number of shell deposits found on river banks during the Middle Archaic period (8,000-
1,000 B.C.E.). Archaeologists believe that the warmer and drier conditions that prevailed 
during the Altithermal period meant lower water levels throughout the regions, thereby 
allowing hunters and gatherers to wade into the shallows to collect freshwater mussels. 
As they discarded the shells after their meals, large deposits formed over the years.  
Experts caution, however, that freshwater mussels remained a seasonal food and that 
large accumulations are not necessarily indicative of permanent settlement patterns.
16
 
 The Chattahoochee waters served as a natural trail marker for overland travel as 
well. As historian Lynn Willoughby states:  This was the logical way to travel‖ because 
―trails shadowed the river on both banks and also paralleled its tributaries. Travelers 
knew that any path that followed a creek downstream led to the river.‖  Upstream 
headwaters were never far from adjacent river systems, which meant that short trails 
connected one waterway to another.
17
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Finally, rivers and streams also provided the means to better communication and 
trade between distant tribes. By around 4,000 B.C.E., Indians had begun to clear trees 
with stone axes to make dugout canoes in order to transport loads too heavy to carry on 
foot. Woodland Indians (1,000 B.C.E.-1,000 C.E.) of the Chattahoochee Basin began to 
develop extensive trade routes by riding their canoes downstream to the Gulf of Mexico 
and then paddling to the mouths of other rivers to exchange local items, such as their own 
increasingly stylized pottery, for other exotic materials like marine shells and salt from 
the coast and copper from the eastern Tennessee region.
18
 
  Not only were rivers a conduit for trade, but they also facilitated the sharing of a 
culture and spiritual belief system. Archaeologists maintain that sometime shortly after 
the beginning of the first century, the Woodland Indians became greatly influenced by 
groups in the Ohio River Valley that erected burial mounds. No one knows the precise 
meaning attached to the earthworks erected by either tradition or how the information and 
techniques used were passed, but it is clear that river travel assisted the transference of 
ideas across space and diverse peoples.
19
    
Whereas the evidence from the Paleoindian and Archaic periods suggests that 
these groups existed as small, nomadic bands of hunters and gatherers that migrated to 
and from seasonal sites, the Woodland (1000 B.C.E.-1000 C.E.) and Mississippian 
(1000-1500 C.E.) cultures established more permanent settlements. Charles Hudson 
writes, ―It was during the Woodland tradition that the Indians first show a decided 
preference for living near the flood plains of rivers. It was in the flood plains that all of 
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these native seed-bearing plants thrived.‖  A village site excavated southwest of Atlanta 
along the Chattahoochee confirms that this sort of environmental exploitation was taking 
place as early as 200 B.C.E. Archaeologists have identified remains of fish, turtles, and 
birds as well as various seeds and nuts that have been scraped from the dirt floors of these 
dwelling structures. Such evidence reveals that the environment around the 
Chattahoochee was so rich in natural foods at this time that settled life was possible 
without agriculture.
20
        
 Alluvial floodplains became increasingly important during the Mississippian 
period as agriculture began to take root among the native peoples. As Charles Hudson 
explains, ―One characteristic of Mississippian sites was that they were invariably built 
near the courses or old channels of rivers and streams where the best soil for their kind of 
agriculture was found.‖
21
  Corn, squash, and beans were planted in these areas using 
digging sticks and short-handled hoes with chipped flint blades or animal bones. This 
increased reliance on domesticated plants provided the economic base for the formation 
of sizable towns characterized by large, flat-topped mound complexes, which served as 
centers of regional political, ceremonial, and trade systems.  
These population centers, such as the Etowah settlement found north of Atlanta, 
were encircled and supplied by a group of smaller satellite villages located along the 
floodplains. But as authors Martin Gerdes and Scott Messer note, ―while the adaptation 
of agricultural practices allowed for the land to support greater populations, greater 
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populations in turn created greater demand for arable land.‖
22
  As a result, warfare ensued 
as competing tribes fought for control of lands suitable for cultivation. By the time 
Hernando de Soto‘s entradas arrived in the 1540s, Mississippian culture had experienced 
a significant decline, with some large mound centers like the Ocmulgee‘s in central 
Georgia, completely abandoned. 
European entry into Georgia marks the beginning of a painful adjustment period 
for Native Americans and the virtual end of the pre-historic tribes in Georgia. Although 
demographic changes were taking place before contact with European explorers, it pales 
in comparison to the massive depopulation that occurred after the mid-sixteenth century. 
Not only did warfare between Europeans and Native Americans take their toll, but lack of 
immunity to diseases carried by the Europeans decimated the extant population.
 23
   
Even as Native tribes burned with fever, political reorganization among the tribes 
continued. The Spanish, who by this time showed little desire to spread beyond the 
Florida peninsula and were satisfied to conduct trade through intermediaries, kept their 
distance. Nonetheless, by the time the French and English began to scurry through the 
Georgia interior in the late seventeenth century, the early tribes had either moved to other 
areas or were amalgamated into other tribes, even despite significant language barriers. 
Some have suggested that, in addition to farming techniques, religious beliefs, and 
kinship systems, the hierarchical structure of the Natchez, Creek, and other Southeastern 
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Indian governments was probably derived from the Mississippian, but there is yet no 
conclusive archaeological or anthropological evidence to confirm linkages between pre-
historic traditions and historic cultures.
24
 
Scholars have, however, thoroughly explored Creek and Cherokee culture and 
cosmologies. Indeed, a great deal of literature exists that examines the different ways in 
which Native Americans and Europeans conceived of their respective places in the world. 
Summarizing much of this literature, Theda Perdue and Michael Green argue, ―Native 
Southerners did not envision a hierarchical world, like Europeans did, in which man had 
dominion over the rest of creation.‖  As evidence, they submit the Indian conception of a 
three-tiered cosmos consisting of the Upper World, Under World and This World. The 
first was the domain of the past and predictability, and fire was its earthly representative. 
In contrast, water was associated with the Under World, which represented the future and 
change. This World, the domain of human beings, mediated between the two and humans 
were responsible for ensuring balance. Consequently, these Indian groups never put out 
fire with water; they used the soil of ―This World‖ instead.  Such a belief structure leads 
the authors to conclude that ―maintaining the purity of discreet categories, preventing or 
repairing the pollution of those categories, and balancing opposites formed the core of 
Southeastern Indian religious belief and practice.‖
25
  
Offering direct comparisons between the descendants of Indians and Europeans, 
author William Winn states it more directly: ―Perhaps the difference between Christianity 
and the beliefs of the Creeks and other Indians in the Southeast had to do with how the 
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Indians related to the natural world. Not only did the early people of the region venerate 
the sun and moon and other natural, inanimate objects—the wind, for example—but they 
also saw humankind as no more important than the other elements in creation. In the far 
more anthropomorphic belief system of the Europeans, humankind was said to be 
simultaneously created in God‘s image and doomed to spiritual inadequacy.‖
26
  
 Within the Creek conception of the universe, there were spirits in the water, 
animals, and rocks and the Creeks made sense of their lives by explaining it in terms of 
the spirit world. Nothing was random. If a hunter lost a knife, a spirit must have taken it; 
if one became ill, he or she had probably offended a particular spirit. 
Accordingly, for those Creek Indians living on or near the Chattahoochee, the 
river was not simply a waterway or big stream, but was, as Lynn Willoughby contends, 
―a spiritual conduit.‖   Snakes, otters, and beaver swam in the Chattahoochee, all linking 
the physical and spiritual worlds. The river was home to the fish that provided 
sustenance. But it was also a means of travel and recreation. And all these elements 
required that reverence be outwardly displayed: every able-bodied man, woman, and 
child was expected, in both summer and winter, to enter the river and plunge four times 
beneath its surface in a daily bathing ritual that perhaps suggested the idea that ―similarity 
in appearance equaled similarity in nature.‖
27
      
Rivers, which were called the ―Long Man‖ or ―Long Snake,‖ were also featured 
prominently in the Cherokee spirit world. The head of the snake was thought to be in the 
mountains and his tail in the lowlands. The river was associated with the moon, and on 
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every new moon, including those in winter, the Cherokees used to go to the bank of the 
river where a priest officiated and everybody, much like in the Creek tradition, jumped 
in. This observance was thought to ensure long life, implying that the snake, which 
annually shed its skin, was associated with longevity. Usually this ritual took place at the 
head of a river where they could face upstream toward the rising sun, for just as fire could 
be offended, so could water.
28
  
And though Winn viewed such practices as indication that Native Americans 
were ―the greatest naturalists the Valley has ever known,‖ there is ample evidence to 
suggest that Indians did not always completely ―live in harmony with nature.‖
29
  Charles 
Hudson asserts that just the opposite may be true, particularly when Native Americans 
used exhaustive slash-and-burn techniques to stimulate deer populations. ―The Indians‖ 
he writes, ―actually modified the forest cover far out of proportion to their numbers.‖
30
  
Similarly, both contemporary observers and later historians have written about the 
corralling of bison over cliffs in the American Plains and the over-hunting and 
wastefulness with respect to deer in the mid-Atlantic.
31
 
It should come as no surprise then that Indians actively engaged in modifying 
their environment. The question, rather, is the extent to which their activities disrupted 
their ability to acquire future supplies. There is little evidence to imply that the Cherokee 
Indians, who settled along the upper Chattahoochee and constructed weirs to capture and 
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utilize various poisons to tranquilize fish during the late eighteen and early nineteenth 
century, squandered the river‘s natural resources. In contrast with their slash-and-burn 
practices, which could allow fires to burn uncontrollably, Indians appear to have limited 
themselves to catching only the amount of fish that they could readily process and store. 
There are several reasons for this. The first is cultural. As Charles Hudson explains, 
despite their techniques to acquire freshwater fish, the Cherokees showed a marked 
ambivalence toward it as a food source. The idea of decayed fish, he argues, revolted 
them, and a dream of decayed fish was considered a nightmare portending evil.  
Additionally, there were environmental factors that were interlaced with the 
cultural. As previously mentioned, the Chattahoochee River Valley offered a wide array 
of natural resources for the Southeastern Indians to exploit. Although these tribes lived in 
an area that contained some of the most abundant salt and fresh water fishing spots in 
North America, they were just as reliant on hunting plentiful game and agricultural 
produce. Therefore, their food supply remained diversified and no particular source was 
over-exploited. Furthermore, their sustenance patterns were dictated by the seasons and 
they migrated between cold and warm weather settlements. In the late summers, as fish 
began to spawn, younger male Indians often camped near the Fall Line or shoals while 
the women, the elderly, and children collected wild vegetables, berries, and nuts. In 
spring months, corn, beans, and squash were planted in the narrow valleys or wider flood 
plains and harvested in autumn. Winter months, in contrast, were generally dedicated to 
hunting large game.
 32
   
 
                                                     
32
 Hudson, 216, 272-309; Gerdes and Messer, 69-71; Timothy Silver. A New Face on the Countryside: 
Indians, Colonists, and Slaves in South Atlantic Forests, 1500-1800  (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990), 51-56, 88-89. 
46 
 
MAKING ―SECOND NATURE‖ 
The Southeastern Indians‘ semi-permanent habitation patterns and ―balanced‖ 
belief system stands in stark contrast to the hierarchical belief structure and 
geographically expansive yet sedentary settlements of European and American settlers. 
European cultural concepts were largely derived from Biblical interpretations and 
perhaps none was more important to New World settlers than the instruction to ―replenish 
the earth, and subdue it: and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the foul of 
the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth.‖ This ostensible duty to 
control nature had consequences for both the landscape and Native Americans.
33
    
Culturally pre-disposed to ―subdue‖ the land and to view themselves atop the 
social pecking order, early white settlers misunderstood that hunting and gathering 
required both mobility as well as sparse possessions and therefore often looked 
suspiciously upon the natives. Describing the reaction of New England colonists to 
Indians‘ spartan lifestyle, historian William Cronon offers a possible scenario of what 
Georgia settlers may have imagined as they encountered the Creeks and Cherokees: ―A 
people who moved so much and worked so little did not deserve to lay claim to the land 
they inhabited. Their failure to ‗improve‘ that land was a token not of their chosen way of 
life but of laziness.‖  Despite the fact that white settlers readily adopted effective Indian 
agricultural and hunting techniques and realized that they now inhabited a landscape that 
had been previously transformed by native activity, they judged Native Americans as 
indolent, and this perception became a justification for white territorial acquisition.
34
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But, as both Cronon and Timothy Silver point out, future land grabs undertaken 
by whites must also be understood within the context of differing conceptions of 
―property‖ rights and an expanding world market. Cronon argues that although Native 
American families recognized exclusive hunting and fishing rights on respective tribal 
lands, they did not envision these areas as permanent possessions. Instead, what they 
exchanged were usufruct rights, or acknowledgements by one group that another might 
use an area for planting, hunting, or gathering. As he explains, ―what Indians perceived as 
political negotiations between two sovereign groups the English perceived as an 
economic transaction wholly within an English jurisdiction.‖
35
  
 Concurring with Cronon, Silver contends that ―what made the native system 
different was that it did not encourage the continuous stockpiling of goods or money. 
Indeed, the Indian economy stressed almost completely opposite values: day-to-day 
subsistence and generosity.‖  This was in direct contrast to the European market model, 
which ―was an economy that stressed the importance of private property, profit, and 
virtually unrestricted accumulation of goods. It was, in a word, capitalistic.‖
36
 
The founding of English settlements in the Carolinas after 1670 prompted the 
creation of more persistent trade relations with interior tribes than those intermittent 
contacts established by the Spanish. Much of this new trade was concerned with 
obtaining furs, and, in some cases, Indian slaves. But as English traders made inroads into 
Georgia, they stumbled across tribal boundaries that were increasingly in flux, due in 
large part to tribal consolidations that followed the onset of epidemics initiated by 
Spanish explorers. During this period, the Creeks, a loose confederation of tribes that 
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numerous scholars believe absorbed many of the formerly displaced Indians, came under 
pressure as the Cherokees gradually expanded south into the Appalachians. A series of 
conflicts ensued between these tribes throughout the seventeenth century, with Creeks 
ultimately ceding much of the highlands and settling in the Coastal Plain by the early 
eighteenth century. As a result, the Chattahoochee River as it flowed through the 
Piedmont effectively became a buffer zone between the tribes where each retained 
hunting rights.
37
     
White settlers poured into the Georgia Piedmont in the decades following the 
close of the American Revolution. This was due in no small part to the invention of the 
cotton gin in 1793, which ensured that the short-fibered variety of cotton, which had been 
cultivated in small amounts along the coastal areas, could be produced in large-scale 
quantities on inland farms and potentially used as an export crop. But in 1800 most of the 
area that is now metropolitan Atlanta technically remained as Indian territory because 
Georgia‘s federally approved western boundary extended no farther than the Oconee 
River, roughly fifty miles east of present-day Macon, Georgia. Sensing the need to spread 
economic opportunity to poor whites through a series of land lotteries, the state of 
Georgia entered into agreement with the U.S. government in 1802 to extend Georgia‘s 
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boundaries to the east bank of the Chattahoochee River in exchange for the termination of 
all Indian land titles remaining within the state.
 38
    
Creeks and Cherokees were left to choose between two unsavory alternatives: 
fight back or accommodate. The Creeks were of two minds. Hemmed in by white 
encroachment, some decided to remove themselves to lands west of the Mississippi River 
while some decided to resist and make allegiances with the British during the War of 
1812.  
The Creek decision to join with the British not only led to their eventual removal 
from the area, but also provided the context for the first white settlements in the area. In 
1813, Georgia soldiers were dispatched to establish forts to protect interior white 
settlements as well as supply lines for General Andrew. Indeed, it was Andrew who led 
the decisive campaign against the Creeks in Alabama, in part by utilizing old Indian trails 
and trading villages situated along the Chattahoochee River‘s eastern flank. The 
Peachtree Trail, which would later become one of Atlanta‘s most famous streets, sat atop 
the ridges that make up the Eastern Continental Divide, which extends from the 
Appalachians down through the heart of present-day Atlanta. Fort Daniel, the first 
garrison to be constructed, was located at the northern end of the trail near Old Suwanee 
Town at Hog Mountain, in what is now Gwinnett County. The second garrison, Fort 
Peachtree, was established on a high hilltop at the confluence of Peachtree Creek and the 
Chattahoochee River at the terminus of a path that splintered west from the Peachtree 
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Trail. Standing Peachtree, as it was originally known, was once a point of entry into the 
Creek territory and served as a well-known center for white and Indian trade. Abandoned 
by the Creeks prior to the beginning of the nineteenth century, it was later designated as a 
post office in 1825 before being renamed to Montgomery‘s Ferry in 1837, some ten years 
after all Creek lands had been officially ceded to Georgia.
39
   
Unlike the Creeks, the Cherokees occupied the northwest corner of Georgia near 
the Etowah River and were not in the direct line of white encroachment. Enjoying long-
standing trade alliances with both the English and the Americans, the Cherokees began to 
adopt an agriculturally-based economy, engage in the African slave trade, and even assist 
on the removal of the Creeks.
40
  Their proclivity to become ―civilized,‖ even as they 
retained much of their cultural heritage, made the Cherokees the subject of great 
fascination among Georgia‘s frontiersmen. Composed in the early twentieth century, 
Sarah Huff‘s handwritten manuscript for the autobiographical My Eighty Years in Atlanta 
illustrates how exotic many whites found their Cherokee neighbors to be: 
When I was a child I was always interested when Indians were mentioned by old 
neighbors, who often came to spend the day and ‗sit til‖ bedtime with my father 
and mother. I have heard them tell of the Hightower Trail. Shallow Ford, a few 
miles up on the Chattahoochee River, was where the happy warriors and their 
straddle-riding squaws, would jump their Indian ponies into the swiftly-flowing 
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stream, and yelling at the top of their voices, which were not meant for anything 




But the Cherokee‘s rugged charm and accommodation to capitalist market 
ideology did not prevent whites Georgians from seizing their land. When gold was 
discovered in the Blue Ridge provinces in the late 1820s, Georgia politicians redoubled 
their efforts to have the last remaining Indians removed from the state. In 1827, newly-
elected Governor John Forsyth and the Georgia legislature claimed jurisdiction over all 
Cherokee Nation lands and invalidated Cherokee law, thus prompting a three-way legal 
battle between the Georgia, the Cherokee Nation, and the federal government. 
Determined to solidify its claim before questions of sovereignty could be decided in the 
courts, the state organized northwestern Georgia into Cherokee County, even as the 
Supreme Court decided in 1832 (Worcester v. Georgia) that the Constitution vested the 
federal government with sole authority in Indian affairs.  
Undeterred by the federal decision, the Georgia legislature proceeded with its 
plans to distribute Cherokee lands to white settlers. It was also aided in this endeavor 
when President Jackson, manifesting his latent hostility toward Native Americans and 
fearing political retribution, refused to enforce the Supreme Court verdict. Realizing the 
days of the Cherokee Nation were numbered, a tribal faction negotiated the Treaty of 
New Echota in 1838, which ceded all remaining Cherokee lands in Georgia in exchange 
for five million dollars and access to lands west of the Mississippi in present-day 
Oklahoma. In May 1838, at least 13,000 Cherokees were rounded up in Georgia, 
Alabama, Tennessee, and North Carolina by the federal government. Forced to travel 
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along the infamous ―Trail of Tears,‖ an estimated 5000 Cherokee died from cold, 
starvation, and disease. As a result of this forced exodus, North Georgia lands were 
officially opened for business.
 42
    
Roswell King was among those who ventured into the lands beyond the 
Chattahoochee in search of gold. Sent by the Bank of Darien in 1830 to investigate 
commercial possibilities in North Georgia, King later opened and operated two gold 
mines in Dahlonega during the mid-1830s. By 1838 he had convinced several families 
seeking a cool retreat from the heat and sickness of the coastal summers to relocate to an 
area above the west bank of the Chattahoochee River, about twenty miles north of 
present-day Atlanta. ―The colony‖ they settled is now known as Roswell.
43
 
During his numerous travels between Darien and Dahlonega, King crossed not 
only one of Georgia‘s first cotton mills near Augusta, but also Vickory Creek, a nearby 
tributary whose falls dropped quickly before entering into the Chattahoochee.
44
  A New 
Englander by birth and a southern businessman by profession, King quickly realized that 
wealth could be summoned not only from the gold veins buried within the Blue Ridge but 
also from the Piedmont‘s fertile lands and flowing waters. 
Several cotton-related technologies would make that dream a reality. The first was 
the cotton gin. By 1801, not ten years after its invention, cotton production had soared in 
Georgia, increasing by a staggering 1900 percent, from approximately 1,250 bales 
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produced annually to 25,000. This figure increased to 220,000 by 1833, with much of the 
production taking place on coastal plantations where it was then sold to cotton agents 
from Philadelphia and Boston.
45
 
Surveying the undeveloped waters of Vickory Creek, King saw an opportunity to 
harness its energy and bring the mechanized textile industry into the Georgia Piedmont. 
After building a small saw mill with the aid of his son Barrington King and forty or so 
African slaves, he summarily commissioned Thomas Rogers, a mechanic from Paterson, 
New Jersey, to design a vertically integrated mill similar to those being used throughout 
the Northeast. He shortly thereafter hired upstate New Yorker Henry Merrell, a machinist 
trained in textile manufacturing, to transport the machinery to Roswell and oversee mill 
operations.
46
      
Like Massachusetts-style firms, King planned to build a vertically integrated mill 
where both spinning and weaving would be performed to produce finished cotton cloth. 
But unlike these large enterprises, he followed the rural Rhode Island model and 
constructed a small-scale mill that employed local families rather than the legions of 
female workers used by the Lowell mills.
47
 Recent demographic changes made this 
feasible. Census records show that by 1833, over fifteen hundred whites lived in Cobb 
County, where the village of Roswell was located at the time. Many of these people had 
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moved to the area in search of gold, but others were yeoman farmers looking to grow 
cotton on cheap arable land made available by the state‘s land lotteries.
48
  For King and 
his investors, this was a perfect marriage of economics, technology, and geography: local 
farmers could grow cotton that could then be processed in the water-powered mill and 
sold back to them as finished cloth. Henceforth, the production and manufacturing of 
cotton could be tightly coupled in the Piedmont.
49
   
Chartered in December 1839 and capitalized at $45,000, the Roswell 
Manufacturing Company was one of only nineteen cotton or woolen factories operating 
in the state. The largest in North Georgia, its location and the materials used in its 
construction reflected its relationship to the Piedmont‘s particular geographical setting. 
Operations were housed in a brick building that was three and one-half stories high and 
measured 48 by 88 feet. A hewn granite basement served as the solid foundation, which 
was necessary to not only uphold the massive weight of the walls but also because the 
mill was constructed on the slope of a steep hill overlooking the north bank of Vickory 
Creek‘s narrow floodplain. A thirty-foot high dam, made of logs, mud, and rocks and 
located some 400 yards from the main building was used to impound the creek and create 
a millpond. Water escaping the dam and accelerating over exposed shoals was then 
redirected through a flume to rotate an undershot water wheel before being expelled back 
into the creek via a tailrace. The energy captured by the waterwheel was then transferred 
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Census and financial records indicate that in 1840, under Merrell‘s direction, the 
factory ran 480 spindles with 28 employees and produced about $6,000 worth of goods. 
By 1849, operations had increased to the point that 3500 spindles and 40 looms were 
being used to produce 1,200 bundles of yarn per week and 1,100 yards of shirting per 
day.  Poor transportation routes, however, limited the markets of those scattered 
production facilities, like John Woodall‘s gristmill and Wofford‘s sawmill, that used the 
region‘s waterpower to provide the staples of agricultural life. Henry Merrell commented 
that, despite the Roswell firm‘s steady growth, un-navigable water courses above the Fall 
Line only allowed for ―wagon-trade‖ over rugged country roads that rarely stretched 
beyond a twenty-five mile radius.
51
  
Most of these roads were simple improvements on the prehistoric trails that 
existed on ridge tops that were oriented toward fords or shoals in the region‘s many rivers 
and streams. One important path, that which ultimately became Peachtree Road and 
Peachtree Street, has been previously discussed. Another was the Hightower Trail, an 
Indian trading path than ran from the vicinity of the Etowah complex in northwest 
Georgia, down through present-day Decatur and on east to Augusta, Georgia, on the 
Savannah River. The trail crossed the Chattahoochee at Shallow Ford, near what is now 
Roswell, and served as a major river crossing during low water periods. 
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During the early 1820s, the Inferior Courts of the area‘s newly organized counties 
were charged with the responsibility of maintaining proper roads between the various 
county seats. Although natural fords were fairly common, the vagaries of weather made 
them unreliable as trade and commercial routes. As a result, the Inferior Courts began to 
authorize the right to establish ferry crossings where the newly cleared roads intersected 
streams and rivers.  
One of the earliest authorizations recorded, that of Martin‘s Ferry near Vickory 
Creek, was granted by the DeKalb County Inferior Court in 1829: 
On application order that Rubin Martin be authorized to establish a ferry on the 
Chattahoochee River above the Shallow Ford at place now known as Martin‘s 
Ferry and be allowed to charge the following rates as toll: for every road wagon 
loaded crossing .62; empty .50; cart or two horse wagon .37; for a gig or one man 
horse carriage of any description .25; for a man and a single horse .12; footman or 
lead horse .06 ¼ ; cattle .04 a head; hogs and sheep .02 a head; Provided he goes 
bond on a good security in the sum of $1,000.00 for the keeping of a good flat and  




This record not only indicates the county‘s interest in commerce beyond the 
Chattahoochee but also that the authority for the route may have been more of a 
regulatory tool to encourage fair rates and performance standards. This was increasingly 
important for facilitating traffic as the area began to swell with what Merrell labeled 
―forty acre people‖ seeking quality land in Georgia‘s upper reaches. By 1840, at least a 
dozen such operations had been established on the Chattahoochee River between Forsyth 
County to the northeast and DeKalb towards the southwest. Indeed, because of their low 
cost in relation to bridges, many ferries continued to function well into the twentieth 
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century, and numerous metro Atlanta street names, such Power‘s Ferry Road and Pace‘s 
Ferry Road, can trace their origins to these endeavors.
53
   
As cotton production and white settlement continued to stab westward into the 
Piedmont, the Georgia legislature began to seriously consider financing schemes to help 
reduce the cost of shipping from the interior‘s fledgling agricultural and industrial 
production economy to the coastal seaports. They were also interested in possibly linking 
the state‘s manufactured goods to the lucrative markets beyond the Tennessee River 
Valley. In 1825, stimulated by New York‘s successful experiment with the Erie Canal, 
Georgia created a Board of Public Works to investigate the possibility of constructing a 
grand canal system that would connect the Tennessee River with the Georgia rivers that 
flow into the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean.  
But the combination of municipal rivalries, Cherokee protests, and unsuitable 
terrain proved to be insurmountable obstacles. From the start, coastal cities seeking to 
increase the traffic of goods entering and exiting their ports squabbled amongst 
themselves and prevented any agreement on a canal terminus. Moreover, the Englishman 
Hamilton Fulton, who had been hired by the Board to act as Chief Engineer of the 
proposed project, soon found that the Cherokee Nation, tempered by Georgia‘s recent 
dealings with the Creeks, was unwilling to allow topographical surveys in their sovereign 
lands. Undaunted, Fulton and his aid Wilson Lumpkin persisted until the Cherokees 
forced them off their land at gun point. Fulton‘s crew had, nonetheless, made cursory 
evaluations and declared that the Appalachian mountains, ―which divide and separate the 
Western from the Atlantic water, may justly be considered (on our whole northern line) a 
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formidable breast work of nature calculated to defy the ingenuity of man.‖ Other 
members testified that Georgia‘s soils were ill-suited for canals and any constructed by 
the state would require exorbitant construction and maintenance costs. And so, faced with 
limited profits from land lotteries and the Board‘s apparent dismissal of a canal option in 
its 1826 final report, Georgia‘s high hopes for a centralized canal were drowned out.
54
 
Although the Board of Public Works only existed for one year, its report did exert 
considerable influence over the state‘s future internal improvements. Not only did it 
recommend that Georgia not follow states like Pennsylvania and Virginia in pouring 
funds into obsolete canals, but it also suggested that a single seaport for exports be 
selected and that main rivers be made navigable for steamboats. It also suggested that the 
state forego plans to expand into regional and national trade circles and instead 
concentrate its resources into consolidating internal trade for the benefit of its own 
citizenry. Most importantly, the Board advocated that railroads, which could more easily 
blend into the natural landscape, should serve as the main transportation arteries.
55
     
 Over the next decade, Georgia sputtered in achieving these policy goals. The 
cities of Brunswick, Augusta and Savannah, in bailiwick fashion, continued privately-
funded attempts to build short canals into their respective ports. The state legislature 
appropriated funds amounting to $80,000 to improve navigation on the Oconee, the 
Altamaha, the Chattahoochee, the Ogeechee, and the Ocmulgee Rivers, but the bulk of 
these piecemeal efforts were directed to improving traffic below the Fall Line.  Black belt 
                                                     
54
 Robert Coleman. A History of Georgia. 2
nd
 ed. (Athens: University of Georgia Press,1991), 155-56, see 
also Gates, Chapter Three, 70-87. 
 
55
 Gates argues that this effort to consolidate the scattered economic activity through viable transportation 
networks was what ultimately allowed Georgia to emerge as ―the Empire State of the South.‖  Gates, 79-




planters also benefited as restrictive steamboat monopolies were lifted (Gibbons v. 
Ogden) and steamboat builders learned to lessen the draught and generally improve the 
design of their riverboats. By 1838, although river transportation above Columbus 
remained limited to shallow-draft vessels going short distances, a few flatboats and 
barges were making runs between Standing Peachtree and West Point, Georgia.
56
 
 Once South Carolina completed its rail line from Hamburg to Charleston in 1830, 
the Georgia legislature felt it must act. Georgia‘s coastal cities, fearing the loss of 
commerce,   quickly shelved canal plans and caught the railroad-building fever. Piedmont 
planters, who chafed over high transport costs, put substantial pressure on their elected 
representatives to follow the Board‘s recommendations and get busy building a railroad 
system. In 1833, the legislature responded by chartering the Georgia Railroad, with the 
intent to connect Augusta to Athens, with a branch to Greensboro, Georgia. Then, in 
1836, following the opening of Cherokee lands to white settlement, the legislature 
chartered the state-owned Western and Atlantic (W & A) to tie the Georgia interior with 
the Tennessee valley at Chattanooga.
57
  The only issue that remained for Piedmont 
residents was where the W & A‘s line would traverse and terminate. 
 It is unclear to what extent King and his associates were privy to the debates 
concerning the W & A‘s path, but they certainly chose a propitious location and time to 
build their factory. In 1836, the legislature resolved that ―the said railroad shall cross the 
Chattahoochee River at some point between Campbellton, in Campbell County, and 
Wynn‘s Ferry, in Hall County.‖  This official statement mirrored the Board of Public 
Works‘ general assessment that that the area between the Chattahoochee and the Etowah 
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Rivers was the most efficient northerly route. Governor Wilson Lumpkin (1831-1835), 
who had participated in the preliminary canal surveys, was also convinced that this was 
the best route. He wrote, ―with regard to the great central road, I speak with confidence 
when I express the opinion that no country admits of a superior road to what might be 
framed from the Chattahoochee to the Tennessee River.‖  His message held sway, and the 
legislature authorized the construction of a trunk line from the Georgia state boundary    
―. . . commencing at or near Rossville, in the most direct and practicable route, to some 
point on the southeastern bank of the Chattahoochee river, which shall be most eligible 
for the extension of a branch railroad thence, to Athens, Madison, Millegeville, Forsyth, 
and Columbus, and any other points which may be designated.‖
58
  
 The act said nothing of the line‘s end point. This responsibility fell to Chief 
Engineer Stephan Harriman Long, who in 1837, after surveying six possible routes that 
lay within the seventy mile distance between Wynn‘s Ferry and Campbellton, chose 
Montgomery‘s Ferry as the most ―economical and favorable‖ place for crossing the river.    
Further accommodations were made to extend the W & A ―eight miles‖ east beyond the 
river to a point near the ―headwaters of the South River‖ where a ridge summit provided 
the suitably flat space for the W & A and the Georgia Railroad to meet. This site, land lot 
No. 77, became the depot for the town called Terminus, whose first train departed for a 
round trip to Marietta, Georgia on December 24, 1842.  
 By 1851, with the entire line from Chattanooga to the renamed Atlanta in 
operation, the state of Georgia was well on its way to successfully circumventing at least 
one geographic constraint—namely the lack of navigable rivers above the Fall Line— 
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that had hampered so much of its early economic development. Atlanta‘s population 
climbed steadily, reaching 7,741 at the dawn of the Civil War, as the major rail lines it sat 
atop fingered out into the southeastern United States and began to clutch distant markets. 
Even after General William Tecumseh Sherman‘s Union Army followed the W & A‘s 
trail into the city, utilizing and destroying most of the region‘s ferries, bridges, and 
factories along their way to Savannah, Atlanta rebounded, and by 1775, when the city 
established its first municipal water system, its population was well over 30,000.
59
   
 But increased population brought other geographic considerations to the fore: 
adequate water supply and wastewater removal. As population densities rose sharply 
during the post-war years, Atlanta‘s wells and springs became contaminated by leaching 
cesspools, overflowing privies and streets, and poorly constructed sanitation ditches. The 
construction of underground water-carriage sewers eliminated one set of problems but 
caused another: it discharged effluence from household ―water closets‖ into the river 
systems that were now being used to supply drinking water. Although Atlanta fortunately 
escaped the water-born epidemics that ravaged many urban areas during this time, 
alarmed local citizens feared that the city‘s health and reputation would suffer if 
proactive steps were not taken. 
 Urban historian Stuart Galishoff has published numerous articles examining 
Atlanta‘s early attempts to address its public health concerns. He, like many others who 
have analyzed similar attempts in various cities during this period, often focus their 
attention on how public authorities such as Boards of Health, City Engineers, and 
chambers of commerce have sought technological solutions to environmental problems.  
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For instance, Galishoff details how Atlanta officials painstakingly inched beyond the use 
of wells and cisterns and eventually created a modern water supply system that tapped 
into the Chattahoochee River. Likewise, building off of Martin Melosi and Joel Tarr‘s 
scholarship, he chronicles how sanitarians utilized the evolution of disease theory to 
convince Atlanta‘s municipal officials of the need to construct modern sewerage 
infrastructure, most notably by becoming the first American city to adopt the Imhoff 
sedimentation tanks. In short, Galishoff‘s work centers on public engagement with the 
built environment.
60
   
 Examining urban water resources from the perspective of public authorities has 
certainly enlightened our understanding of the process of urban development. After all, 
when citizens voice their complaints, as did Simeon Kennady when he wrote— ―I have to 
inform you that I live on Cain street intercepted by brooks and rivulets. Void of access to 
my house. I need not give you the details of my difficulties.‖—they do so in the hopes 
that their elected officials will alleviate their concerns. And as studies have shown, 
municipal authorities have demonstrated a remarkable capacity for remedial action. 
 Yet exclusive discussions of public authorities vis-à-vis water resources may 
silence the ways in which ordinary, individual citizens encountered their changing 
environment, particularly with respect to obtaining adequate water supplies. For example, 
while Galishoff notes that ―private sources of water supply were supplemented by a few 
public wells and pumps located near the business district and maintained by a council 
Committee on Wells, Pumps, and Cisterns,‖ he does not dwell on what those private 
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sources were or how they came to be. Likewise, when discussing Atlanta‘s successful 
drilling of an artesian well, he frames the achievement within the context of the city’s 
march toward a modern municipal system without stopping to consider how the ground 
water source was found or the techniques used for bringing it to the surface. 
 Atlanta‘s earliest settlers, as well as those later residents that lived some distance 
from municipal pumps, relied on natural springs. Sarah Huff‘s manuscript passage 
―Springs of Early Atlanta,‖ is revealing in its attempts to convey not only the importance 
of these springs in providing ―the refreshing waters of life,‖ but also the social life they 
engendered. And though the selection appears somewhat mawkish in tone, a quick survey 
of some of its lines offers a sense of the centrality of springs ―singing the song of the 
Chattahoochee as they travel along.‖   
 Recognizing the presence of water as a sine qua non for life, she begins by flatly 
stating, ―a spring on a piece of property was its most valuable asset.‖  Springs, she writes, 
were the areas where men hunted deer and mothers and wives washed family clothes.  
Moving past the necessities of frontier life, she then explores the social dimensions that 
the occurrence of springs provide: ―as the hamlet became more thickly settled gathering 
places were required, and as there were no halls, big springs, like the famous Walton 
Spring, came in handy, for beautiful groves in which to arrange seats were sure to give 
shade for big audiences.‖ Springs were amorous settings as well. ―In the old days,‖ she 
writes, ―it (Mineral Spring) was also known as the source of the town‘s romances. 
Various pioneer women have told me that their troth was plighted while they and their 
suitors promenaded to and from the Mineral Spring.‖ 
64 
 
 With these sentimental flurries recorded, Ms. Huff then returns to the more 
practical aspects. She mentions that although Huff Spring flows ―at the rate of the rate of 
six gallons per minute,‖ her family discontinued use of this spot. Possibly explaining why 
her family no longer utilized the Huff Spring‘s cold waters, she then adds, ―for purposes 
of greater convenience the citizens began digging wells.‖  She explains that these wells 
were not without their own sets of problems as well. ―The town being floored with Stone 
Mountain granite made well-digging a very irksome task. The rock was usually reached 
at a distance of only a few feet from the top, but water was seldom found before the well 
measured from fifty to seventy five feet.‖  Some residents, however, devised solutions: 
―the foreign-born men, many of them workers in iron, put pumps in their wells and 
cisterns.‖  Ms. Huff then concludes the chapter by expressing her mixed feelings about 
the city that has grown around her. She observes, ―the people of the old-time town loved 
their springs so dearly, the wonder is that they didn‘t name their village Springville or 
Springplace,‖ before lamenting that ―filling up of those springs deprived the town of its 
most picturesque feature.‖
61
   
 The vicissitudes of Ms. Huff‘s prose, from waxing romantically to dry 
assessments, illuminate the complex relationship individuals have with their environment 
and water sources in particular. Her pastoral images are, to some extent, reminiscent of 
the Native American belief in balance and order, yet her musings are not embedded with 
religious overtones or spirituality of any sort. In fact, Huff‘s mentioning of springs being 
covered over and the loss of what seems to have been a picturesque landscape 
complicates Charles Hudson‘s distinction between Indians and whites. He writes, 
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―industrialized nations have for so long assumed that nature exists for man to use in any 
way he sees fit, and that nature is infinitely forgiving, the Cherokees recognized that man 
had to exploit nature in order to live, but that man should do so carefully, and that nature 
was not infinitely forgiving. If mistreated, nature could strike back.‖
62
  Speaking in 
generalities, Hudson may be correct. Although there is no direct evidence that the 
Roswell Manufacturing Company was environmentally negligent, the continued 
expansion of the mill facilities demonstrate that its investors clearly saw the area as a 
place to be improved upon and exploited for profit. Huff, for her part, exploited the fruits 
of earth but she also paused to reflect on the nefarious features of rapid development. 
Indeed, if a sense of spirituality does inform her writing, it is in her grieving the loss of a 
sense of place, the meaning one gives or attachment one feels toward a specific location.  
 Samuel Richard‘s diary from the late 1860s to the 1ate 1870s has numerous 
entries that mention his family trips to city‘s springs and the social atmosphere that 
pervaded these locations. On Friday May 17, 1872, he wrote: ―Yesterday afternoon Jabe 
(z) and I with Miss Marion and Sallie rode out to the ―Ponce de Leon‖ Spring about two 
miles. This mineral spring has lately become quite famous with our citizens and crowds 
ride there everyday for pleasure and for health . . . The Spring is situated in a deep glen in 
the woods and in quite a picturesque place.‖
63
  Later, on Monday August 23, 1875, he 
notes, ―I have walked to the Atlanta Mineral Spring several times before breakfast of late 
with our girls and Annie Isham.‖
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 Some of Samuel‘s most interesting journal entries pertain to his well and to the 
uncertain access to water in the Piedmont soil. Commenting on the status of the 
construction of his new home, he wrote ―I have also had a well dug there and it was very 
successfully and speedily done. It is but nineteen feet deep and we have 5 ½ feet water.‖  
No more than four months after being dug, he wrote that ―a rough, yet picturesque, well 
box‖ was built that ―works easily with tow baskets on a chain.‖  He adds, ―I am afraid too 
that the water is sinking as it is less than two feet.‖  Over the next five years, the water 
level in Samuel‘s well continually rose and fell, even dropping to eight inches in the fall 
of 1870. In January 1868, he noted that ―the water has returned in abundance‖ and then in 
November 1872, he literally hit rock bottom. ―I have had our well dug thirty inches 
deeper,‖ he wrote, ―which is all the depth that could easily be made as the diggers came 
to solid rock at that point.‖
65
        
It is unclear if Samuel‘s well bottoming out at a little over twenty-one feet caused 
him to move his family to a new residence, but by 1877 Samuel had subscribed to the 
city‘s new water system. Completed in September 1875 at a cost of $226,000, the 
waterworks pumped water five miles into the city from the South River. Ostensibly built 
to provide an increased volume of water via a sixteen-inch main for business and 
industrial needs and fire protection, the system had a daily capacity of 2 million gallons 
and had an additional three miles of smaller pipes to service residents living in or near the 
downtown business district.
66
      
 Contrary to what one may expect from someone who had persistent problems 
obtaining water from his well, Samuel‘s diary entries concerning piped-in water are 
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remarkably cool. Although his family had been required to fetch water from the well in 
their previous home, there is no excitement about having water flowing into the home. In 
fact, Samuel‘s diary reads like something one might find in today‘s newspaper columns. 
He started, ―We have had the water from the works introduced from our premises today 
at 114 Washington Street‖ before adding ―and just about dark gave the front yard a good 
sprinkling.‖  But because the South River‘s water pressure remained low, city officials 
clamped down on residential use. Perhaps because he knew as well as anyone the 
fickleness of the water supply cycle, Samuel seems to have taken these water use 
restrictions in stride: ―The weather is very warm and dry for the season and our 
‗sprinkler‘ is cut off until April 1.‖
67
  
 Samuel also makes frequent mention of the state of city affairs, particularly with 
respect to infrastructure, or lack thereof. A devoutly religious man, his repeated 
references to (and judgment of) members of his congregation missing services on account 
of muddy streets testifies to Atlanta‘s lack of storm water sewers and paved streets. To 
that end, he wrote on Sunday August 27, 1871: ―It has been storming more or less for 
several days and last night the rain came in torrents so that I had to go out at 3 oclock this 
morning and wade in to open a drain in the yard to prevent a flooding.‖  Like most urban 
residents of his time, his entries indicate that he was also cognizant of dangers of fire and 
epidemics, two major issues that prompted municipal officials to hustle for sufficient 
water supply and sewer removal systems.  
As previously explained, the South River facility quickly proved  itself incapable of 
meeting the city‘s needs. Its water was polluted because the river‘s reservoirs were fed by 
rain washings from the city‘s natural drainage sources, which by the 1870s had become 
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opens sewers. What‘s more, low water pressure meant that the system failed to provide 
for the services for which it was intended. The network‘s limited capacity was unable to 
flush the crude rock sewers built after 1873. By 1886, many in the city were drinking 





Figure 1.2 – South River Station in 1887. (Source: City of Atlanta, Department of Water, 






Figure 1.3 – Artesian Well at Five Points, ca. 1894. (Source: City of Atlanta, Department 









Unfortunately, contemporary newspaper articles and city reports do not contain 
information or an explanation as to how the aquifer that provided water for the artesian 
well was located and delivered to the surface. Geologists inform us, however, that 
although the Piedmont‘s crystalline substrata has low porosity and is generally 
impermeable, ground water can collect in substantial quantities between cracks within. In 
cases such as this, when water is held between firmly sealed rocks and there is only a 
limited means of escape, it will stand under hydrostatic pressure and be expelled with 
force. Humans have been tapping into such ground water sources for over four thousand 
years. And while many swear by the accuracy of divining rods for locating groundwater, 
chances are that the crew that tapped the well employed more sophisticated technologies. 
By the early 1880s, when Atlanta first began looking for a supplement to the South River, 
petroleum engineers in the upper Appalachians had nearly perfected the technique of 
surveying and drilling and one can be reasonably certain—because records indicate that a 
steam-driven pump was used—that the crew that tapped the Five Points well used 
methods similar to those employed in oilfield operations.
68
 
Several types of drilling were available during this time and each corresponded to 
the surface to be penetrated. As a general rule cable tools were used in areas underlain by 
consolidated rock while hydraulic-rotary tools, and sometimes cable tools, were utilized 
in areas with unconsolidated rock. Because the Atlanta region‘s metamorphic and 
igneous rocks are consolidated, logic dictates that cable tools were used for the well‘s 
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creation. This type of drilling was accomplished by crushing the rock by delivering 
hammer-like blows through a chisel-shaped bit suspended on a cable. The bit rose and 
fell freely into the hole, with the spring-like action of the cable causing it to administer a 
sharp, quick strike while the lay of the cable provided for a twist on each successive drop 
to turn the bit a few degrees. As the surge of the bit was impeded by cuttings lying 
beneath, the bit was periodically removed and a cyclical device with a flap valve, known 
as a bailer, was placed into the hole. The bailer would then fall to the bottom of the hole 
where it struck water, causing a rapid surge of water and cuttings upward with it. The 
bailer was then quickly raised and lowered and finally withdrawn from the hole with the 
cuttings. Once the well reached a desired depth, yields could be increased by fracturing 
the rock walls with explosives.
69
             
 
CONCLUSION 
In Nature’s Metropolis, historian William Cronon examines how the human-made 
systems of rail lines, credit networks, maps, and markets that emerged in the late 
nineteenth century effectively meshed with and obscured ties to the non-human 
ecological system, creating the impression that both systems were quite ―natural.‖  He 
explains that ―a kind of ‗second nature‘ designed by people and ‗improved‘ toward 
human ends, gradually emerged atop the original landscape that nature—‗first nature‘—
had created as such an inconvenient jumble.‖
 70
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This same scenario would also play out in Atlanta by the end of the nineteenth 
century. Georgia‘s Native Americans had established settlements along the 
Chattahoochee River‘s rich alluvial soils and fished within its flowing waters. Whether 
they fashioned weirs to capture the fish or cleared forest undergrowth to stimulate game, 
they actively modified the natural environment around them to suit their purposes. But 
due to their animistic worldview and low population densities, Native American 
alteration of the physical environment remained limited. Georgia‘s white settlers, 
however, intensified the exploitation of the area‘s natural resources. Atlanta‘s political 
leaders and urban boosters would, under the presumption that they were simply 
improving upon the natural advantages the region provided, build ever larger mills and 
factories, lay railroad lines, and construct other urban amenities in an effort to foster 
economic development.  
Water and sewer development were a large part of the cityscape‘s transformation. 
By the late 1880s it became apparent that an entirely new water system would have to be 
constructed if Atlanta‘s growth was to continue. In 1891, for example, the Atlanta Water 
Works opened its 20 million gallon Hemphill Avenue water station on the Chattahoochee 
River. Similarly, city leaders, fearing that their hodge-podge system of sewers would 
invite the ravages of water-borne diseases, passed a bond issue in 1910 dedicated to the 
construction of over 300 miles of combined sanitary and storm water sewers and the 
establishment of three sewage plants capable of treating up to 16 MGD.
71
 
                                                     
71
 AWW, ―A Century of Progress,‖ (1975), 7-12 (hereafter cited as AWW, ―A Century of Progress); for 
more detail on the early history of Atlanta‘s sewer system, see Galishoff, ―Paying for the Cost of Growth,‖ 
9-41; An extended analysis of the problems associated with combined sewer systems will be presented in 




Although some Atlantans like Sarah Huff may have pined for the pastoral days of 
yore, most greeted the city building process with a sense of optimism. In implementing 
these modern water systems, Atlanta leaders could pride themselves with having spared 
the public the inconveniences of gathering water from wells and cisterns as well as the 
health hazards associated with privies and sub-standard sewers. They would also express 
faith in the community‘s capacity to shape its own destiny.
72
  But as subsequent chapters 
will show, the problems of limited water resources would not be overcome so easily. The 
Chattahoochee River‘s natural flow regime would soon prove too feeble to effectively 
meet the demands of the city‘s surging population and would thus prompt civic leaders to 
beseech the federal government to assist in the impoundment and regulation of its 
contents. In addition, as the metropolitan population began to spread further from the 
downtown area, less of the water withdrawn from the river was returned and would 
instead be diverted into other drainage basins, which reduced the Chattahoochee‘s ability 
to assimilate increased waste loads and created the need to explore enhanced treatment 
options.    
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“ATLANTA GROWS WHERE WATER GOES” 
 
The only basic factor in Atlanta’s future growth which must be improved is our water 
supply.  Practically all new industrial growth and improvement revolves around plentiful 
supplies of water. It is desperately vital to our civic existence. 
William Berry Hartsfield, 1951 Annual Address 
 
Unless Metropolitan Atlanta recognizes the practical limits of its urbanization, it may 
someday face a breakdown of the essential services and facilities on which a city must 
depend. 
Metropolitan Planning Commission, February 1952  
 
 
In February 1952, the Metropolitan Planning Commission (MPC) published its 
first regional land use guide for Metropolitan Atlanta, Up Ahead.  This plan was intended 
as a ―general framework‖ for guiding the physical growth of a 300-square mile 
―urbanized core‖ that extended beyond the City of Atlanta. To that end, the MPC 
forecasted future trends in population, industry, and commerce and recommended 
primary highway and rail systems that would ―be necessary for the free movement of 
people and goods.‖ In addition, the planning agency laid out general estimates for future 




By the 1950s, Atlanta‘s five-county metropolitan population was 694,669 and was 
expected to rise to more than 1.2 million by 1980. Based on these figures, water supply 
emerged as a particular concern for the MPC. Whereas most urban area of Atlanta‘s size 
had developed along the shores of rivers, lakes, or oceans, Georgia‘s capital was situated 
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on a water divide, a distinction it shared with only three other large cities in the world.  
The ridge that Atlanta is perched atop is part of the Eastern Continental Divide, which 
splits drainage between the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean. According to the 
MPC, this geographical feature is significant for two reasons. First, the ridge summit 
served as an ideal spot for a railroad junction and contributed greatly to Atlanta‘s 
strategic importance as a transportation center, a position the city could enhance with 
further improvements to its rail, highway, and air transportation systems.  Second, the 
ridge and its rocky surroundings made the region vulnerable to a lack of water. In fact, 
the planners emphasized that Atlanta ―must be able to develop a water resource base 
capable of supporting a much greater demand than at present‖ if the city was to continue 
to grow.
2
 Never before it seems were the challenges of reconciling the limitations of the 
Chattahoochee River watershed with the ambitions of the Atlanta metropolitan region as 
apparent as they were in the immediate post-World War II period 
The desire to maintain economic growth was the shibboleth of Atlanta‘s mid-
twentieth century political and business establishment. Key members of this community, 
as it turns out, had been engaged in an intense lobbying effort to secure the construction 
of Buford Dam, a multi-purpose impoundment authorized by Congress in 1946 to 
regulate the flow of the Chattahoochee River. Regulated releases of the river were 
necessary, Atlanta Mayor William Hartsfield and other pro-growth advocates 
successfully argued, because Atlanta was largely at the mercy of the Chattahoochee 
River‘s historically erratic flow. This group was also concerned, however, that the City of 
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Atlanta might experience the loss of population, tax revenue, and white political control 
because of decentralized metropolitan growth. Consequently, while Atlanta officials 
embraced certain features like highway construction that were recommended in the 
MPC‘s various land use guides, they also embarked on self-serving annexation plans and 
infrastructure building that included major expansions to the Atlanta Water Works 
(AWW). The unfortunate results were that the goals of comprehensive regional planning 
were undermined and greater water consumption was encouraged.    
  
THE ROOTS OF REGIONAL PLANNING AND THE POTENTIAL OF A 
REGULATED RIVER, 1900-1946 
 
The growing pains that Atlanta experienced at mid-century were a result of the 
uncoordinated growth that characterized the city‘s early development. The state assembly 
that authorized the initial land surveys in the 1830s was thinking about railroads, not a 
future metropolis, and as a result formal planning had been a neglected affair. Atlanta‘s 
first streets followed old Indian trails, railroads fingered out atop natural ridges, and its 
neighborhoods and industry emerged in the ample space that existed in between. 
Improvements to the city‘s waterworks, sewage system, and the street pattern had of 
course been made as new industry and people flocked into the city, but no action was 
taken toward overall planning until the state General Assembly established the Atlanta 
City Planning Commission (CPC) in 1920.
3
   
The Planning Commission was the product of the Atlanta Chamber of 
Commerce‘s attempts to impose order on a city that was undergoing significant 
demographic and spatial transformations. Between 1900 and 1920 the City of Atlanta‘s 
population grew from 89,872 to 200,616, an increase of 123 percent. Such a drastic 
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change in a relatively short period of time no doubt required at least some improvements 
to the city‘s infrastructure. And as historian Blaine Brownwell explains, although urban 
business groups were involved in political reform movements, ―leading commercial and 
civic groups were, in fact, apparently more prominent and influential in the early attempts 
to solve urban ills through systematic, comprehensive city planning than they were in the 
revision of municipal government.‖ There is little surprise then that CPC‘s authorized 
tasks were to make recommendations for laying out new streets, boulevards, and 
sidewalks, relieve traffic conditions, address sanitary improvements, and to establish 
zoning regulations and propose plans for an area as far as six miles away from the city 
limits of Atlanta and into Fulton County.
4
  
The commission‘s responsibility for alleviating traffic congestion and planning 
into Fulton County reflects a growing awareness of the technological and demographic 
trends that attended the introduction of the automobile. Like the streetcar before it, the car 
refashioned the modern urban landscape by providing people with the ability to work and 
shop in the city during the day while retiring into residential suburbs in the evenings. For 
example, while the city‘s population grew during the 1920s by thirty-five percent, the 
population of Fulton County outside of Atlanta grew by fifty-one percent. The result was 
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an increasingly scattered population that no amount of newly paved streets or viaducts 
could recapture.
5
   
 Supplying Atlanta with sufficient amounts of water was also a fundamental 
concern. Between 1920 and 1923, for instance, the AWW installed seven concrete rapid 
sand filters, constructed a new chemical application building, added a 10 million gallon 
clear well, and laid a 48 inch supply line from the Chattahoochee River Pumping Station 
to the Hemphill Treatment Plant. As a result of these improvements, AWW system 
capacity jumped from 41 MDG to 62 MGD. 
AWW officials also began to worry that the natural flow of the Chattahoochee 
River would need to be altered so that the city could consistently withdraw the necessary 
amounts to feed its water supply system. The river‘s depth fluctuated considerably over 
the course of the year, which was a primary reason the AWW constructed two storage 
reservoirs with a combined capacity of 500 million gallons in 1920, a reserve amount that 
alone could supply the city with water for about 16 days. In 1925, moreover, the region 
experienced a severe drought that reduced the amount of water that flowed past the 
AWW intake from an average of 2,710 cubic feet per second (c.f.s) to a low 230 c.f.s, (a 
change from 1,751 MGD to 148 MGD).  Although actual use during the period hovered 
around 30 MGD, the drought brought water levels so low that it nearly exposed the 
AWW‘s intake pipe. In order to prevent water rationing, at the AWW‘s behest, the City 
Council decided to furnish funds for the construction of a rip rap dam that would use rock 
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pilings to divert the river‘s flow to the intake side of DeFoor‘s Island to insure sufficient 
depth of water over the intake main.
6
 
Atlanta‘s water managers were not the only ones interested in the use of dams to 
harness the potential of the Chattahoochee River.  The Chattahoochee is part of a larger 
system, known as the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) River Basin, which 
originates in Georgia‘s Blue Ridge Mountains and flows past Atlanta as the 
Chattahoochee River before merging with the Flint River to become the Apalachicola 
River before emptying into the Gulf of Mexico. Residents on the lower reaches of the 
system began to organize in the early 1920s to promote the  
dual goals of flood control and navigation enhancement along the river through a 
series of locks and dams between Columbus and Atlanta. It was hydroelectric power, 
however, that first got Congress‘s attention. In 1925, Congress asked the Corps of 
Engineers to work with the Federal Power Administration (the precursor to the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission) to examine the development of hydroelectric facilities 
on the nation‘s waterways, which included the ACF basin.
7
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Figure 2.1 - The Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin. (Source: U.S. 
Geological Survey. http://ga.water.usgs.gov/nawqa/basin/images/map.basin.gif (accessed 







Efforts to develop the ACF stalled, however, after the stock market crash of 1929. 
During that time Atlanta, like most other cities, was reeling from the effects of the 
economic downturn. By the mid-1930s Atlanta was thirteen million dollars in debt and 
teetering on the brink of financial ruin. It was paying its employees in scrip and was 
unable to undertake badly needed improvements to the city‘s health facilities, schools, 
parks, and water-related infrastructure.
8
  
 Crises often present reform-minded politicians with an opportunity to enact 
sweeping changes, however. William Berry Hartsfield was this kind of politician. Born in 
1890 as the son of local tinsmith, Hartsfield rose to prominence through a keen mixture 
of self-discipline and self-promotion.  Unable to afford a formal education, he wrote to 
deans of prominent universities and requested lists of essential readings.  Working as a 
clerk during the day and spending his evenings in the Atlanta Public Library (his alma 
mater, he liked to say), he was effectively self-taught and was subsequently admitted to 
the Georgia Bar Association in 1917.  From this point he moved quickly into politics, 
elected as a city alderman in 1923, as a state legislator in 1933, and finally serving as 




 As a public servant, Hartsfield was the consummate urban booster. Throughout 
his four decades in public office, he relentlessly promoted Atlanta as a national aviation 
center and was a tireless huckster who relished any opportunity to enhance Atlanta‘s 
prestige for attracting commercial enterprises. To that end, it was Hartsfield who 
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famously labeled Atlanta as the city ―too busy to hate,‖ a phrase that served as a 
convenient mantra for a coalition of racial moderates who maneuvered to help Atlanta 
publicly sidestep much of the turmoil experienced by other southern locales during the 
burgeoning civil rights revolution.  Although skeptical of New Deal-style politics, which 
he believed potentially diluted personal character and initiative, he nonetheless courted 
the federal government for increased expenditures directed toward the betterment of his 
city.  ―Whatever his forum,‖ as one biographer noted, ―Hartsfield never failed to beat the 
drum for Atlanta.‖ And though Hartsfield technically spoke for the city he was elected to 
steward, his words resonated well beyond its corporate limits, effectively making him the 
face of an emerging southern metropolis.
10
        
 After taking office in 1937, Hartsfield worked closely with the business 
establishment to repair the city‘s frayed finances and infrastructure. With the support of 
his best friend, Coca-Cola magnate Robert Woodruff, who also presided over the 
prominent Trust Company of Georgia and served on the boards of General Electric and 
Southern Railway, Hartsfield worked to restructure the city budget and debt obligations. 
The mayor further restructured city departments to revise salaries and cut expenses and, 
with the aid of the Chamber of Commerce, created a civil-service program in 1939 that 
effectively undercut the appointive power of his ward-based political rivals. Most 
importantly, Hartsfield worked with federal relief administrators to secure funds for 
repairs to the city‘s public facilities. As a result, in 1938 the city began its third major 
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expansion of the Hemphill Water Treatment Plant, adding two additional sedimentation 
basins and seven new gravity filters to bring capacity to 72 MGD by 1941.
11
  
As it turns out, Congressional interest in ACF development was being revived just after 
Hartsfield was elected mayor. In 1939, Colonel R. Park, district engineer with the Corps, 
submitted a report to Congress that analyzed eleven projects at various stages of 
development in the ACF basin, including one at Roswell, Georgia, sixteen miles north of 
Atlanta. The Park Report, as it came to be known, detailed both the costs and benefits of 
each site. Colonel Park considered the following ―direct benefits‖ for all of the proposed 
sites: transportation, hydroelectric power, national defense, commercial value of riparian 
lands, recreation, and industrial and municipal water supply. Park also noted that at the 
time the Atlanta area had no immediate need for increased water supply, though such a 
future need was ―not improbable.‖ He stated that a large reservoir might have value as 
―an assured continuous water supply‖ due to the ―continued rapid growth of the area.‖ 
Though he assigned the other direct benefits a monetary value, he declined to do so for 
water supply, presumably because the benefit of this purpose, unlike all of the others, 
could only accrue in the future, rendering any valuation at that time speculative.
12
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Figure 2.2 – Mayor William B. Hartsfield. (Source: re-printed in Robert David Coughlin, 
Lake Sidney Lanier: ―A Storybook Site‖: The Early History and Construction of Buford 









As with the Great Depression, the advent of World War II played an important 
part in slowing down the development of the ACF basin. Atlanta officials continued to 
look on the ACF project with great interest. Three years after the Park Report, the Atlanta 
Freight Bureau, an organization created in 1902 to promote local shipping and business 
interests, released a study that urged Congress to pursue the full development of the ACF, 
which included a justification for the construction and maintenance of nine-foot 
navigation channel on the ACF from the Gulf of Mexico all the way up to Atlanta. This 
project, the Bureau argued, was not only economically feasible due to the significant 
increase in commercial tonnage on the river that was expected to occur but would also 
benefit the war effort because of Atlanta‘s ―importance to the army as a supply 
headquarters to the fourth army corps.‖
13
  
National defense and the augmentation of the South and its resources were but a 
few of the potential windfalls that were expected to result from the waterway 
development of the region. And with military and economic preparedness still a concern 
after 1945, Congress looked favorably upon the construction of multi-purpose dams as an 
important investment that could provide seemingly limitless power on demand as well as 
other benefits like navigation. 
  Congress moved forward with the ACF project when it adopted the Park Report 
recommendations in the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1945. But because the Park Report 
did not identify specific locations for the dams, the Corps continued to study the area 
over the next year. In 1946, the Corps, in its ―Newman Report,‖ recommended certain 
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amendments and revisions to the original plan for the ACF system, including combining 
several of the hydroelectric sites near Atlanta into one large reservoir at Buford, Georgia 
to increase power generation and to better regulate flows downstream. Division Engineer 
Brigadier General James B. Newman noted that the Chattahoochee River would be an 
excellent source of hydropower. According to Newman, a large reservoir—what would 
become Lake Lanier—was needed to make the locks and dams downstream more 
effective. The Newman Report noted that the proposed dam at Buford would be valuable 
for the purpose of flood control because of the frequent flooding in the basin and the 
severe damage that previous floods had caused. The report also explained that the various 
dams in the proposal would help keep flows continuous. These continuous flows would 
benefit navigation because they would allow barges to travel from Atlanta to Columbus 
and beyond, and they would assure a source of water supply for the City of Atlanta.
14
  
 The Newman Report, at several junctures, spoke of the benefit that the dam would 
provide for water supply. The report concluded that the project would ―greatly increase 
the minimum flow in the river at Atlanta,‖ which would safeguard the city‘s water supply 
during dry periods. In discussing the operation of the dam, the Newman Report noted that 
releases of 600 cubic feet per second (―cfs‖) should be made during off-peak hours in 
order to ensure a continuous flow of the river at Atlanta of not less than 650 cfs, even 
though this flow would have a slight detrimental effect on power generation. The report 
noted that this ―minimum release may have to be increased somewhat as the area 
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develops.‖ The Report expected that any decrease in power value would be marginal and 
outweighed by the benefits of an ―assured‖ water supply for the City of Atlanta.
15
 
Federal spending played an enormous role in facilitating Atlanta‘s twentieth 
century growth. Although the city had become by the 1930s the regional wholesale and 
retail center, it remained tied to a hinterland in which extreme poverty was common, 
which no amount of home-grown entrepreneurship or boosterism could easily solve. In 
fact, the revolution in the Southern economy occurred only when federal policies and 
programs were applied in combination with what historian Gavin Wright describes as 
―those enthusiast efforts of public agencies and private interests to welcome outsiders and 
outside money into the region.
16
 
 The cumulative effect of this cooperation between the federal government and local 
officials on the Southern economy, particularly in the Atlanta region, cannot be 
underestimated.  First, federal farm price supports, social welfare projects, and especially 
military expenditures during World War II and the postwar era were instrumental in 
buttressing consumer markets in the Southeast and paving the way for further 
industrialization, higher wages, and population growth.  During WWII, for example, 266 
new industries, many of which specialized in the manufacture of durable goods, were 
established in the Atlanta metropolitan area.  In addition, not only did the Department of 
Defense designate Atlanta as the military supply center for the eight surrounding states, 
but dozens of federal agencies relocated to the city as well, with the net result of cash per 
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 Second, the goals of many state and local officials in Georgia began to show a 
marked transition from the maintenance of white supremacy to the protection and 
promotion of economic and industrial progress. In addition to Atlanta‘s perennial 
promoters like Hartsfield or editorialist Ralph McGill, a new batch of politicians such 
Georgia Governor Ellis Arnall (1943-1947) and Cobb County Commissioner George 
McMillan began to espouse development-oriented policies that tacitly accepted federal 
supervision of southern economic development. As historian Bruce Schulman 
convincingly argues, ―changes in federal policy wrought a critical transformation in the 
character of southern political leadership . . . as the national security state supplanted the 
welfare state as the South‘s principal benefactor. . .  ‗Whigs‘ or ‗business progressives‘ 
eventually dominated the South.  Their ability to win military spending, research 
contracts, and highway and airport funds proved essential to both their political success 
and to their region‘s development.‖
18
 
 Finally, wartime and postwar military strategy and population trends seemed to 
point in the same direct: future development would most likely take place outside the 
city.  The atomic bomb, many argued, made the dispersal of critical industrial sites and 
urban concentrations necessary. The selected location of three major manufacturing 
facilities—the Bell Bomber plant and the Ford and General Motors assembly plants—at 
opposite ends of the metropolitan Atlanta is evidence of this new defense reality. The 
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acceleration of an automobile culture only hastened this pattern. The result would be a 
geographically expansive metropolitan region whose water demands would have to be 
met.  
THE BATTLE FOR BUFORD AND BUCKHEAD, 1947-1952. 
 Although Congress authorized the construction of the dams along the ACF, 
money would have to be appropriated each year through the construction process. The 
estimated cost of Buford Dam alone was $32,790, 000. In 1947, Georgia Representative 
James C. Davis informed Mayor Hartsfield that there might be a funding problem for 
fiscal year 1948. Hartsfield, eager to get the project started, contacted various local 




    Over the next three years, Hartsfield consistently campaigned for the completion 
of Buford Dam and Lake Lanier. But like the shrewd politician he was, his justifications 
and rationales for the project seem to have been suited for the audience at hand. For 
example, in a November 17, 1947 letter to Dr. John Steelman, whose assistance 
Hartsfield was seeking in order to secure $1.5 million for the project, the mayor 
acknowledged the dam‘s multi-purpose nature but stressed the river as a vital water 
source for Atlanta. Hartsfield wrote: ―The Chattahoochee River is Atlanta‘s sole water 
supply. Therefore, we are not only interested in the development of the River as a whole 
but it means much to us as a growing city‖  because ―unless something is done very soon 
Atlanta is going to have a water shortage.‖
20
 Six months earlier, in contrast, he wrote 
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Congressman John Kerr to state that ―In view of Atlanta‘s great military importance to 
the nation and of many uncertainties . . . that part of wisdom for the government to be 
prepared with plans for the building of this dam.‖
21
  
 One year later, when Atlanta was asked to contribute matching funds, as had been 
requested of Dallas, Texas, for a similar project, Hartsfield chose to de-emphasize the 
Chattahoochee as a water supply source. In a letter to Georgia Congressman James 
Davis, Hartsfield stated: 
Frankly, in our zeal I think we have just laid too much emphasis on the 
Chattahoochee as a water supply. . . . In our case the benefit so far as water supply 
is only incidental and in case of a prolonged drought. The City of Atlanta has 
many sources of potential water supply in north Georgia. Certainly a city which is 
only one hundred miles below one of the greatest rainfall areas in the nation will 
never find itself in the position of a city like Los Angeles. . . .in view of other 
possible sources of Atlanta‘s future water we should not be asked to contribute to 
a dam which the Army Engineers have said is vitally necessary for navigation and 
flood control on the balance of the river.
22
   
 
 Interestingly, once Atlanta was excused from bearing any costs of constructing 
Buford Dam, water supply conveniently slipped back into his appeals. Consider his 1951 
annual address, made one year after initial work had begun on the dam site, when he 
asked ―all patriotic citizens of metropolitan Atlanta, to inform themselves on this matter 
of future water supply upon which the very life or death of our community depends. 
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When they do they will realize that it is the most important factor in our future, as well as 
in the national defense, as far as the Atlanta area is concerned.‖
23
 
 In fact, Hartsfield‘s annual address also references the 1950 passage of the Plan of 
Improvement, which was another project that had occupied a great amount of his time 
and effort. This annexation program was designed for the city to triple its city limits and 
capture roughly 100,000 new citizens living in the unincorporated suburban fringes just 
outside of the city.  
 As previously explained, suburban sprawl was apparent by the early 1920s. The 
CPC had attempted curb the negative effects of decentralization through zoning 
restrictions but little was accomplished. By the 1940s, residential land use had broken 
through the city‘s corporate limits in many places. Older residential areas around the 
central business core were in decline. ―Slum clearance‖ work, resulting in the 
construction of eight public housing projects, cleared out what planners believed to have 
been some of the worst sub-standard housing. The downtown business district continued 
pushing north along Spring and Peachtree Street and east along Edgewood Avenue. 
Industrial land use followed the rail lines, which had sections along the northwest and 
southwest approaches that were fully industrialized within the corporate zone. Industry 
also pushed into former residential areas along the rail belt lines in central and southeast  
Atlanta.
24
    
 The onset of the Second World War only made matters worse. None of the major 
manufacturing or wartime facilities were located in Atlanta proper.  For example, the 
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―Atlanta‖ Army Depot was actually located at Fort McPherson in Clayton County, to the 
southwest of the city. Similarly, the Ford Motor Company constructed its assembly plant 
in the nearby Hapeville (southeast Fulton County) and General Motors based its 
operations to the northeast of Atlanta in Doraville (DeKalb County). Cobb County in 
particular flourished as a result of defense spending.  Between 1940 and 1950 its 
population jumped from 38,272 to 61, 830, an increase of 61.6 percent. The Bell Bomber 
plant, originally estimated as $15 million dollar construction project, eventually cost the 
War Department nearly $73 million and employed over twenty-eight thousand workers at 
the height of its production in 1945. Although the facility closed down shortly after the 
war, the Lockheed Corporation moved into the plant in 1951 to produce B-47s and, later, 
C-130s. In addition, the army airfield, based at Candler Field, soon relocated to Cobb and 
became Dobbins Air Force Base, which would also later house a naval air station.
25
   
The differential population growth between the city and Fulton County alone was 
undeniably impressive. Between 1920 and 1950 the population of the Atlanta-Fulton 
County area increased by 90 percent. The fastest growing portions, however, were north 
of the city  proper. While the City of Atlanta‘s population increased by 65 percent in this 
period, from 200,214 to 331, 314, the county population outside the city grew by a 
staggering 185 percent, from 60,330 to 172,128. And although the economic benefits that 
Bell Bomber and other defense-related industries bestowed on the metro area were 
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substantial and no doubt welcomed by many, they only seem to have reignited in other 
observers the long-simmering fears that Metropolitan Atlanta‘s gains were the City of 
Atlanta‘s losses.  The result was the revitalization of efforts to expand the City of Atlanta 
through annexation of unincorporated portions surrounding the city and the prompting of 
calls for forthright metropolitan planning.
26
   
 Hartsfield consistently championed annexation as a remedy to what he termed the 
scourge of ―suburbanitis,‖ i.e., suburbanites who made their living in Atlanta but left its 
governance to others. The flow of population into unincorporated Fulton, he and other 
expansionist advocates argued, had gradually resulted in the county government moving 
into the ―city government‖ business and ultimately led to the unnecessary paralleling of 
public services.  With the exception of water distribution, which the AWW sold at double 
rate to Fulton County residents, virtually every other service such as streets, lights, 
drainage, police and fire protection, and hospitals were performed by both the municipal 
and county governments.  What is more, because residents in unincorporated Fulton paid 
less in annual property taxes and the county lacked authority to levy license taxes on 




 For Hartsfield, this ―crazy quilt‖ of local government was an untenable situation. 
From his first days as mayor, Hartsfield pointed to what he deemed an imbalance of city 
and county service expenditures and recommended that the county take a ―greater share‖ 
of the burden.  Frustrated by ―the logical outgrowth of the disunity and selfishness that 
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seems to exist in the Atlanta metropolitan area,‖ he flatly stated: ―Frankly it sounds a 
little ridiculous to us of the corporate city to be told of the marvelous and wonderful 
future and what bold plans we ourselves must make, and then be stopped cold every time 
we attempt to enlarge our city and thus simplify many local problems and insure our own 
orderly expansion . . .‖
28
  
The mayor later reminded a radio audience about the contributions the City of 
Atlanta made in both metropolitan and state development and why allowance of 
expansion was necessary.  He argued: 
Its stagnation would hurt all Georgia as well as its own suburbs. Its great water 
system made possible the growth of its suburbs  and their industrial expansion. Its 
water is used free by county schools; its fire department goes into the suburbs free 
of charge and fights fire with water provided by this city. Its great airport  and 
other facilities are used by all the people for miles around. It is a good neighbor 
whose services would be sorely missed and whose misfortune could not but affect 
adversely all of us alike.
29
   
 
Only annexation, Hartsfield reasoned, could solve this dilemma. 
Fortunate winds began to blow the mayor‘s way when in 1949 a consortium of 
interests rallied around Hartsfield‘s pleas.  Hartsfield, the Chamber of Commerce, and 
various Fulton and DeKalb legislative delegates prevailed upon the General Assembly to 
establish a study group of ―disinterested and unbiased citizens‖ for ―the purpose of 
improving local governments and providing greater efficiency and economy; to provide 
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that said Commission may draft a plan or plans for such improvements to the 
governments of Fulton County and the City of Atlanta.‖
30
  
In its 1950 report, The Plan of Improvement for the Governments of Atlanta and 
Fulton County Georgia, the newly-created Local Government Commission (LGC) 
pressed forward with the topic of Atlanta‘s expansion. Echoing much of Hartsfield‘s 
rhetoric, it claimed that ―a city that cannot grow is destined to become a dead city.‖  
Avoiding the politically-charged term ―annexation,‖ the commission advocated for the 
passive expansion of the City of Atlanta accompanied by a re-shuffling of service 
responsibilities between the city and county.  Among its specific recommendations was 
the absorption of approximately 82 square miles of unincorporated territory to the city‘s 
land area, a complete reassessment of property taxes, and, as will be discussed in greater 




Voters in the upscale Buckhead community, led primarily by the prestigious 
Buckhead Fifty Club, who had argued that annexation would lead to higher taxes without 
improved services, soundly rejected similar annexation attempts in 1941 and 1947. 
Opposition continued to appear in various guises, from homeowner piqued by the 
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Figure 2.3 – Proposed Annexation Area, 1950. (Source: Local Government Commission, 







officials who jealously guarded their local control, and others who preferred city-county 
consolidation to annexation.  To address the latter, the commission maintained that 
complete consolidation of Atlanta and Fulton County was ―not adaptable‖ because the 
county‘s 60-mile length and vast rural areas would make uniform municipal services 
virtually impossible.  To uneasy homeowners, pro-annexation forces countered that any 
increases in property taxes would be offset by reductions in water and fire-insurance rates 
charged to unincorporated customers.
32
     
The unified support of groups such as the Chamber of Commerce, the League of 
Women Voters, the Fulton County Grand Jury Association, and the Parent-Teachers 
Association were apparently enough to allay any lingering doubts.  On June 29, 1950, 
voters in both the city and in the areas to be joined to it overwhelmingly approved ―the 
Plan of Improvement‖ take effect at 12:01 a.m. on January 1. 1952.  On that New Year‘s 
Day, the Atlanta Journal proclaimed that, by adding 100, 000 new citizens and trebling 
its land area, ―in one gigantic stride the city broke the rusty chains of corporate limits that 
had restricted its growth for 20 years.‖
33
 
Significantly, the LGC also indicated a need to establish a ―master plan‖ for 
future metropolitan development. This responsibility would be handled by the 
Metropolitan Planning Commission, which the Georgia General Assembly established in 
1947 as Metropolitan Planning Commission (MPC) as the first publicly-supported, multi-
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county planning agency in the United States.  Comprised of a fourteen member 
commission that included the mayors of Atlanta and Decatur, various appointed (white) 
residents, and a consultant staff specializing in various urban services, the MPC‘s 
mandate was to conduct research, surveys, and conferences for the creation of ―master 
plan‖ to guide the ―orderly growth and development‖ for all the territorial area of Fulton 
and DeKalb counties (the ―Metropolitan Planning District‖).
34
    
  In their attempt to reconcile downtown concerns with metropolitan development 
and expansion, the three reports issued by MPC between 1951 and 1954 are emblematic 
of a fundamental re-conceptualization of the relationship between the city and its 
hinterland that was taking place within the urban planning community.  From 
Metropolitanist plans such as Daniel Burnham and Edward Bennett‘s Plan of Chicago 
(1909) and Thomas Adam‘s Plan of New York and Environs (1929) they borrowed 
visions of a monumental city center that served as the financial and cultural core of a 
larger urbanized area.  As scholar Carl Abbott argues, for most urban planners during the 
mid-twentieth century, the central business district remained ―the unitary center of the 
metropolitan area‖ and, as a result, the assumption that everyone wanted to get downtown 
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 These planners were also influenced by regionalists such as Lewis Mumford and 
Benton MacKaye who advocated population decentralization and functional separation 
both in and beyond the urban core through the use of improved highway and 
communication systems and zoning restrictions.  But unlike the traditional regionalists 
who viewed this ―American middle ground‖ as the locus of artisanal lifestyle, folk 
culture, and indigenous landscape, i.e., a source of alternative values needed to reform the 
homogenizing affects of metropolitanism, these ―metropolitan regionalists‖ viewed 
regionalism as resource development to be managed from the center.  In short, it was a 
recipe for sustained, corporate-driven and federally subsidized economic development 
rather than a normative model of adaptive social behavior.
36
 
 That Atlanta‘s planners and leading businessmen and politicians embraced this 
―metropolitan regionalist‖ outlook is clearly evidenced in MPC‘s various reports.  For 
example, its second preparatory report, Up Ahead: A Regional Land Use Plan for 
Metropolitan Atlanta, argued that initial developmental efforts should be concentrated in 
a 300 square mile ―urbanized core‖ that extended for a radius of 10 miles beyond 
downtown Atlanta. This ―primary planning area‖ would include the City of Atlanta, most 
its home county of Fulton, and parts of the neighboring DeKalb county but also provide 
for the development of ―satellite communities‖ that would ―skip‖ 15 to 50 miles beyond 
the urban boundary. It also made clear reference to a defensive strategy to justify 
dispersal, noting that ―our target value to a potential enemy—and our chances of survival 
if we do get bombed—can depend on how well we scatter our plants and facilities.‖ The 
actualization of this regional plan, its authors hoped, would make Atlanta ―unique among 
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American cities for its open downtown area, its well-planned use of rolling land, its 
decentralized homes and factories, and its web of efficient highways.‖
37
  
 Unlike Up Ahead, which summarized recent trends as a justification for action, the 
actual master plan, Now . . . For Tomorrow, provided a more detailed sketch of the 
probable distribution of people and industry in 1980.  To that end it designated where and 
how residential areas, industrial and commercial zones, and transportation routes should 
be designed to facilitate ―the best and most economical use of every parcel of land in our 
community.‖  Downtown resurgence was prominently featured, with special emphasis 
placed on eliminating substandard sections, alleviating traffic congestion to increase auto 
circulation, and creating new office for the CBD‘s distinct role as ―Golden Heart‖ of the 
future metro area.   
 Reflecting the contemporary preoccupation with combating blight through urban 
renewal, residential neighborhoods were designated in one of three types: development 
areas in outlying districts where new subdivisions and construction would occur; mature 
areas that contained the bulk of the exiting population that would need protection from 
heavy traffic, inadequate facilities, and encroachment of incompatible land uses; and 
renewal areas in centrally located neighborhoods that were marked for ―far-reaching 
programs of rehabilitation and redevelopment.‖  Moreover, recommendations for 
improved neighborhood services such as street design and the strategic placement of 
schools, hospitals, and parks in both extant and future residential areas were made 
according to the schematic.  Lastly, specific zones for both commercial and industrial 
sites were suggested for outlying suburban areas based on Atlanta‘s growing importance 
as a regional distribution center and on the notion that decentralization was actually 
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―helping to ‗unclutter‘ the downtown district, enabling it to perform its unique function as 
the central core,‖ i.e., regional functions such as business, finance, culture and 




 That race was caked onto the collective consciousness of southerners and that it 
provided a subtext with which to interpret Atlanta‘s development is well documented. 
In a 1943 letter to a few hundred ―gentlemen‖ living in the proposed annex areas of 
Buckhead and Druid Hills, Hartsfield revealed more than one motivation for city 
expansion.   
 Although the letter began with a discussion of the higher tax and fire insurance rates 
paid in their respective communities, it soon shifted to the question of white outmigration 
and black political power.  Hartsfield wrote: 
The most important thing to remember cannot be publicized in the press or be made 
the subject of public speeches. Our negro population is growing by leaps and 
bounds. They stay right in the city limits and grow by taking more white territory 
inside Atlanta. Outmigration is good, white, home owning citizens. With the Federal 
government insisting on political recognition of negroes in local affairs, the time is 
not far distant when they will become a potent political force in Atlanta if our white 
citizens are just going to move out and give it to them. This is not intended to stir 
racial prejudice because all of us want to deal fairly with them; but do you want to 
hand them political control of the city? 
 
  Hartsfield would soon begin to ―deal fairly‖ with African-American demands as the 
black community began to constitute a more sizable voting bloc.  But that Hartsfield 
equated a well-run Atlanta with a white-run Atlanta should be no surprise.
39
    
 Similarly, the MPC made provisions for the dilution of black voting power through 
its metropolitan plans.  Up Ahead, citing the need ―to offset growing downtown 
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congestion and tensions resulting from overcrowding,‖ argued that ―the wise thing to do 
is find outlying expansion areas to be developed for new colored housing.‖ This could be 
accomplished, the MPC posited, by using funds from the Atlanta Housing Authority, 
which had the capacity to assemble the land and sell it to private builders.
40
   
In what may seem a case of lambs frolicking with lions, Atlanta‘s black political 
leadership endorsed the ―Plan of Improvement‖ and worked for its adoption through the 
Atlanta Negro Voters League and the Atlanta Urban League.  This action may be 
understood, according to historian Bradley Rice, as indicative of not only a debt that 
black leaders felt they owed Hartsfield and Chamber of Commerce president Elbert 
Tuttle for their recent overtures to the African American community but also of their own 
conviction that ―what was best for the city was best for their community within it.‖  But 
as years passed, blacks became more reticent about such grand compromises. Angered by 
the lack of consultation with regard to initial post-war planning and how urban renewal 
policies either destroyed downtown neighborhoods and businesses or relocated them to 
the outskirts, African Americans on the verge of political control by the 1960s and 70s 
rejected subsequent attempts to add new white voters through annexation.
41
       
 
ENGINEERING ―THE PLAN,‖ 1952-1962 
 On the morning of January 1, 1952, the Atlanta Journal welcomed 100,000 new 
Atlantans into the city, proclaiming it as ―another momentous event‖ that was 
comparable to ―the city‘s rise from the smoldering ashes Sherman left behind him in 
1865.‖  It was a smart, although not wholly sagacious, comparison.  As with the post-
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Civil War rebuilding effort, the post-WWII era was marked by a booster‘s enthusiasm for 
organized civic promotion to achieve economic expansion, what many have labeled as 
the indomitable ―Atlanta Spirit.‖  But whereas the earlier effort took place in a burned 
down town with little more remaining than an existing street pattern, Atlanta‘s latter-day 
policymakers would have to navigate through dense constellation of competing 
municipalities, aging technologies, and growing environmental hazards. The newspaper‘s 
writers may have actually sensed the comparison‘s semantic dissonance because they 
included, tucked in a few pages later, the announcement that the AWW was to embark on 
a $10 million expansion program by the end of 1952 to provide water service to perhaps 
50,000 new customers, a costly project that would have been almost unthinkable in 1865 
when there was no city water system that could have fought Sherman‘s fire.
42
 
 After years of trying to convince voters to approve the Plan of Improvement, 
politicians, planners, and engineers now had to turn their attention to the mission of 
implementing the infrastructural improvements it prescribed. The extension of water 
services to the annexed areas was a major component of the plan and its inclusion seems 
to have been a major selling point for Fulton County residents.  In fact, they may have 
come a little too late.  During 1949, for example, Fulton County sought legislative 
approval to construct and operate its own water supply system.  Fulton County 
Commissioner I. Gloer Hailey argued that water service was needed for thickly populated 
unincorporated areas such as Ben Hill in the southwest section of the county. ―If the city 
system can‘t or won‘t provide the water,‖ Hailey declared, ―then the county will have to 
find a means of doing it, even if it means another water system for metropolitan Atlanta.‖  
Atlanta City Councilman James E.  Jackson, chairman of the council‘s Water Committee, 
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was non-plussed by the commissioner‘s threat, however. ―It‘s all right with me if they 
want to finance it solely with county funds raised outside the city limits of Atlanta,‖ he 
responded. ―I‘ll add this prediction: They‘ll bankrupt the county government in 
attempting it.‖  He further added that the AWW was reviewing the allocation of perhaps 
one-third of its water revenue profits for possible expansion into the areas in question, but 
that it was ultimately a ―problem of engineering and financing‖ and that the City‘s first 
priority was to its own citizens.
43
  
This tête-à-tête is illustrative of the contentiousness of metropolitan water debates 
and the AWW‘s role as a service provider.  Despite the exaggerated talk that emanated 
from Hartsfield‘s office about the city being ready to supply water for the entire 
metropolitan region‘s residential and industrial needs, more restrained voices understood 
all too well the time and cost of such capital-intensive projects. For Jackson, the AWW 
was first and foremost a department within the City of Atlanta, and one with limited 
funding capabilities. It would therefore need to concentrate primarily on its existing 
service area and then attempt any expansions in well-planned stages. 
The consulting engineering firm which had designed most of Atlanta‘s water 
treatment and wastewater facilities during the twentieth century was also more 
circumspect than those in Hartsfield‘s administration about the AWW‘s ability to supply 
the entire area.  In their 1957 report on construction requirements for upcoming fifteen 
years, the consulting engineers of Wiedeman and Singleton recommended that ―future 
planning for the city‘s water works be confined to Fulton County, to that part of Atlanta 
lying in DeKalb County and such customers in Clayton County as are now served.‖  The 
firm based this recommendation on the fact that adjoining counties had begun to develop 
                                                     
43
 Ibid, 9 February 1949, 22 February, 1949, 11 October, 1949. 
105 
 
water supplies from the Chattahoochee River and other sources and that these facilities 
were adequate for present needs and could be extended to meet future requirements.
44
   
  But as Hailey, Hartsfield, and the authors of Up Ahead and the Plan of 
Improvement insisted, water ―is a regional, not local, problem.‖ As the sole distributor of 
water in the Atlanta-Fulton County area, the AWW ―must accept the responsibilities that 
go with a monopolistic position.‖
45
 
The Plan of Improvement would ultimately be the first crucial step in taking on 
that greater ―responsibility.‖  The LGC, for its part, was content to place immediate focus 
on the proposed annexation area.  Recognizing the advanced state of the AWW system 
and the desire to avoid duplication of services, it stated, ―The Atlanta Water Department 
in effect has a public monopoly for water services in the Fulton County area‖ and ―as it 
would be wasteful for the county to set a competing water system for the outside area, the 
Commission believes that the city‘s monopoly should be continued.‖  But despite the 
extensive network of mains within the new limits, AWW managers estimated that one-
third of all families in the new area were not connected to the system and there remained 
fairly large sections that did not receive city water at all. The commission therefore called 
for the City of Atlanta to extend water services to the area in a way similar to that 
furnished within the city limits. To avoid undue stress on the city‘s finances, it 
recommended that a period of four years after the effective date of the extension of city 
limits should be allowed for completing the extension of water mains in the new area.  
Lastly, after noting that the city was allowed by law to charge double rates in 
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unincorporated Fulton County, the Commission also called for the AWW to adopt a 
considerably more liberal policy on water distribution in the adjacent area outside the 
new city limits.
46
      
 The Commission‘s recommendation for the maintenance of an AWW 
―monopoly‖ was based on the advanced state of AWW operations as well as the shape of 
Fulton County. Of the AWW‘s 75,000 water meters, for example, roughly 60,000 were 
located within Atlanta‘s pre-annexation borders, some 14,000 were in unincorporated 
Fulton County, and nearly 600 were in unincorporated areas of DeKalb. In addition, the 
water department sold water to the governments of Hapeville, Marrietta, Smyrna, and 
Forest Park.  Fulton County has a peculiar shape. Totaling 523 square miles, it is about 
60 miles long from the northern tip above Alpharetta to the southern tip near Palmetto.  
At some points, between Sandy Spring and Roswell to the north, it is only 2 ½ miles 
wide; at others it is as much as 20 miles wide.  Furthermore, the City of Atlanta and its 
surrounding suburbs comprised the densest areas of development. It seems then that 
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Figure 2.4 – AWW Service Area, 1965. (Source: City of Atlanta, Department of Water, 





Unlike the Commission‘s four-year plan, the AWW‘s 1952 response came in the 
form of a more ambitious ten-year multi-million dollar expansion program. Conceived 
and directed by AWW General Manager Paul Weir, it was divided into two five-year 
programs designed for the two-fold purpose of supplying adequate water service to the 
annexed areas and to provide for future expansion of the system. The programs were to 
cost one million dollars per year and provide for distribution pipe extensions, additional 
storage tanks, and construction of a second waterworks system near the Chattahoochee 
River to complement the existing Hemphill plant.
48
 
Weir was a seasoned veteran of the AWW and no doubt a capable manager.  
Joining the department in 1928 as a recent Georgia Tech graduate, Weir first worked as a 
chemical laboratory technician before becoming superintendent of filtration, where his 
experiments in corrosion control and protective pipe lining were rewarded with the 
international Goodell prize  
in 1941. By 1948, when Weir was recognized as ―one of the leading waterworks 
authorities in the county,‖ Weir was elected to replace the retiring W. Zode Smith as 
AWW General Manager.
49
    
 Work on the first phase began immediately. Within the first eight months of 
construction, nearly fifty miles of water pipes had been laid, enough to supply a 
population of between 20,000 and 25,000.  All told, between 1952 and 1958, a total of 
460 miles of cast iron and steel water mains and 25,400 service meters were installed, 
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19,697 feet of mains were cleaned, and two elevated storage reserves and a new pumping 
station were added to boost filtered water pumping capacity to the new areas.
50
      
 Under Weir‘s tenure, however, the AWW resolved to not simply meet the needs 
described in the Plan of Improvement but also to prepare to meet future metropolitan 
needs. Although the AWW in 1952 supplied just under 60 MGD of water to 452,000 
customers, they project that by 1970 their customer base would climb to near 650,000.  
Here they relied on demographic forecasts, provided by the MPC, which anticipated the 
population of Fulton, DeKalb, Cobb, and Clayton counties to reach 1 million by 1970.  
Based on these projections, the AWW reasoned that 20 MGD additional capacity would 
be needed to prevent overload of the existing 72 MGD Hemphill Treatment Plant. This 
would necessitate further system expansion, which resulted in the proposed construction 
of the Chattahoochee River Treatment Plant.
51
  
 Completed in 1960, this facility was hailed as an achievement that would ―assure 
the city ample water for 25 years.‖  Electrically controlled and consisting of a river 
pumping station, two filtered water supply mains, two storage reservoirs, and two 
secondary pumping stations, it was to operate independently of the steam-powered 
Hemphill plant so that the city would always have water in case one system should 
unexpectedly shut down.  Initially producing 20 MGD, it was designed for an ultimate 
capacity of 60 MGD to be developed by progressive additions as demand dictated.
52
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 But what dictates demand?  It is standard engineering procedure to design 
facilities so that they are capable of handling peak daily demands (or loads). In the case 
of water supply facilities, the peak demand is normally considered to be one-and-a-half-
the daily average water demand.
53
 The question remains whether water utilities try to 
encourage water use. This would be consistent with the intent of both the Plan of 
Improvement and the MPC‘s master plan, which essentially sought to aggrandize the City 
of Atlanta by defining a core area for development within a larger metropolitan area.  In 
doing so these metropolitanist plans also provided the rationale and means for the natural 
expansion of the city‘s water system, which in turn fostered population increases. 
 It is in this context that the AWW‘s growth appears to be consistent with the 
scaling up of operations that took place among public utilities during the mid-twentieth 
century, particularly after the basic technological processes became skillfully routinized 
by technically trained managers. Historian Richard Hirsh argues, for example, that by the 
1930s the electric utility industry had established a ―grow and build‖ strategy as their 
basic managerial approach.  In addition to promotional pricing, this strategy, which 
would dominate the industry through the 1970s, depended on the development of large-
scale technology that offered decreasing unit costs.  Moreover, this managerial approach 
was based on the presumption that new technology would become more efficient and less 
costly (per unit of power output).  The result was that the strategy simply encouraged the 
growth in customer usage of electricity so that utility companies would need to install 
new power units.
54
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 Although one should guard against pushing the analogy between electric and 
water utilities too far, Hirsh‘s insights, broadly construed, provide a foundation for 
interpreting AWW activities in the post-war period.
55
 The AWW was an engineering-
centered municipal department committed to expanding both the Atlanta metropolitan 
region and it own operations within that sphere.  And in Weir the AWW selected a 
transitional figure for what was proving to be a transformative time in Atlanta‘s history. 
   The AWW‘s actions were more than a deliberate response to new population 
demands precipitated by the Plan of Improvement.  Instead, the AWW was seeking to 
build demand and capture future customers within an expanding metropolitan area.  By 
the 1950s the AWW utilized increasing returns to scale in order to produce an 
undifferentiated commodity to an expanding customer base that would extend 25 miles 
beyond the city center. And as its mid-century slogan ―Atlanta grows where water goes‖ 
suggests, the AWW was a prime facilitator of metropolitan development.  By the early 
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1960s, even before further additions to the Chattahoochee plan, t would raise total system 
capacity to 112 MGD, the AWW supplied water to 57 percent all of households 
connected to public water systems in the five-county SMSA area at precisely 1 cent per 
barrel consumed.  In addition, although industrial customers remained a fraction of total 
users, the AWW supplied, as Hartsfield never tired of telling people, heavy hitters such 
as Lockhead, Ford, Candler Field, and the Dixie Coca-Cola Bottling Company.  With a 
total rated capacity of 92 MDG, the ―giant of the metropolitan area‖ alone could treat 
more water in a single day than all of other metro water systems combined.
56
   
 Equally important was the revenue that such large-scale operations provided to 
the City of Atlanta.  By 1965, for example, the AWW generated $8.5 million from annual 
cash water sales, up from $5.1 million in 1952.  Interestingly, however, the AWW 
retained and spent only 28 percent of every dollar it collected each year, with half of that 
dedicated to ongoing operations and the other half allocated to retiring water revenue 
certificates that funded previous expansions.  By law, city schools received 30 percent of 
water revenue.  And the city government ordinarily used about 42 percent for general city 
operations that were in no way concerned with the water works.  Consequently, an 
expanding AWW effectively plowed money into the city‘s treasury, supplying roughly 15 
percent of Atlanta‘s revenue.
57
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 The AWW‘s circulation of booklets that promoted water supply operations and 
the MPC‘s use of the second-person narrative were integral factors in the creation of what 
urban scholar Seymour Mandelnaum has termed ―deep communities of mutual 
obligation.‖  Consider, for example, the inclusive language of MPC reports that relied on 
personal pronouns: ―how can we make the best and most economic use of every parcel of 
land? How can we provide for the most efficient movement of goods and people?‖  The 
MPC‘s choice of phrasings, like ―the answer must come from you—the citizen‖ was a 
deliberate attempt not only to convey that regional planning ―is the key to our 
metropolitan future‖ but also a way invest citizens with responsibility for carrying out 
these plans.  Likewise, AWW circulation of booklets containing the slogan ―Atlanta 
Grows Where Water Goes‖ was instrumental in engaging AWW customers. During in 
the 1950s this promotional campaign featured the cartoon character ―Willing Water‖ 
making comparisons between the price of water and the higher costs of meat, bread, 
gasoline, ice, all under the declaration that ―Atlanta‘s pure water supply is cheaper than 
dirt‖ served to bury the engineering problems of a city department and encourage the 
development of water consuming technologies such as industrial cooling towers, 
dishwashers, and garbage disposals.
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During the years immediately following WWII, Atlanta found itself in an 
unsettling position with regard to its future water supplies. Like most other large 
American cities in the first half of the twentieth century, Atlanta operated a municipally-
owned, centralized water system. This network of facilities and distribution pipes utilized 
improved treatment and filtration techniques to provide increased capacity for local 
economic development and population growth. Technological developments such as 
these were insufficient, however. Typical of other cities of this period, Atlanta 
experienced urban growth that was increasingly characterized by metropolitanization and 
suburbanization. But unlike Houston, which was able to meet its regional water demands 
by supplementing its groundwater reserves with the plentiful waters of the nearby San 
Jacinto River, and unable to reach into distant sources as Los Angeles had done  
with the Owens Valley, Atlanta was forced to rely on the inconsistent flows of the 
Chattahoochee River for its source of water.
1
  
 To Atlanta‘s good fortune, the federal government stepped in and financed the 
construction of Buford Dam. Intent on fostering Southeastern economic development and 
buttressing national defense in the post-war decades, Congress had proposed constructing 
a series of multi-purpose dams along the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) River 
Basin. Atlanta‘s metropolitan leaders and planners exploited this opportunity, arguing 
that the city‘s future economic growth, and its contribution to the nation, would be 
jeopardized unless the regulation of the upper Chattahoochee was accomplished. As a 
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result of their intense lobbying efforts, water supply became an authorized purpose of 
Buford Dam.  
Even as regional leaders were urging the federal government for assistance in 
securing water supplies, the City of Atlanta was implementing annexation and regional 
land use plans that would later strain its water resources. The irony of these developments 
is striking. Atlanta leaders entered the 1950s with a clear understanding of the limitations 
of the Chattahoochee River watershed but exited that decade engaging in practices that 
undermined the best intentions of regional planners. Buford Dam certainly regulated the 
Chattahoochee‘s flows but the rapid extension of highways, lack of regulations to limit 
the geographic extent of suburban development, and expansion of water treatment 
capacity invited a kind of water consumption at odds with the coordinated regional 
development Atlanta officials purportedly championed.  
    The remaining three chapters, which have significant temporal overlap, will 
explore the environmental and legal problems that arose in the wake of metro Atlanta‘s 
quest to secure larger supplies of water for its expanding population. Leavened by the 
Lake Lanier impoundment, the city and its neighboring county governments would 
continue to expand their water supply facilities and increase their withdrawal amounts. 
As we shall see, this led to confrontations with downstream neighbors and federal and 






“SEWERS HAVE NO SEX APPEAL”: THE CHALLENGES OF WATER 
POLLUTION CONTROL IN POST-WAR ATLANTA 
 
 
Atlanta officials might be compared to the little old lady who lived in a shoe in respect to 
pollution control—they have so many problems they don’t know what to do. 
W. Eugene Smith, 1968 
. . . the showdown between Atlanta and the Water Quality people is only the beginning of 
a long series unless the proper parties wake up to the fact that the old laissez faire days 
are gone as far as playing fast and loose with the general public’s water is concerned. 
Atlanta Journal editorial, 1971 
 
In February 1965, after a composite study conducted by the United States 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) determined that the 
Chattahoochee River was ―grossly polluted for about 100 miles below Atlanta,‖ the 
Georgia State Water Quality Control Board (SWQCB) initiated an abatement program to 
reduce the amount of sewage and industrial waste being discharged into the river. The 
City of Atlanta, which owned and operated three wastewater treatment facilities 
(WWTFs) located on the river, was considered to be a major source of the pollution.  
Atlanta, as well as other cities and industries known to discharge untreated or 
inadequately treated wastes, were advised that the Board would require, within a 
reasonable time, a plan and schedule for abatement from each of them.
1
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The City of Atlanta, in collaboration with the consulting engineering firm of 
Wiedeman and Singleton, produced an engineering report in December 1965 that 
outlined major improvements to be made in the three waste treatment plants. Based on 
design criteria provided by the SWQCB, which the Board argued would ―enable the City 
to arrive at a reasonable and practical solution‖ to its municipal pollution problem, the 
construction plan called for upgrading the facilities to the level of ―secondary‖ treatment 
to ensure the removal of up to 85 percent of organic matter entering the river. The 
SWQCB accepted Atlanta‘s plans on March 1, 1966 and established July 1971 as the 
completion date for all water pollution control projects to be in operation.
2
 
Atlanta Mayor Sam Massell informed the SWQCB in mid-1970, however, that 
the city would be unable to meet its agreed-upon deadline due to delays in obtaining 
financing and the failure of engineers to complete further detailed plans. Upon 
recognition that efforts ―to secure the voluntary cooperation and compliance‖ of Atlanta 
officials had failed to achieve the desired ends in ―a reasonable period of time,‖ the 
SWQCB, in conjunction with the newly-created Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), took more decisive action. On December 9, the EPA threatened prosecution to 
force Atlanta to undertake the specific antipollution measures it dictated if the city did not 
deliver acceptable abatement plans within 180 days. What is more, the SWQCB 
simultaneously assumed exclusive power to grant or deny applications for new sewer 
attachments until the city completed these abatement projects. The projects were to 
include both the immediate acceleration of a program to achieve the required secondary 
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treatment of the municipal effluent entering the Chattahoochee River and the necessary 
increase in sewer service fees to accomplish it by December 31, 1972. But the ultimate 
goal, as federal and state agents reminded Atlanta officials, was for the complete 
elimination of all municipal pollutants discharged into the city‘s rivers and streams.
3
    
Less than two months later, in February 1971, Sam Massell told a U.S. Senate 
Subcommittee that insufficient funding and public apathy had rendered his city virtually 
impotent to solve its water problems without greater federal assistance. ―I don‘t believe in 
standing in the schoolhouse door, and I am not trying to stop anything,‖ he told the 
senators, but ―the money is not available.‖ Federal and state ―demands for increased local 
commitments to control pollution‖ had occurred, he argued, when ―demands for other 
city services are rapidly increasing and local revenue sources are severely strained to 
meet that burden.‖  Moreover, Massell asserted that securing additional local revenue 
from ―the man on the street‖ for the purpose of pollution control was made all the more 
difficult because ―sewage doesn‘t have the sex appeal that other projects do.‖ The stark 
reality, he ruefully assured the subcommittee, was that without increased federal funding 




Congress, which was in the midst of oversight hearings to evaluate the expanding 
federal effort to restore the quality of the nation‘s soiled waters, proved willing and 
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receptive. Federal relief came the following year with the passage of the Water Pollution 
Control Act Amendments of 1972, which not only established stricter abatement 
requirements and enforcement measures, but also boosted the federal share of facility 
construction up from thirty-five to seventy-five percent. As a result of the latter 
provisions, Atlanta officials began to tackle some of their most pressing pollution control 
needs, most notably through the Three Rivers Water Quality Management Program, a 
mammoth tunneling project designed to divert treated wastewater away from three local 
rivers and deliver it back to its point of origin, the Chattahoochee River.
5
 
As the foregoing summary suggests, only the imposition of federal and state 
authority and assurances of federal financial support would compel the City of Atlanta to 
take substantive action on its water pollution problems. More accurately, in tracing the 
roots of Atlanta‘s lax environmental stewardship and the evolution of federal water 
legislation from the 1930s to the 1970s, this chapter argues that events in Atlanta 
unfolded in the shadow of transitions taking place in federal and state environmental 
agencies. It demonstrates first that the federal presence in Atlanta sewer issues did not 
simply begin with the carrot and stick approach of the 1970s. Rather, federal presence 
dated back to infusions to help build Atlanta‘s massive metropolitan sewer system in the 
1930s and evolved according to environmental paradigms that slowly shifted from 
concerns over public health and economic development to ecosystems awareness.  
Furthermore, it also shows that although Atlanta leaders faced numerous topographical 
and technological challenges, their consistent resistance to making necessary financial 
and administrative adjustments also compounded their troubles, leaving state and federal 
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authorities with little choice but to become important participants in efforts to address 
Atlanta‘s mounting water pollution crisis. 
THE FEDERAL ANTIDOTE TO WATER-BORNE DISEASE IN ATLANTA, 
1935-1952 
Atlanta emerged from the piecemeal sewer operations of the late nineteenth 
century to become among the nation‘s pioneers in urban sanitation during the two first 
decades of the twentieth century.  For example, in 1912 it became the first American city 
to use Imhoff sedimentation tanks for the processing of sewage and by 1916 had three 
fully operational biological treatment facilities. As a result of these improvements, 
Atlanta saw its typhoid death rate decline by seventy percent—from 56 per 100,000 in 
1911 to 17 in 1916— as nearly 80 percent of its population was served by the plants at a 
cost of less than five cents per capita.
6
 
As the city entered the 1930s, however, it found that its physical facilities had not 
kept pace with the terrific population growth witnessed during the preceding decade. 
During the 1920s, Atlanta‘s population increased by approximately seventy percent. Then 
the Great Depression occurred, bringing with it unemployment and reduced 
manufacturing output. As a result, local tax receipts plummeted and, as operating 
expenditures were curtailed in response, attempts to improve the area‘s deteriorated 
schools, hospitals, playgrounds, and parks came to a grinding halt.
7
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Atlanta‘s civic leaders singled out the city‘s sewerage system as its most urgent 
infrastructural problem. Labeled a ―disgrace‖ by one historian of the New Deal, its 
overloaded disposal plants spewed vast amounts of untreated human and industrial 
wastes into area streams, while its antiquated sewer network caused street and cellar 
flooding during even moderate rainstorms.  Such inadequacies produced not only 
offenses to the eyes and nose but reignited public health concerns as well. In 1933, for 
example, the Georgia State Board of Health director reported that Atlanta typhoid rates 
were twice the average for the fifteen largest urban areas in the country and that the city 
ranked first among all American cities in diphtheria deaths. Moreover, local farmers who 
used various creeks to water their livestock began to file damage suits against the cities of 
Atlanta and nearby Decatur ―for inadequate sewage treatment and stream pollution.‖ In 
response to these complaints, the grand juries of Fulton and DeKalb Counties requested 
that the local Better Government Commission investigate the area‘s sanitary conditions 
and recommend possible remedial abatement measures.
8
  
The Commission issued its report in February 1935. It found that the 
municipalities of Fulton and DeKalb had made provisions for fully or partially treating 
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approximately 31 million gallons of sewage per day (MGD) but that the total daily waste 
load actually approached 44 MGD. Much of raw sewage discharged into streams, the 
report claimed, came from developed areas lying in between the municipalities. 
Recognizing that ―unincorporated areas are a large factor in the problem‖ and that 
numerous limitations prevented any single municipality from providing comprehensive 
service to all of Fulton and DeKalb Counties, the investigators recommended that a 
Metropolitan Sewer District be established ―to provide for all of the area a common 
system of sewers and disposal plants.‖
 9
  
The Better Government Commission understood well that providing Atlanta with 
an adequate sewerage system would be difficult and expensive. The City of Atlanta and 
its adjacent communities sit on rugged topography. It is split by the Eastern Continental 
Divide, a ridge that demarcates the two watersheds of the Atlantic Ocean: the Atlantic 
Seaboard watershed and the Gulf of Mexico watershed. Rainwater falling east of the 
ridge enters the Altamaha River Basin and eventually enters the Atlantic Ocean. That rain 
which falls west of this ridge enters the Apalachicola Basin via the Chattahoochee River 
before emptying into the Gulf of Mexico. Smaller drainage and sub-drainage basin mold 
the terrain into countless segments that requires a myriad of gravity-dependent sewers to 
conduct wastes to not one but several disposal plants. Metropolitan Atlanta was also 
home to political boundaries that did not conform to the natural drainage systems, 
producing potential jurisdictional disputes over which city or county was responsible for 
paying for the treatment of wastes generated in one area but transferred to another. 
Lastly, the City of Atlanta, the largest sewer provider in the area, was in dire economic  
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Figure 3.1— Atlanta Topographical and Political Boundaries, 1964. (Source: Atlanta 
Regional Metropolitan Planning Commission, Water and Sewer Problems in 






Figure 3.2 – Metropolitan Atlanta Counties, 1964. (Source: Atlanta Regional 






straits had been reduced to relying on bank loans since 1933 to cover its operating 
expenses. But despite these daunting obstacles, the Commission stated: ―the well-being 
of the community demands that it [―the sewage problem‖] be dealt with at once, and now 
is the time to do the work, at the lowest cost to the district, by reason of federal aid.‖
10
   
The Commission‘s report came at a propitious moment. According to historian 
Jason Scott Smith, by 1935 President Roosevelt‘s New Deal was undergoing a ―Public 
Works Revolution‖ that would eventually ―transform the landscape and make the case for 
the New Deal in cement, mortar, and steel.‖ After being criticized by the national media 
and trade and professional organizations for putting too few men back to work too 
slowly, the New Deal  entered a phase in which it merged the acute need to stimulate 
immediate economic recovery with the federal government‘s long-term goal of resource 
management and economic development. It did this through a host of state-sponsored 
public works construction programs that were financed through the Works Progress 
Administration (WPA) and the Public Works Administration (PWA). For example, by 
mid-1935, two years after its creation, the PWA stopped emphasizing loans for self-
liquidating public works projects with the potential to raise revenue (roads, bridges, 
dams) to cover the costs of construction and began to offer grants-in-aid for municipal 
improvements. In addition, with the establishment of the PWA in April 1935 the federal 
government complimented the WPA‘s method of limited contract employment on large 
infrastructure worksites (and indirect employment in related industries) with the direct 
employment of large numbers of workers in selected smaller construction projects under 
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government supervision.  And although primarily remembered for its support of artists 
and writers, the WPA actually devoted seventy-five percent of its funding and work relief 
to far less sexy projects such as highways, streets, public buildings, utilities, and 
recreational facilities. Likewise, the PWA ―primed the pump‖ by authorizing the 
construction of some thirty-four thousand projects  by early 1939 at a cost of over $6 
billion, during which time it made possible about eighty percent of all sewer construction 
in the Unites States.
11
   
When the WPA became functional in the fall of 1935, the Atlanta city council 
applied for a nine million dollar grant to construct its sewer system and make 
improvements to school facilities. Within weeks of submitting the application, federal 
officials informed Georgia Senators Walter George and Richard Russell that six million 
dollars in grant money was approved for initial sewer construction and that work would 
proceed on the basis of cooperation between the WPA and the PWA. The former agency 
was to directly oversee construction of four small waste plants and employ thousands of 
workers in the laying of all sewer lines.  Additionally, the latter agency contracted with 
local private companies for the construction of two larger disposal WWTFs. With 
assurance of federal money, Atlanta civic leaders waged an all-out campaign for passage 
of a $1.75 million bond issue (with a token $55,000 allotted to school improvements) to 
cover the city‘s share of construction expenses, which passed on September 25, 1935. 
Work commenced in December 1935 and continued for four years. During that time six 
modern disposal plants, with a total treatment capacity of 68 MGD, and approximately 
116 miles of trunk and sanitary sewer lines were built throughout Fulton and DeKalb 
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Counties at a total cost of nearly eleven million dollars. Aided by this infusion of federal 
largess, Atlanta‘s officials rejoiced in the belief that ―the sewage problem of the entire 
metropolitan district has been met and solved for 20 years to come.‖
12
  
Federal agencies did not involve themselves in how the two-county sewerage 
system was to be managed by the various local governments. According to the Better 
Government Commission‘s proposal for a Metropolitan Sewer District, a single agency 
would be created to provide sewerage service for all of Fulton and DeKalb counties in 
order to relieve individual municipalities of the burden of existing indebtedness, 
operational and maintenance expenses, and the planning of when and where 
improvements and enlargements would occur in otherwise isolated systems. 
Municipalities and water suppliers within the district were to make contributions based 
on the amount of water sold, with the maximum charged fixed at one cent per one 




The Commission‘s plans were only partially realized. Rather than creating the 
proposed Metropolitan Sewer District, which would have required enabling state 
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legislation to allow for such an authority to establish uniform rates and make all planning 
decisions for the whole system, local governments opted to move forward through 
contractual agreements that were to be re-negotiated every five years. After a series of 
heated debates the beneficiaries resolved in 1940 that the City of Atlanta, which had the 
most experience with waste treatment, should maintain ownership and responsibility for 
operating four of the system‘s disposal plants with Fulton County to pay one-third of the 
cost of those plant operations. Similarly, DeKalb County was to contribute a portion for 
its area serviced by these facilities overseen by Atlanta, but also hold the title to two 
small disposal facilities located wholly within the county. In addition, improvements to 
any part of the system required approval from those governments affected, with 
apportioned costs to be re-negotiated as the need arose.  Lastly, each government was 
allowed to dictate its own system (or absence) of sewer service charges and the area‘s 
respective water supply departments were incorporated only insofar as they were 
potential sources of revenue and not as planning partners.
14
 
Washington also did not assume any responsibility for establishing standards for 
the quality of the effluent discharged into Atlanta‘s streams. Although federal financing 
certainly did mitigate against some of the area‘s most pressing public health concerns, its 
chief objective in Atlanta was to provide for work relief and to foster economic recovery 
and development. As Martin Melosi explains, the United States Public Health Service 
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(USPHS) had engaged in water quality monitoring since 1912 but no fixed standards 
existed until after the Second World War. Federal water policy, instead, had traditionally 
called for federal funding of dams for flood control, power production, and irrigation 
purposes. And even with the introduction of state-sponsorship of sewer plants in the 
depression-era, the federal role in pollution control remained limited, as evidenced in 
President Roosevelt‘s 1938 veto of a stream-pollution bill that passed through Congress
15
    
Despite the lack of national water quality standards, a general consensus had 
emerged through the interwar years among sanitary engineers regarding biological 
methods that could be employed to satisfactorily treat wastewater. The plethora of 
drainage divides and the dependence on the cheaper form of gravity conveyance required 
that Atlanta‘s system would include numerous disposal facilities of differing load 
capacities. The treatment methods chosen for these plants were largely based on the 
volume of water in each receiving stream, a fact that indicates a reliance on the ability of 
flowing water to partially dilute municipal wastes. The city‘s WWTFs, depending on the 
location, fell into two categories: those that provided primary treatment only and those 
that provided primary and secondary treatment. The primary treatment plants— the R.M. 
Clayton plant and Utoy Creek plant—discharged their effluent into the tributaries of the 
Chattahoochee River. The four remaining plants—Intrenchment Creek, South River, 
Shoal Creek, and Snapfinger—provided both primary and secondary treatment and 
discharged into the tributaries of the Flint and South Rivers. The reasoning behind this 
approach was that the Chattahoochee River, because of its relatively large size, could 
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Wastewater, by weight, is 99.4 percent water. The remainder is either dissolved 
material or suspended matter (―suspended solids‖). The dissolved content typically 
consists of organic compounds, although trace elements of inorganic compound may be 
found as well. With sufficient capacity and time, running water can theoretically purify 
itself of biodegradable organics, which serve as food sources for bacteria and other 
aquatic micro-organisms. But this chemical reaction consumes oxygen. The amount of 
oxygen needed to stabilize the biodegradable organics is called the biochemical oxygen 
demand (BOD).  The higher the BOD, the more oxygen needed to break down the 
organics. If the oxygen demand of the wastewater exceeds the oxygen sources of 
receiving water, then the oxygen will be completely depleted and the stream or lake will 
become septic near the wastewater discharge point.
17
 
Primary treatment is a basic form of treatment. Its main goal is to remove from 
wastewater those solids which would either settle (such as heavier suspended solids) or 
float (such as grease). In this stage, raw sewage passes through screens to remove objects 
greater than half-an-inch and a comminutor so that any remaining particles can be 
pulverized to an eighth-of-an-inch or smaller.  Screened water then enters a grit chamber 
where heavy sand, cinders, or grit from street washings are allowed to settle to the 
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bottom. The grit or gravel is taken from the chambers and is typically washed and 
disposed of through landfilling.   
After screening and grit removal, sewage goes into a large (Imhoff-type) 
sedimentation tank where it is detained long enough (2-3 hours) to remove as much 
organic material (by settling) as possible without the whole process becoming anaerobic, 
which would cause nuisance odors and slow down the treatment process. The settled 
materials, known as raw sludge, are removed from the sedimentation tanks by mechanical 
scrapers and pumps. Floating material, such as grease and oil, rise to the surface of the 
tanks, where they are collected by a surface-skimming system and removed for further 
processing in either sludge digesters or drying beds before being carried away and also 
landfilled.  
Secondary treatment, in contrast, is more complex and therefore more expensive. 
The major goal is to remove the soluble BOD that escapes the primary process and to 
provide added removal of suspended solids. In most cases, such as in Atlanta, biological 
processes bring micro-organisms into contact with the impurities present in the 
wastewater so that they may use these impurities as food. The objective is to encourage 
the right kind of aerobic bacteria by providing them with ideal temperature and oxygen 
concentrations to maximize their reproduction, and hence the oxidation of wastes. 
Secondary treatment thus seeks to speed up, by mechanical means, the natural processes 




 In secondary treatment the effluent is intermittently sprayed into trickling filters, 
which are coarse beds of coal, coke, or stone.  As wastewater trickles through the beds, 
which range in depth from 3 to 10 feet, it passes over the ―fixed film‖ of microbial 
growth that clings to the media‘s surface area. This provides the needed contact between 
the organics and the micro-organisms and allows the latter to feed. The cleaner water that 
trickles out of the bottom of the filter with small amounts of washed-out microbial 
growth is then passed through a second sedimentation basin or ―final clarifier‖ to allow 
those solids to settle out.      
The differing effects of primary and secondary treatment are substantial. Whereas 
secondary treatment may remove more that 85 percent of the BOD and suspended solids, 
primary treatment only typically removes 60 percent of the suspended solids and about 
35 percent of the biological content from raw sewage. Soluble pollutants are not removed 
in primary treatment. This can leave water bodies in a very unhealthy state. Organic 
matter depletes the oxygen resources of water bodies, and if unchecked, will stimulate 
undesirable growths of plants or organisms (such as algae).  An overabundance of plant 
growth can harm aquatic life and by choking off necessary oxygen supply and as well as 
produce undesirable esthetics or adverse health effects for downstream water users.
18
      
But as the threat of water-bornee diseases receded with the construction of new 
facilities in the 1930s, new concerns over the dangers to public water supplies posed by 
                                                     
18
 EPA, Alternatives, 6-7; Rogers, America’s Waters, 111; The activated sludge process, which was first 
developed in the 1910s but did not come to Atlanta until the early 1962, is another biological technique 
commonly found in secondary treatment plants.  It derives its name from the biological mass formed when 
air is continuously injected into the wastewater to supply the conditions under which micro-organisms can 
grow and feed off the organic matter. The aeration causes the organisms to clump together to produce a 
flocculate precipitate or ―activated sludge.‖ This mixture is drawn into a secondary clarifier so the sludge is 
settled out and disposed of in landfills while most of the sludge is returned to the aeration tanks to be 
introduced to fresh wastewater so that the process of nitrification (or oxidation of materials) can begin 
again. See EPA, Alternatives, 8-14; Melosi, The Sanitary City, 172;  
134 
 
the rapid urbanization and industrialization attending World War II emerged. Enhancing 
water ―quality‖ for purposes of economic development, as Melosi explains, took on 
greater importance during the postwar years. The disjointed attempts of local and state 
health agencies to protect the nation‘s public water supplies from the harmful effects of 
toxic chemicals and soluble biological content prompted the federal government to take 
the first tentative steps at creating a national abatement program. Therefore, in 1948 it 
passed the first-ever Federal Water Pollution Control Act, which empowered the USPHS 
to collect data and prepare comprehensive plans to prevent the pollution of interstate 
waters. In addition, it authorized the Federal Works Administration to provide technical 
assistance to local agencies and municipalities constructing treatment plants.
19
  
 Although the 1948 act established a precedent for further federal involvement in 
water pollution control, it confined the federal agencies to a supporting and advisory role. 
Water pollution was looked upon as a local matter, and as Paul Charles Milazzo observes, 
―the statute‘s rather convoluted regulatory features illustrate how faithfulness to 
federalism undercut programmatic effectiveness.‖
 20
  There were no federally required 
goals, objectives, limits, or even guidelines. Furthermore, the authority of the USPHS did 
not extend to watercourses that did not flow across or form any part of state boundaries. 
Lastly, any suits and judgments brought by the federal government were subject to 
potential veto by the state in which the pollution originated.  
In the absence of federal water pollution control mandates, Georgia‘s State Board 
of Health tried cooperation and education as a means of preventing water pollution. The 
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state‘s Public Health Department (created in 1903) tried various methods of public 
outreach to maintain an awareness of the various dangers to water quality. Through its 
Public Health Engineering and Water Pollution Control Divisions, which were  
established as early as 1924, it offered technical assistance to local communities in the 
form of educational films and literature, which included a comic book on combating 
water pollution titled ―The Fight to Save America‘s Waters: A Mark Trail Adventure in 
Public Health and Conservation.‖ More substantive was its annual Georgia Water and 
Sewage School, which brought together national sanitation equipment suppliers, public 
health officials, academics, and engineers to disseminate the latest information on water 
supply and pollution-related issues. Its 1951 meeting held at the Georgia Institute of 
Technology, for instance, included sessions on bacteriology of water and sewage, 
mechanical clarifiers, and sludge digestors, as well as a demonstration on new methods of 
sewage cleaning.
21
       
According to William H. Weir, director of the state‘s Pollution Control Division 
during the 1950s, the success of cooperative efforts between state agencies and local 
political and industrial leaders in combating stream pollution was evident by mid-century. 
Reflecting back on the progress made in pollution control since he joined the agency in 
1928, Weir argued that water-borne diseases had been brought under control by the 
replacement of privy vaults with modern sewage treatment techniques. Typhoid fever, 
which had claimed 17 lives for each 100,000 persons in Georgia in 1930, was ―almost 
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non-existent,‖ Weir claimed, which led him to conclude that ―the pioneer work of 
pollution control is in the past now.‖  Furthermore, he believed that civic and industrial 
leaders had awoken ―to the economic need for the advantages of a pure water supply,‖ 
which suggested to him that stringent state agency focus on disease prevention had been 
supplanted by widespread attention to the primacy of water quality in economic 
development. Municipal officials, he opined, realized that ―not only is it more healthful to 
build sewage treatment plants but also more helpful in getting new industries.‖ Similarly, 
as courts began to award damages to persons who claimed damages from upstream 
pollution, industries showed an awareness that pollution control is ―not only good public 
relations but also prevents lawsuits.‖ What is more, Weir felt that if municipal and 
industrial leaders continued to seek technical assistance from his office for building and 
improving treatment systems, then Georgians could be confident that they were on their 
way to having ―a pure water supply for unlimited growth.‖
22
  
And growth was the order of the day for most Atlantans as they entered the post-
war years. As Chapter Two explained, Atlanta officials had grown increasingly alarmed 
by residential and commercial decentralization. In an effort to maintain the vigor of 
downtown Atlanta and reduce the wasteful redundancy of duplicated city and county 
services, Atlanta‘s civic leaders successfully pushed for the 1952 annexation of 
unincorporated areas in north Fulton County that had experienced tremendous population 
growth during the interwar period. The ―Plan of Improvement,‖ the city‘s blueprint for 
achieving the desired corporate expansion, outlined the broad services needs for both the 
Atlanta Water Works (AWW) and the Sewer Division in the new city limits. According 
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to the Plan, the AWW needed to extend water mains into large sections of the newly 
incorporated area that had not previously received city water. This prompted AWW 
director Paul Weir to initiate a two-phased, ten year program of system improvements 
wherein the first five years the city would enlarge its distribution network to meet  the 
most immediate water supply demands and then later expand treatment capacity over the 
remaining five years to ensure adequate water supply for the next twenty-five years. 
 Because planners and engineers of the 1930s had constructed a system for a city 
much larger than the Atlanta of that era, sewage improvements, according to the Plan of 
Improvement, would be far more modest in comparison to those of the AWW.  Equally 
important, the planners argued, was that the City of Atlanta as well as Fulton, and 
DeKalb Counties continued to cooperate in accordance with the negotiations prescribed 
in the establishment of what became known as the ―Metropolitan Sewer System.‖ In 
1946, for example, the city and county passed a joint bond issue that dedicated $3 million 
for the construction of new sewer trunk lines to tie into the existing facilities. This kind of 
collaboration, it was believed, portended great things for Metropolitan Atlanta‘s future 
growth.
23
      
 With the threat of water-bornee diseases curbed and treatment capacity apparently 
sufficient, Atlanta leaders looked forward to continued economic progress as they began 
the second half of the twentieth century. In fact, if they took the words of the city‘s Chief 
of Construction at face value, then they had cause to be optimistic. In June 1951 Clarke 
Donaldson assured local reporters that Metropolitan Atlanta‘s sewer system was well  
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Figure 3.3—Atlanta Metropolitan Sewer System, 1962. (Source: Atlanta Regional 






ahead of the expanding city‘s needs. With 980 miles of sewer lines, he projected the 




CANARIES IN THE COALMINE, 1952-1958 
 No sooner had Atlanta achieved its desired annexation of un-incorporated 
portions of Fulton County than ominous signs emerged regarding the city‘s ability to 
digest the water problems associated with its far-flung suburbs. The authors of the Plan of 
Improvement, the Local Planning Commission, had largely concerned themselves with 
justifying the reorganization of city and county services and left the messy details of its 
execution to the city‘s sanitary engineers and regional planners. These latter individuals, 
like other environmentally conscious groups across the nation, were showing a growing 
concern for the water quality problems associated with World War II industrialization 
and postwar suburbanization and consumerism. They began to argue that water quality 
was a ―combined problem‖ of water supply and wastewater disposal; an issue that they 
believed had to be managed on a regional scale.
25
 
The unregulated use of septic tanks was one matter that engineers felt could not 
be ignored. As Adam Rome explains, septic tanks were a major feature of postwar 
suburban life. Residential developers, who tried to satisfy the unleashed demand for new 
housing stock after wartime restrictions, chose these devices as a cheap method of waste 
                                                     
24
 ―New Sewer System Ahead,‖ Atlanta Journal, 1 June 1951. 
 
25
 MPC, Up Ahead, 96 
140 
 
treatment in peripheral areas that lacked municipal sewer lines. Despite the fact that 
septic tanks had first been developed almost a half century earlier, their ecological 
complexity was only beginning to be understood by the 1950s. Tanks frequently failed 
only after two to three years of use and the majority of these installations took place 
without regulation. And as Rome points out, because these private vessels caused water 
pollution both above and below ground, sanitary engineers were confronted with a public 
health concern like that faced during the privy vault era: the need to convince citizens to 
turn toward public systems to ensure the quality of public water supplies.
26
 
  The increased reliance on septic tanks prompted local consulting engineers to 
recommend in 1953 that sewer lines and pumping stations be constructed in North Fulton 
County to prevent the future contamination of public water supplies. Wiedeman and 
Singleton, the city‘s principal engineering consultants since the 1920s, surveyed the area 
in the wake of the Plan of Improvement and found that the entire area was without 
sanitary sewer service. Of particular concern were the commercial sections of Sandy 
Springs, an affluent bedroom community that was projected to be on the verge of a 
significant population spike.  Due to the widespread use of private septic tanks in this 
area, the consulting engineers anticipated that ―it is only a matter of time‖ before the 
Sandy Spring‘s soil would become ―overloaded with sewage wastes.‖  This posed an 
immediate concern because the larger area‘s insufficiently treated sewage seeped into the 
various creeks and ultimately entered the Chattahoochee River just above the Cobb 
County and the City of Atlanta water supply intake pipes. This problem, the engineers 
assured, could be adequately addressed by retrofitting the septic tanks into the 
                                                     
26
 Rome, The Bulldozer in the Countryside, 87-118. 
141 
 
metropolitan sewerage system and delivering the waste to the R.M. Clayton plant for 
treatment. And although current demographics did not require the construction of 
addition disposal plants in the area, the consulting engineers suggested that building new 
facilities should be contemplated ―when and if the population density justifies.‖
27
    
The consulting engineers were not the only ones to highlight the entanglements of 
water supply and water pollution in Atlanta. Within a month of the January 1952 
annexation, the Metropolitan Planning Commission (MPC) issued its regional land use 
guide, Up Ahead, and raised concerns about the area‘s ability to protect its water 
resources. In this report, the MPC, a multi-county planning agency charged with the 
responsibility of assisting local governments in their efforts to achieve orderly 
metropolitan development, argued that Atlanta would need to seek ways of regulating the 
flow of the Chattahoochee River to ―assure the water supply needed for its future 
growth.‖ Metropolitan Atlanta‘s position on top of a water divide, the report indicated, 
made it vulnerable to water shortages. In addition, the Chattahoochee River‘s erratic 
levels over the course of a year and the presence of moderate droughts, which occurred 
every three to five years, brought the river‘s flow dangerously close to the city‘s 
minimum needs.   
Federal construction and operation of Buford Dam by the Army Corps of 
Engineers, the MPC argued, would be a key factor in determining how Atlanta‘s water 
issues would be resolved. Conceived  in the wake of federal success with the Tennessee 
Valley Authority and urged on by Atlanta officials for its perceived necessity to future 
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economic development, the proposed dam, located forty-eight miles northeast of the city, 
was intended for the purposes of flood control, conservation, hydro-electric power, and 
water supply.  
It was this latter function that vexed the MPC. Although hydro-electric power 
plants return all diverted water back to the river, the MPC maintained that the plants also 
require irregular water releases for peaking purposes. The Corps proposed that it would 
release between 500 and 8000 cubic feet per second (c.f.s.) to service plant operations 
and suggested that no less that 600 c.f.s (or 388 MGD) would reach Atlanta. But the 
MPC argued that while 600 c.f.s would secure the city‘s 120 c.f.s domestic water supply 
needs it would not provide the requisite 1000 to 1200 c.f.s. ―to take care of sewage as it is 
now treated‖ at the R.M. Clayton Plant. The planners further argued that fluctuations 
caused by peak demand releases would also deprive the city of the uniform flow needed 
for both water supply and waste disposal because water would not arrive when it was 
most needed. 
To make certain that Metropolitan Atlanta had ―the right amounts of water in the 
right time and at the right place,‖ the MPC suggested that city leaders investigate 
constructing a second ―re-regulation‖ dam somewhere between Atlanta and the federal 
dam in the event that the Corps proved unwilling to adjust its operations. Such a dam, it 
posited, would provide temporary storage that could be released ―in a more nearly even 
pattern of flow‖ of about 1600 c.f.s. (1034 MGD) in Atlanta.
28
  
 In 1958, the engineering consultants Wiedeman and Singleton provided further 
justification for such a project. Records generated by the U.S. Geological Survey gauging 
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stations along the Chattahoochee River for the years 1903 to 1955 showed that 
unregulated flows had fallen below 600 c.f.s. on only 7 days of the average year (or only 
2 percent of the time) and that flows exceeded 2000 c.f.s at least 48 percent of the time. 
Completion of Buford Dam, however, had altered these flows considerably. Data 
collected by the Army Corps of Engineers during regulated releases from the dam on two 
days in 1956 indicated that minimum flows would be 600 c.f.s at all times and that 
average flow was 1920 c.f.s.   The consulting engineers noted, however, that the Corps‘ 
main function was to provide peak flows for power production, which amounted to 8000 
c.f.s. for about six hours during the daytime from Monday through Friday. Water released 
from the reservoir took roughly 15 hours to reach Atlanta, which ensured that power 
production and local needs would not be in synch. The result was just as the MPC 
predicted: water would effectively arrive when Atlanta‘s WWTFs needed it least. 
Moreover, the Corps did not provide releases on weekends, which also meant that Atlanta 
would experience a ―weekend trough‖ of 650 c.f.s that would begin about 10 p.m. on 
Saturday and end about 10 p.m. on Monday, which were also peak water demand days 
for the city. 
 The consulting engineers thus concluded that ―re-regulation to provide more 
water for sewage dilution for Atlanta would be most beneficial‖ because ―the present 
natural flows are insufficient to meet present sewer loads at low flow seasons.‖ To secure 
a uniform flow of 1600 c.f.s. as suggested by the MPC, engineers considered multiple 
reservoir options. A 5000 acre re-regulation dam could provide up 1700 c.f.s, which was 
adequate dilution strength for a population of over 6 million. But such ―complete‖ re-
regulation, they argued, was unnecessary and could cost between $2.6 and $6.3 million 
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dollars. In contrast, a reservoir with a storage capacity of 3,200 acres would provide the 
suggested 1600 c.f.s., which they considered sufficient dilution strength ―for a period of 
about 2O years.‖ Such a reservoir could be completed by Georgia Power‘s Morgan Falls 
Dam, located roughly 8 miles north of Atlanta in Roswell, and could be modified to 
achieve the desired effect for between $850,000 to $1 million. 
 On September 6, 1957, the City of Atlanta and the Georgia Power Company 
entered into a formal agreement for the construction and operation of the 8-foot Tainter 
Gates on Morgan Falls Dam that created the recommended 3,200 acres of storage with 
average flows of 1600 c.f.s. reaching Atlanta. This agreement provided that the city pay 
50 percent of the costs of the improvements, with the city‘s contribution not to exceed 
$500,000. Georgia Power constructed the improvements and bore 50 percent of the costs 
and maintained title to the dam.
29
       
 Interestingly, the MPC argued that while the federal government did not have 
responsibility for guaranteeing a water supply for Metropolitan Atlanta it should not 
complicate the matter either. It suggested, essentially, that the Corps could have used its 
conservation mandate—to release water when it could do no harm—to help better 
regulate the flow of the Chattahoochee. To be sure, the proposed 600 c.f.s releases were 
an amount considerably above the average in drought periods. But as the planners and 
engineers pointed out, this was insufficient to meet the total water demands of 
Metropolitan Atlanta as they presently existed. Future development in Cobb and Gwinnet 
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Counties would only add to these requirements. This is why the MPC tried to impress 
upon local governments the need for regional water resources planning and coordination.   
 But why such continued reliance on dilution of sewage? The simple answer is that 
it was a cheaper alternative to upgrading WWTFs to the level of secondary treatment. 
Georgia Power, which received adequate flow from Buford Dam and had no 
responsibility for regulating water to meet Metropolitan Atlanta‘s needs, willingly helped 
subsidize Atlanta‘s sewer system, which was beginning to show signs of wear. And 
Atlanta‘s Sewer Division had little money for improvements. Unlike the revenue-
generating AWW, the Sewer Division did not collect sewer service fees and relied on 
general obligation bonds to fund any capital improvement projects such as disposal 
plants, trunk lines, and outfall sewers. In fact, the city covered its sewer operating 
expenses through its general fund, which was replenished by splashing over revenues 
obtained through its water supply sales. Although it did assess property owners for the 
costs of new laterals lines that were extended down neighborhood streets, the city often 
lost money on these additions. City Finance Chairman Ralph Huie stated, for example, 
that the city only collected 54.6 percent of its outlays for sewers laid in 1952 and 57 
percent for those in 1953. The shortfalls resulted from policies that allowed customers to 
defer payments for up to two years by simply pleading hardship and exempted individual 
homeowners with septic tanks entirely.
 
 Mayor Hartsfield was adamant that such ―pay as 
you enter‖ exemptions and deferments had to end, even going so far as to attend Board of 
Aldermen meetings to veto individual deferments.  It was all for naught, it seems, 
because even after he demanded a closed-to-the press session—telling reporters first that 
―We‘re talking about a new sewer policy. We‘re getting in trouble in there‖—he relented 
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and allowed for both the deferments to be increased to four years and for $500,000 of an 
upcoming bond issue to be set aside as a ―revolving fund‖ to finance easy terms for 
homeowners when sewer costs posed a hardship.
30
   
  Such concessions extracted a steady toll on department finances and ultimately 
compelled the city to seek funding though other channels. In the summer of 1954 the city 
passed a $10 million dollar bond issue that earmarked $2 million for improving sewer 
disposal facilities, building new outfalls, and repairing decaying downtown trunkline 
sewers, as well as bolstering the revolving fund. Even then, the $2 million fell well short 
of the six million consulting engineer Mike Singleton told the City Sewer Service 
Committee it needed to invest in repairs over the next five years.  In addition to 
Singleton‘s damning report, the local press began to point out that water pollution was 
becoming more pressing with each passing day, as the city‘s WWTFs grew overloaded 
with new suburban sewer extensions, especially in the South River area. While pointing 
to the ―spirit of helpfulness from the state health department‖ in offering technical advice, 




 The day was indeed coming fast, as events at the national level heralded. By the 
mid-1950s, as state and local authorities bombarded Washington with requests for aid in 
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remediating stream pollution, the federal government was mobilizing to provide greater 
assistance in pollution control efforts.
 32
   
 Rather than basing their appeals on the traditional grounds of public health, 
Congressmen advocating federal intervention took a more expansive view. They now 
framed water pollution as a dire threat to continued national economic development. 
―Pollution control,‖ observes historian Paul Charles Milazzo, ―represented a way to make 
water supply meet water demand, clearing the way for economic growth and prosperity.‖ 
Constituted in an atmosphere of distributive, constituent–seeking economics of natural 
resource development, the 1956 Federal Water Pollution Control Act (PL-660) became 
the first permanent federal law regarding urban sewage treatment, despite President 
Eisenhower‘s insistence that polluted waters remained a ―uniquely local blight.‖ Whereas 
the 1948 act had tentatively initiated a federal presence in construction programs on an 
experimental basis, the 1956 amendment made it a prominent feature.  The act not only 
contained provisions for research, training, and the collection of basic data, but it 




 Although the construction program proved to be a popular component of the act, 
the continued commitment to federalism and lack of thorough-going abatement policy 
weakened its overall effect. The act essentially reaffirmed the policy of Congress to 
recognize, preserve, and protect the rights of states in preventing and controlling water 
pollution, actions for which few states could claim much achievement. A $250,000 limit 
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on construction grants was too low  to capture large projects and an added provision set 
aside half of all appropriations for cities with populations of 125,000 or less. The Public 
Health Service, which partnered with state water pollution control agencies, was directed 
to withhold grants from projects ―in which there is no federal interest or in which federal 
participation is not needed.‖
34
  
Although it did not provide funding to Atlanta, the state of Georgia responded to 
federal overtures by enacting its first laws that specifically mentioned control of water 
supplies. The Georgia Water Quality Control Act of 1957 prohibited ―the discharge of 
sewage, industrial wastes or wastes‖ into the waters of the state that would adversely 
affect or ―jeopardize public water supplies and public health‖ and interfere ―unreasonably 
with beneficial use of the water resources for recreation, fish and wildlife development, 
agriculture, and the industrial development of the State‘s natural resources and its 
manpower.‖ In addition, the law created, within the State Board of Health, a ―Water 
Quality Council‖ that ―would make recommendations to the Board‖ with regard to 
regulations or standards for conducting water policy within the state.  Lastly, the Board 
was granted the authority to issue permit certificates for discharges into state waters and 
the Water Quality Council was directed to conduct hearings in review of orders or actions 
provided by the Board.
35
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Despite its apparently broad mandate, the new state law produced little credible 
action. Minutes of the Georgia Water Quality Control Council‘s regular quarterly 
meetings from 1959 through 1963 suggest that the council was relegated to investigating 
allegations of pollution and seeking voluntary compliance with the goals it set. Several 
instances bear out this observation. In early 1961, for instance, members of the South 
DeKalb Civic Club, a local business development organization, requested the council‘s 
assistance in ―eliminating the obnoxious odors‖ emanating from the South River, which 
received effluent from Atlanta‘s disposal plant. The council initially sent a letter of 
inquiry to Mayor Hartsfield that asked the city ―what they propose in the way of waste 
treatment on South River and their time-table for completion of such waste treatment 
work.‖  Hartsfield, as subsequent meetings made clear, did not bother to respond. The 
Council followed up with progress reports and later determined that no further 
investigation was necessary because the city had moved forward independently through a 




When the Floyd County Wildlife Association broached the subject of muddiness 
and discoloration in the Etowah River, the Council dispatched a geologist from the 
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Georgia Department of Mines, Mining, and Geology to investigate mining operations in 
the area. The geologist reported that two companies were impounding mud ―as a valuable 
process of obtaining barite ore‖ that was shipped to foreign markets but that each was in 
the process of constructing larger dikes to mitigate against any contamination of the river.  
Satisfied with the findings, and eager to encourage local volunteerism, Council President 
Merritt ―expressed the hope that through the Water Quality Council, situations such as 
this can be brought to the front to illustrate to the public the efforts of industries with 
regard to waste treatment.  Discussions between parties concerned often sheds light on 
one another‘s endeavors and interests and smoothes the way for understanding the 
problem.‖
37
        
  ATLANTA KICKING AND SCREAMING: 1960s 
In 1962, the state Health Department Director John Venable told the Atlanta 
Rotary Club that Georgia had to do something about its water pollution problems and that 
unless steps were taken that the state will have reached ―either [its] maximum 
development or will have defaulted regulation of [its] water to the federal government.‖ 
The steps he initially had in mind were for sound zoning requirements in all counties and 
―complete acceptance by all of the need to conserve water.‖ By the end of 1963, he was 
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calling the 1957 legislation ―inadequate‖ because it did not provide sufficient authority to 
control pollution and still had less authority to prevent it.
38
   
Venable‘s warning of federal encroachment into local environmental affairs was 
not unwarranted. As historian Charles Paul Milazzo explains, although Congress 
continued to abide to the tenets of a federalist approach to water pollution control, many 
such as Senator Edmund Muskie began to call for uniform water quality standards that 
were backed by threats of federal action. By 1963, thirty-three states, mindful to prevent 
direct federal involvement or greater oversight into their internal affairs, passed 
legislation to establish water quality standards.
39
      
 President Johnson made clear the need for greater federal action against water 
pollution in his 1965 ―State of the Union‖ address.  He noted ―that of all the reckless 
devastations of our national heritage, none is really more shameful than the continued 
poisoning of our rivers and our air.‖ Turning away from the federalism of the Eisenhower 
presidency, Johnson signaled a new federal approach resolving to end ―the wasteful and 
degrading poisoning of our rivers‖ and challenged Congress to provide the means and 
methods to ―clean completely entire large river basins.‖
40
 
Responding to Johnson‘s call, Congress passed the Water Quality Act of 1965. 
This act required states to adopt water-quality criteria standards for all interstate waters 
and to implement and enforce plans for those standards by June 1967. If a state failed to 
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act, the federal government would adopt standards, which states could modify upon 
request. The Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), the 
federal agency authorized to administer the act, was empowered to seek abatement 




Belatedly, Georgia saw this legislation coming and acted accordingly. The 
Georgia General Assembly passed the Georgia Water Quality Control Act of 1964, which 
created the State Water Quality Control Board (SWQCB) as the state‘s first full-time 
water pollution control agency. Among other things, the SWQCB was charged to survey 
the extent and effects of pollution to the state‘s waters, to develop a comprehensive 
program for prevention and abatement, to conduct and cooperate in research on waste 
treatment, and to establish or revise standards for water quality.
42
 
R.S. ―Rock‖ Howard, the man chosen as Executive Secretary to the SWQCB, was 
as solid a pollution fighter as his nickname implies. Within two years of his being named 
SWQCB director, the agency would grow from a staff of himself and one secretary to a 
contingent of 18 engineers, chemists, and biologists. This team articulated an approach to 
environmental regulation that explicitly linked the state‘s future prosperity to the quality 
of its rivers and streams. Although Howard jealously guarded the state‘s right to monitor 
its own water quality, he was a consistent advocate for greater federal financial assistance 
and technical training to aid communities in combating water pollution. Most 
importantly, during his ten years as director, he demonstrated that he would urgently and 
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Howard had his work cut out for him when he began but he acted quickly and 
decisively. He implemented two important rules upon taking the helm. First, he required 
all domestic sewage to receive at least secondary biological treatment, and all industrial 
wastes would receive treatment equivalent to secondary treatment. Second, in accordance 
with the requirements of the federal 1965 act, the SWQCB began to set up water 
standards for all waters—intra and interstate—flowing through Georgia. To that end, the 
board sought to specify the maximum degree of pollution permissible in accordance with 
the public interest in water supply, game and fish conservation, agriculture, industrial, 
and recreational uses.
44
  These standards included criteria for bacteria, acidity, alkalinity, 
dissolved oxygen, taste, odor, solids, turbidity, temperature, mineral compounds, toxic 
substance, as well as other pollutants.  In doing this, Georgia became one of the first 
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Although the SWQCB actions would eventually compel Atlanta to act on its 
pollution problems, the city was in no position to tackle more stringent water quality 
demands in the mid-1960s. Studies published by the Atlanta Region Metropolitan 
Planning Commission (ARC) in 1963 and 1964 on regional water and sewer needs 
confirm this. The ARC identified the major physical and administrative problems 
associated with Metropolitan Atlanta‘s numerous sewer systems. Chief among its 
concerns was the amount of untreated sewage that entered the city‘s three major rivers as 
a result of WWTFs that could not meet the demands of new population growth. The City 
of Atlanta by this time operated eight of nine WWTFs in the Metropolitan Sewer System, 
which had expanded to include contracts between the City of Atlanta, three counties 
(Fulton, DeKalb, and Clayton), and four cities (Atlanta as well as College Park, 
Hapeville, Forest Park). The four plants that it operated on the Chattahoochee River only 
provided primary treatment.
46
  Even in the best conditions such treatment only removed 
35 percent of the pollutant materials before water was discharged into the river. To make 
matters worse, the massive R.M. Clayton plant, which serviced nearly 450,000 people 
and received almost half of the all waste in the study area, was badly overwhelmed. 
Designed for a treatment capacity of 42 MGD, by 1964 the average flow through the 
plant was 66 MGD. As a result, water in the Chattahoochee below Atlanta was deemed 
unsafe for recreational uses and was placed off-limits for boating, swimming, and fishing. 
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Even with secondary treatment of its received waters, the South River had to deal 
with purification problems of its own. Problems there arose because of the small natural 
flow of the South River headwaters. In fact, the ARC questioned whether it was a ―river‖ 
at all, at least until it received the large volumes discharged from four different WWTFs.  
The natural flow of the river was about equal to the amount of sewage effluent that was 
dumped into it, yielding a dilution ratio of one to one, which was a cause for concern. 
The ARC also was concerned about the diversion of water from the 
Chattahoochee to other watersheds. This occurred because Atlanta straddles several 
basins. Water was drawn from the Chattahoochee and piped under pressure across ridge 
lines to residences, businesses, and industries in other drainage basins. The used water 
was then collected by gravity flow, treated and discharged into other rivers, notably the 
South and Flint Rivers. The Flint River eventually rejoined the Chattahoochee on its way 
to the Gulf of Mexico, but the South River flowed toward the Atlantic coast.
48
 
Added to the imposing physical problems were administrative and financial ones 
as well. Metropolitan Atlanta had twenty-three separate wastewater facilities in the mid-
1960s, many of which criss-crossed natural drainage lines and political barriers. Here 
again one can see the obstacles imposed by the local topography but exacerbated by 
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political boundaries. While cities and counties straddle numerous drainage basins, water 
flows in several directions, making it very expensive to construct facilities sufficient to 
treat all the waste.  Either the city or county must build several different WWTFs—each 
at a different downstream location—or pump and pipe all wastes to a central facility.  
Neither alternative is cheap.  
Some of the overloading of Atlanta‘s wastewater disposal plants stemmed from 
the fact that the city was essentially catching wastes from adjoining areas and had to 
factor this into its facility capacities. Water from northern DeKallb County, for example, 
flows westward through Atlanta to the Chattahoochee. East Point‘s waste actually went 
into four different treatment plants owned and operated by Atlanta. Negotiated 
contributions by the adjoining political entities whose waste flowed into the Metropolitan 
Sewer System helped defray some of the costs of maintaining the system.
49
  But it was 
not enough to make up for lost ground, and Atlanta did not seem willing to help itself. It 
continued to allow deferments on sewer ―taps ins‖ while refusing to charge sewer service 
fees. In 1964, the Board of Alderman unanimously resolved to defer implantation of 
sewer charges until a new state constitution was written. It further resolved to prevent any 
sewer expansions or improvements that would benefit any other government unless that 
government contributed to the expenses. Although the city was justified in its expectation 
                                                     
49
  East Point, for instance, paid 16 percent of the operating costs of the R.M. Clayton plant, 14 percent for 
the Flint plant, 17 percent for the Utoy Creek plant , and 25 percent for Camp Creek plant.  Forest Park 
paid six cents per one thousands gallons plus a share of the operating expenses based on the volume of total 
output. ARMPC, ―Water and Sewer Needs,‖ 62-71.  
157 
 
to be paid for services rendered, the declaration to wait until a new constitution was 
adopted may be interpreted as a stalling act.
50
 
A separate report published by the Public Service Administration found a high 
degree of inefficiency across Atlanta‘s city government. Commissioned by the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development to determine the overall effectiveness of 
municipal governance in the burgeoning Sun Belt capital, the organization concluded 
that, despite high civic pride, Atlanta was a poorly run city.  The report further argued 
that city‘s municipal administration required ―fundamental alteration‖ to maintain its 
present levels of performance ―much less fulfill its proper leadership role respecting 
community improvement in an expanding metropolitan environment.‖
51
 
 One feature of city governance that puzzled the authors was the separation of 
water supply and sewerage services into separate departments. The Sewer Division, it 
noted, competed for resources with several other divisions in the Construction 
Department. What is more, the city did not collect charges for these services. In contrast, 
it described the AWW as a ―technically excellent waterworks fully able to meet both the 
present and future water demands of the City and surrounding area.‖  The report not only 
recommended that the city should commence sewer service fees, but also that it merge 
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the two operations into a single department to ―help overcome the serious lag which 
exists in the provision of sewer service.‖
52
 
Feeding off the ARC and other reports, editorialists, columnists, and staff writers 
at the Atlanta Journal began to portray water pollution not just as a local problem but one 
that affected the entire metropolitan area. In April 1964, for example, just two months 
after the ARC‘s publication, an Atlanta Journal editorial openly pleaded for the 
establishment of direct sewer taxes to pay for needed new construction and further argued 
that ―our shortsightedness in this respect is a deterrent to new industry. It is inconsiderate 
of downstream neighbors. It can develop into a health menace.‖
53
 
Amidst the clamor for sewer taxes and sense of bewilderment over the slow pace 
of change, editorialists began to float the idea of a single regional authority to oversee all 
water-related issues on a regional or river basin level. The concept had first been aired 
during the 1930s for sanitary authority and was revived again in the late 1950s when 
Mayor Hartsfield, optimistic about the Metropolitan Sewer agreements, shrugged it off as 
―behind the times.‖ But as the ARC and staff writers increasingly pointed out the myriad 
financial problems that faced the numerous sewer systems in the metro area, the idea 
regained some currency. Local officials, determined to maintain control and ostensibly 
satisfied with the current state of affairs, resisted calls for a metropolitan sewer authority. 
The most they were willing to do was organize an association or ―get-together‖ of 
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 In addition to feeling pressure from the press, local officials had to contend with 
the newly created SWQCB. While sympathetic to Atlanta‘s financial woes, the Board in 
1965 requested that the city submit its abatement program after HEW Water surveys 
(referenced in the Introduction) determined that pollution of the Chattahoochee was 
critical and remedial measures were unavoidable. 
Before the city presented its plan, a delegation of officials traveled from Georgia 
to Washington D.C. in June 1965 to testify before Senator Ed Muskie‘s subcommittee 
investigating the effectiveness of the 1956 Water Pollution Control Act. In addition to 
―Rock‖ Howard, the group included Hartfield‘s successor Atlanta Mayor Ivan Allen, Jr. 
and the city‘s Chief Pollution Control Engineer, Robert Morris. As to be expected, all 
parties encouraged greater federal and state assistance to aid in antipollution measures. 
They did so, however, for different reasons. Comparison of their testimony illuminates 
not only the different roles and concerns of the environmental violator and the 
environmental regulator; it also provides insights into how they would respond to the 
pollution problem in question. 
For Atlanta the violator, the problem was somewhat predictable: needed 
expansions were expensive and money was in short supply. According to Allen, who had 
testified before Congress in 1963 to urge passage of a Civil Rights Act,  it would take 10 
years and an estimated $90 million in capital investments to bring all of Atlanta‘s sewer 
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facilities and collection network into compliance with state water quality laws. The 
mayor noted that the city‘s debt limit was $200 million and ―that has already pretty well 
been consumed,‖ much of it spent on high profile construction projects like a major 
league baseball stadium, a downtown civic center, freeways, and marketing campaigns. 
Although Mayor Allen was surprisingly confident that ―this city and its metropolitan 
neighbors will solve its present-day problem and continue to provide an adequate 
development base for the future,‖ he argued that it could do so ―only at the cost of full 
government as that assistance might be available.‖
55
  
  Most revealing was the apparent self-centeredness with which the Atlanta 
officials discussed the problem of ongoing water pollution. Both Allen and Morris 
registered their concern over the proposed construction of West Point Dam, which was 
initiated under the Flood Control Act of 1962 to provide water storage for power 
generation and navigation on the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint Waterway. Prior to 
the testimony, many Atlanta officials worried, without a trace of irony it seems, that a 
dam restraining the Chattahoochee‘s flow 60 miles below the city might have a negative 
effect on the river‘s ability to dilute Atlanta‘s waste discharges. If Atlanta could not get a 
grip on its pollution, they hypothesized, then the proposed dam would create a ―sludge 
lagoon‖—a smelly nuisance incapable of supporting fish life and a potential hazard to 
human health.  
Morris made clear that Atlanta would continue to require the greatest assimilative 
capacity of the Chattahoochee‘s waters because ―the idea we live with today is that a 
partial answer to pollution is dissolution.‖  And while Allen acknowledged that the 
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federal dam above Atlanta had made possible a continuing flow of water for his city‘s 
demands, he seemed to lay responsibility for any future problems at the government‘s 
feet for proposing a facility that would benefit downstream locales. He said, ―When you 
go south of here you activate a problem,‖ he told the committee. ―As you create the 




In contrast, Howard the state regulator had a more expansive view of total state 
water quality problems. A plain speaker, he laid out the progress his agency had made 
and the ways federal and state governments could offer assistance. Immediate sewage 
needs, which he said ran the gamut from small to medium-sized towns with no sewer 
system to Atlanta‘s behemoth metropolitan system, amounted to $125 million, with 
Metropolitan Atlanta requiring half of the total cost. These pressing concerns necessitated 
increased federal and state appropriations, which he believed should be directed primarily 
toward facility construction. He next argued that there existed a need for accelerated 
research to develop more efficient and economical treatment methods, which could be 
accomplished by the federal and state incentive program to assist municipalities and 
industries in abating water pollution. Lastly, he maintained that greater technical training 
and a dedication to recruiting more specialists was ―essential if we [the SWQCB] are to 
satisfactorily discharge our responsibilities of enforcement and surveillance.‖
57
   
 Six months later, in December 1965, the city responded with Wiedeman and 
Singleton‘s engineering report, which conformed to the broad contours of SWQCB 
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demands and Allen and Morris‘s concerns. It recommended that the R.M. Clayton, Utoy 
Creek, and Sandy Creek plants be enlarged and improved to provide secondary treatment 
for a cost of $40,940,000. This program of expansions, the engineers assured, would 
provide for the removal of 85 percent of the organic matter from the expected 117 MGD 
of wastes to be discharged into the river by a serviced population of 1,420,000 in 1985. 
They further stated that while this could be accomplished within the SWQCB‘s 
established criteria of 4.0 milligrams per liter of dissolved oxygen and with the existing 
1600 c.f.s. that flowed by the facilities, that re-regulation, i.e., damming of the river 
would probably have to occur at some time in the future. The report from the engineering 
consultants also contained a contingency clause regarding the ramifications of restraining 
the flow of the Chattahoochee below Atlanta. The report, in fact, stated Atlanta‘s position 
clearly: maintenance of the proposed quality of service was based upon ―the right of the 
Atlanta Metropolitan area to use the free flowing river for assimilation of its wastes after 
giving them the highest practical degree of treatment.‖
58
 
On March 1, 1966, the SWQCB accepted the recommended plan and informed 
the city that it had until July 1, 1971 to complete all water pollution control projects in 
operation on the river. In September 1966 the City of Atlanta imposed its first sewer 
service charge, set at the rate of fifty percent of one‘s water bill. The feeble rate, further 
reduced by grant of numerous exemptions, failed to muster sufficient revenue to support 
the issuance of bonds. The revenue shortfall prompted a series of conferences that slipped 
the compliance deadline to December 1972.  When, in December 1970, it became 
apparent that the City of Atlanta was ―again falling behind in an agreed upon schedule 
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and has failed to enact needed sewer rates to finance the necessary program‖ the EPA and 
SWQCB stepped in with the measures described at the beginning of this chapter.
59
     
THE BIG CLEAN UP, 1972 -1985 
In February 1971, the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution held 
a series of oversight hearings to evaluate recent funding and manpower experience in the 
expanding federal effort to curb water pollution. Chaired by Senator Edmund Muskie, 
this panel was particularly interested in the efficacy of the Clean Water Restoration Act 
of 1966, a grants-in-aid program by which the federal government covered 30-55 percent 
of the cost of constructing public owned sewerage treatment plants. Set to expire in June 
1971, this program had radically increased the scale of annual federal funding over the 
previous five years from $150 million to $1.5 billion in order to help local communities 
comply with the state-created water quality standards imposed by the 1965 Clean Water 
Act.
60
     
 As previously stated, Atlanta Mayor Sam Massell testified before the Senate 
subcommittee less than two months after the EPA and SWQCB issued abatement orders 
against the city of Atlanta for its continued pollution of the Chattahoochee River. Massell 
did not so much defend Atlanta‘s apparent negligence as lay bare a set of cascading 
dilemmas that hampered efforts to implement effective water pollution control policies in 
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American cities. Chief among the mayor‘s concerns was the financial exigencies that 
urban areas faced.  Armed with a study by the U.S. Conference of Mayors and the 
National League of Cities, Massell testified that average annual investments in WWTFs 
had risen from $760 million in 1956-1960, when the initial construction grant provisions 
began, to nearly $2 billion in 1970. This greatly increased local commitment had 
occurred, he maintained, when local revenue sources had become severely taxed to meet 
rapidly growing demands.  Worse still, recent studies estimated that addressing water 
pollution in American cities would require between $33 and $37 billion over the next five 
years. The mayor thus argued that while federal outlays had provided communities with 




State inaction, Massell believed, added another degree of complication. The 1966 
Act had called for federal contributions to rise to 50 percent when individual state 
governments provided 25 percent of the cost of construction. Massell charged that many 
states such as Georgia had failed to actively contribute matching funds to local initiatives, 
due to lack of concern or money. State non-performance, he contended,  not only violated 
the spirit of the grants-in-aid program but often left cash-strapped cities with the burden 
of having to pay up to 70 percent of the cost of constructing sufficient WWTFs. 
 Equally important, Massell maintained, was the ―limited public interest in the 
whole area of pollution.‖ ―When pollution control costs the average citizen money,‖ he 
explained to the senators, ―its appeal to him diminishes.‖  Besides, the issue had attracted 
very little attention over the last century but now ―this generation all of a sudden has to 
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pay for it.‖ As evidence of the problem of public apathy, Massell pointed to Atlanta‘s 
difficulty in raising the $25 million needed to cover its share of the required secondary 
treatment plants on the Chattahoochee River. He argued that the Atlanta Aldermanic 
Board concluded that it was necessary to raise water and sewer charges through 
legislative fiat in order to fund the bond issue.  ―If we had to go to referendum to raise 
sewer service charges 80 percent like we did,‖ the mayor ruefully surmised, ―I am afraid 
that we would have kept our pollution or whatever the penalty was of a 180-day mandate.  
I don‘t believe it would have passed.‖ 62 
 Like Mayor Allen before him, Massell clearly feared that Atlanta had reached the 
extent of its political and financial ability to resolve its water issues without greater 
federal and state assistance. On behalf of the U.S. Conference of Mayors and the National 
League of Mayors he presented a set of recommendations that urged assured 
appropriations of between $3 and $4 billion over the next five years as well as that the 
federal share of costs for all grants aiding local sewage treatment programs be increased 
to 75 percent regardless of state participation.  
Congress responded by enacting its most thorough revision of existing federal 
water laws: the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972. Comprehensive in 
scope and designed to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, the act established a tight 
regulatory system with precise and detailed abatement requirements, streamlined 
enforcement procedures, and heavy penalties for violations. It further set goals for 
swimmable-fishable interstate and intrastate waters by 1977 and zero pollutant discharges 
by 1983.  In order to achieve these goals, the Act not only authorized $18 billion for 
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construction grants over the next three years but also increased the federal share of 
construction to 75 percent, with state and local governments to pay the balance.
63
 
The Act reflected the profound transformation in the public‘s general 
understanding of and concern for the environment. During the 1960s and early 1970s 
many Americans began to question the legitimacy of rampant economic and suburban 
development, as well as scientific and technological developments, as they demonstrated 
their profound effect on ecosystems. This criticism of postwar consumption and expertise 
was informed, in no small part, by the ideas of popular ecology writers such as Rachel 
Carson, Aldo Leopold, and Barry Commoner. As Paul Charles Milizzo explains, these 
writers ―conveyed a common ethical imperative to a wide audience with finely crafted 
prose‖ that suggested not only that ―everything is connected to everything else‖ but also 
that scientists and engineers were often guilty of a ―technological hubris‖ that led to the 
estrangement of society from nature.
64
 
Charles Paul Milazzo has also keenly documented the rise of an alternate 
environmental outlook, one based in the highly technical field of systems analysis. As 
Milazzo explains, most professional ecologists in the years after 1945 ―treated the basic 
unit of study, the ecosystem, as a self-contained, self-regulating entity that could be 
quantitatively described and rationally managed.‖ This alternative mode of modern 
environmentalism, paradoxically, drew its inspiration from the very same community that 
popular ecological writers such as Carlson and Commoner often criticized: the 
technocratic engineers and scientists who had attempted to coordinate and manage 
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―sprawling defense-related bureaucracies of the Cold War.‖ This language of ―systems 
thinking,‖ moreover, appealed to legislators and congressional staffers seeking to pass 
more effective environmental regulations because it proposed ―solutions in keeping with 
the technical methods and administrative ethos prevalent in other policy areas.‖
65
 
The ecosystems discourse structured the way federal legislators framed water 
policy during the 1970s and beyond. Regional planning and effluent limitations to protect 
the biodiversity of aquatic ecosystems replaced the attempts to produce and enforce 
localized ―ambient‖ water quality standards. Moreover, even while states retained the 
responsibility of monitoring wastewater discharges, authority for implementation and 
enforcements was shifted from the state to the federal level. 
State surveillance had been an important component of water pollution control. 
Indeed, even before Atlanta had made any progress toward abating its pollution of the 
Chattahoochee River, the SWQCB set its sights on forcing the city to rectify the long 
neglected but ―deplorable‖ condition of the South and Flint Rivers. In 1972, Howard‘s 
team presented a report based on a three year water quality monitoring program that 
included analysis on the Chattahoochee, South, and Flint Rivers to determine the effect of 
wastewater discharges and urban runoff on the quality of those streams.
66
 
Even though the travails of the grander Chattahoochee garnered headlines, locals 
had known about how susceptible the smaller streams were to pollution for a long time. 
With their headwaters contained within urbanized areas and their consequent minimal 
stream flow, these smaller waterways had long been nuisances for those unfortunate 
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enough to reside near their banks. South River is actually located in the headwaters of the 
Altama River Basin. It drains much of the southeastern portion of the Atlanta 
metropolitan area and flows into Lake Jackson, where its confluence with the Yellow and 
Alcovy Rivers forms the Ocmulgee River.  The Flint River drains the south-central part 
of the metropolitan area.  Its headwaters are in Hapeville and south Atlanta. It flows 
through Hartsfield–Jackson International Airport to Griffin, Albany, and Bainbridge. The 
Flint River joins the Chattahoochee River at Jim Woodruff Dam to form the Apalachicola 
River. In its lower reaches, the Flint has served as one of the most important streams in 
Georgia. Up near its point of origin, it is smaller than both the Chattahoochee and the 
South Rivers.
67
   
The SWQCB studies gave new insights into how bad pollution had become. 
Beginning at the R.M. Clayton plant just below the AWW intake, the Chattahoochee was 
characterized by poor quality for a reach of some seventy miles, of which the first forty 
were found to be ―grossly polluted.‖ In the hot, dry months of July through August, the 
river may have even been in ―near septic conditions‖ for a reach of over thirty miles 
where the fecal coliform levels were so high that the river could not meet Georgia‘s 
fishing criteria. Urban runoff and large discharges of untreated and inadequately treated 
wastewaters from the metropolitan area in general, but from the City of Atlanta, were 
responsible for these problems. 
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The South River was heavily polluted for much of its length from the 
metropolitan area to Lake Jackson. The proposed criteria for dissolved oxygen, bacteria, 
ammonia, and toxic substances were not at all met at any point in the 44 mile stretch of 
the South River, which was monitored during the study period. These conditions were 
caused by inadequate and inconsistent wastewater treatment, combined sewer overflows, 
urban runoff, and a large volume of wastewater relative to the amount of natural stream 
flow available for waste assimilation. The relatively high fecal coliform levels found in 
the South River constituted a potential health hazard in the stream, and high nutrient 
concentrations promoted biotic blooms and contributed to the eutrophication (unwanted 
plant life choking animal life) of Lake Jackson. 
The Flint River was heavily polluted for at least twenty miles below its 
headwaters near the airport. So little natural flow was available for natural assimilation 
and dilution of wastewater in the upper reaches that the shear volume of treated 
wastewater lowered the dissolved oxygen concentration of the stream. Moreover, 
complex industrial wastewaters, untreated wastewaters and inadequate treatment from 
Clayton County were primarily responsible for those conditions.
68
  
In order to meet the 1977 deadline for achieving the discharge requirements 
mandated by the 1972 federal act, the City of Atlanta resolved in the fall of 1972 to 
initiate a program to evaluate effective treatment alternatives and to develop cost 
effective and environmental acceptable means to bring the city into compliance with the 
new discharge requirements being established by Georgia‘s primary agency for 
protecting air, land, and water resources, the Georgia Environmental Protection Division 
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(EPD), for the rivers in question. In January 1973, Atlanta retained the services of Black, 
Crow and Eidsness, a prominent environmental engineering consulting firm from 
Gainesville, Florida to provide a comprehensive study for abating pollution in these 
rivers. Completed in April 1974, the report made two basic recommendations: 1) treated 
wastewaters from the Intrenchment Creek, South River, and Flint River should be 
conveyed back to the Chattahoochee River, and 2) initial or ―first flush‖ sewer system 
overflows should be treated before discharged.
69
 
The main problem was getting the water back to the Chattahoochee. Two 
alternatives were suggested. One was that the city could dig a ditch through south Fulton 
County, lay a pipeline, and pump water across the sub-continental ridge. This was 
expected to cost $96,944,000. The cheaper alternative, which was finally decided upon in 
1977 after two subsequent engineering reports and a public hearing ―to inform interested 
individuals,‖ would be to tunnel some 200 feet underground into the hard rock and 
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simply avoid the expense of pumping by allowing gravity to convey the water.  The 
anticipated cost of tunneling was $83,328,000. 
70
 
The Three River Water Quality Management Program was to achieve 
improvements in three major areas. The first set of improvements involved enhancements 
to the city‘s existing Intrenchment Creek, South River, and Flint River ―Water Pollution 
Control Plants‖ to enable them to produce an effluent quality satisfactory for discharge 
into the Chattahoochee River. The second set consisted of the construction of two 
Combined Sewer Overflow Storage and Treatment facilities, and construction of separate 
sanitary sewers in one area to reduce the number of pollutants from combined sewers 
entering Intrenchment Creek and the South River. The last group included construction of 
force main, tunnel, and gravity sewer systems to convey the treated wastewater from the 
above three disposal plants to the Chattahoochee River for discharge.
71
     
Although work was scheduled to start in 1978, further design modifications, 
funding delays, and contract bidding conflicts prevented construction from beginning 
until January 1981.  Originally sold to the public as an $80 million project (of which the 
city was obligated to pay $1.6 million), it soon mushroomed to more that $200 million, 
which brought the city‘s share to $37 million. Details are sketchy as to why this 
happened. One explanation was that the original design was flawed because it was based 
on inadequate studies. Local pollution control officials suggested that changes in water 
standards also required a reevaluation. City requirements that contractors pre-qualify for 
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bid proceedings to ensure that they meet Atlanta‘s minority participation standards also 
caused delays. Any contractor denied a contract could file a protest against those 
contracts which were awarded on the grounds that the receiving firm was not fifty percent 
minority-owned. The greatest ire, at least from local engineers, was reserved for the EPA. 
Many local participants, such as Atlanta pollution control director George Barnes, 
complained of often unneeded archaeological studies, countless environmental impact 
statements (EIS), and unclear and changing EPA guidelines. But whatever the cause, 
Atlantans watched the sewer rates climb as a result of the delays.
72
 
Once funding and contract disputes were resolved by mid-1982, construction 
began in earnest. Discharges to the Chattahoochee River required the reduction of both 
BOD and ammonium nitrate during the summer months and only BOD reduction during 
the winter months. To accomplish this, the South River Plant was enlarged to a 35 MGD 
nitrifying activated sludge plant. In addition, the Flint River plant was abandoned. Flow 
previously handled by that plant was now pumped to the South River Plant. The 
Intrenchment Creek (a two-stage rock trickling filter plant) was also modified.  During 
the dry weather, the Intrenchment Creek Plant was to operate as a two-stage trickling 
filter plant and its effluent pumped to the South River Plant for nitrification.  During wet 
weather, one stage of the Intrenchment Creek Plant filters was to be used to treat normal 
flows.  Combined sewer overflows in the Intrenchment Creek Basin were to be diverted 
into a twenty-six foot, two mile long tunnel just north of the Intrenchment Creek Plant.  
These overflows, after collection in the storage tunnel, were to receive chemical 
treatment (flocculation and sedimentation) followed by treatment in the second stage 
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trickling filter prior to discharge to Intrenchment Creek. Normal wastewater effluent 
would be pumped from Intrenchment Creek to the South River plant for further 
treatment.    
 South River Plant effluent (including Intrenchment Creek and Flint River basin 
flows) was then diverted to the Chattahoochee through the Peachtree ridge. This 
diversion system consists of a 54 inch diameter, 2 mile force main, a 10 foot diameter, 
7.5 mile tunnel, and a 68 inch diameter, 5.5 mile gravity sewer. The tunnel, constructed 
with a boring machine, was completed in December 1984. 
 An above-ground storage facility was constructed at the site of the third major 
combined sewer overflow point in the South River basin. The screen and de-gritted 
effluent from this facility was now discharged into a separate sanitary sewer that is a 
tributary to the South River Plant. The wastewater diversion system and plant 




As the preceding narrative amply demonstrates, it is doubtful whether the City of 
Atlanta would have fully committed itself to substantively improving the quality of its 
local waterways without the assistance or pressure of the federal government.  Although 
Atlanta built a modern sanitary sewer system prior to WWI that could combat the 
immediate risks of water-borne diseases, over the next few decades the city proved to be 
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financially ill-equipped and politically ill-disposed to making the changes that a rapidly 
expanding metro population and evolving environmental paradigm required. 
The local topography certainly made providing wastewater treatment exceedingly 
difficult. Ridges and valleys carved the area into numerous drainage basins and 
necessitated the construction of numerous pollution control facilities, which were built 
with federal largesse. But the city‘s reliance on dilution, its reluctance to charge sewer 
fees until the late 1960s, and the inability of metropolitan governments to come to terms 
with the regional scope of pollution control problems made the City of Atlanta a flat-
footed responder to the new ecological imperatives of the 1960s and 1970s. As result, 
when federal and state regulatory agencies began to actively promulgate new standards 
for water quality the city was left with little choice but to plead once again for federal 
financial assistance in managing the Chattahoochee‘s waters.         
Although the Three Rivers project was successful with regard to increasing the 
flow of the Chattahoochee River, it was not the panacea many local officials thought it 
would be. As the next chapter shows, water pollution remained a divisive issue for many 
of Atlanta‘s residents and downstream neighbors, prompting some activists to challenge 
the expense and wisdom of particular pollution control strategies while motivating others 






TROUBLED WATERS: POLICY AND PROTEST OVER POLLUTION 
CONTROL IN ATLANTA 
 
We all know that the future of Atlanta depends on economic growth; it depends on jobs 
for all who want to work; it depends on keeping the City an affordable place to live; and 
it depends on an attractive and enjoyable quality of life.  But what we sometimes forget is 
that all of these things – growth, jobs, affordability and quality of life – depend on 
something even more fundamental.  They all depend on – clean water.  
Atlanta Mayor Shirley Franklin, 2003 
 
Despite the enormous amounts of public resources and energy spent in plans to 
treat and re-divert water back to the Chattahoochee River during the late 1970s and early 
1980s, Atlanta continued to be plagued with problems stemming from chronic 
underinvestment in its water supply and wastewater systems. In addition to the broken, 
cracked and overburdened water distribution and sewer lines that led to excessive water 
wastage and groundwater infiltration, combined sewer overflows (CSOs) regularly 
belched untreated sewage and storm water directly into urban streams during heavy 
rainstorms. The city‘s existing wastewater treatment facilities (WWTFs) were ill-
equipped to process the amounts of phosphorous-rich content of sewage that arrived in 
the plants. By 1995, after state-imposed fines and sewer connection moratoriums failed to 
convince the city to take decisive action, citizen activists, the EPA, and the EPD sued 
Atlanta over its persistent violations of federal and state water quality standards. Around 
the same time, Atlanta became the subject of a national cautionary tale when it entered, 
176 
 
and ultimately dissolved, one of the first contracts in the U.S. to privatize the operation of 
its aging municipal water supply system. 
By 2002 Atlanta appeared fully ready to resolve the years of environmental and 
infrastructural inattentiveness. In that year, newly-elected Mayor Shirley Franklin vowed 
to create ―the cleanest streams and rivers of any large city in America.‖ To that end, she 
convened a panel of local and national experts to counsel the city in how best to fulfill the 
orders of a federal Consent Decree that obligated the city to implement corrective 
measures for its CSOs. She further announced the beginning of the ambitious Clean 
Water Atlanta initiative, a multi-billion dollar long-term action plan designed to improve 
water quality in Atlanta through capital construction programs and enhanced operation of 
the City's drinking and wastewater systems. Lastly, to oversee the City‘s new 
comprehensive approach to solving water issues, Mayor Franklin created the Department 
of Watershed Management in order to unify the operations and administration of 
Atlanta‘s drinking water, wastewater, and storm water systems.
1
    
 This chapter demonstrates that Mayor Franklin‘s aggressive approach to 
managing the area‘s water resources can only be understood as the belated reaction to the 
persistent application of pressure by exogenous actors such as federal and state 
governments and citizen activists. In the case of pollution control, for example, local 
environmental advocates realized during the 1990s that despite the recent diminishment 
of federal largess to support WWTF upgrades, existing federal legislation provided a 
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framework by which public-interest groups could legally challenge Atlanta‘s 
transgression of established water quality standards. Thus, through citizen-initiated court 
action, federal enforcement power could be brought to bear on the city. Likewise, 
litigation and the threat of direct federal intervention in determining regional water 
supply allocations stimulated the city and state to initiate policies that were more 
responsive to water users both within and beyond the Atlanta metropolitan area.   
Chapter Four therefore examines some of the policies, practices, and protests that 
would lead to comprehensive water resources management in Atlanta. It analyzes the 
intense controversy surrounding three central issues in local wastewater policy that 
persisted despite the completion of the previously detailed Three Rivers Water Quality 
Management Program: CSO abatement, phosphorous control, and the repair and 
replacement of the city‘s sewer infrastructure. It also describes how years of neglect of 
the city‘s sewer infrastructure were reversed through the convergence of growing federal 
and state regulatory pressure for better effluent treatment, and an unexpected—but 
surprisingly effective—grassroots protest movement that found it necessary to use the 
federal courts as an instrument to force Atlanta into compliance with federal water 
quality law. Last, it concludes with a discussion of the debates and actions involved in 
Mayor Franklin‘s Clean Water Atlanta initiative.  
ATLANTA‘S DIRTY WATER:  
INCREASED REGULATION OF PLANTS, PIPES, & CSOs, 1985-1990 
 
 By the late 1980s, the city‘s pollution control officials were under mounting 
regulatory pressure to control more effectively long-standing wastewater issues not 
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adequately addressed by the 1985 completion of the Three Rivers Water Quality 
Management Program.   
Phosphorous pollution emerged as one major problem that needed to be resolved. 
Phosphorous is a naturally occurring nutrient found in agricultural fertilizers, manure, 
organic wastes and a variety of other sources. It is an essential element of plant life and is 
harmless in small amounts. But high concentrations of phosphorous, which became 
prevalent with increased use of synthetic detergents after World War II, can lead to a 
reduction in dissolved oxygen in water bodies due to an increase of mineral and organic 
nutrients. This nutrient enrichment, known as eutrophication, can cause slow-moving 
rivers and lakes (which have limited self-purifying capacities) to turn green rapidly and 
choke with aquatic plant growth.
2
  
 Atlanta discharged significant amounts of phosphorous into local streams because 
its WWTFs lacked the necessary equipment to handle the amounts of phosphorous that 
entered the plants located on nearby waterways. This issue was compounded by the 
dueling collection systems serving the city. As previously explained, Atlanta leaders 
chose during the early formation of the city‘s sewer network to utilize combined sewer 
systems in order to effectively evacuate sanitary and storm water away from the 
downtown area and into outlying streams. As the city expanded and built numerous 
WWTFs, sanitary engineers installed modern sewers in the newer surrounding suburbs 
where the storm water would be collected separately and never mixed with sewage water. 
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The old combined sewers were then connected to the newer separate sewer system by 
smaller interceptor pipes.  
This system typically operated efficiently under dry weather conditions because 
these interconnected systems were able to carry flows of waste straight to one of four 
sewer treatment plants. But heavy rainfall caused storm water runoff, which increased 
significantly as a result of continued street paving and urban development, to overload 
the entire system. As street water flooded the combined system, it mixed phosphorous-
rich sewage with millions of gallons of storm water. The smaller interceptor lines that 
connected the new system to the old were quickly filled to capacity. Sewer treatment 
plants therefore went into rapid processing mode to accommodate the overload, but often 
failed to meet state discharge limits for phosphorous and other pollutants. During heavy 
rains, moreover, the excess of combined storm and sanitary waters were not treated at all. 
Rather, this stew of chemical and biological water was released through relief structures 
known as combined system overflows (CSOs) into nearby creeks before arriving in the 
WWTFs. The resulting un-filtered debris and wastewater, which contained bacteria and 
chemical levels hundreds of times higher than acceptable, flowed through parks and 
neighborhoods and to those communities downstream from Atlanta.
3
 
 Although the City of Atlanta stopped constructing combined sewers during the 
1920s, 330 miles of these sewers and eight CSOs continued to be used in downtown and 
Midtown areas throughout the twentieth century.  This continued to occur despite the fact 
that engineers and public health officials as early as the 1950s had suspected CSO design 
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to be ―a prime culprit in the inability of existing systems to operate efficiently.‖
4
 In fact, 
in 1953 Atlanta contracted with the consulting engineering firm of Wiedeman and 
Singleton to investigate complaints of noxious odors emanating from several area CSOs. 
Still reliant on the assimilative capacity of streams, the engineers recommended that the 
city defer substantive action in favor of ―expanded maintenance and operation.‖ Sewer 
separation was an option never considered in their report. Instead, the consulting 
engineers suggested frequent inspection and cleaning of interceptor grates and the 
possible raising of overflow weirs, the paving of outlets, and installation of fire hydrants 
to prevent the exposure and pooling of wastes ―when the conditions are such that they 
might become a source of nuisance.‖
5
  
The proverbial can was kicked further down the street in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Existing federal grant-in-aid programs, which covered the lion‘s share of water 
remediation expenses in most cities, only assisted in the construction of treatment 
facilities, not the enhancement of sewer collection systems. Atlanta mayors Ivan Allen, 
Jr. and Sam Massell realized this constraint when they respectively appeared before 
Congressional committees in 1965 and 1971. Although each mayor‘s testimony touched 
upon the need for sewer separation and general collection system upgrades, they 
pragmatically chose to concentrate on obtaining more federal assistance for achieving the 
required secondary treatment levels rather than challenging Congress to expand the scope 
of its funding considerations. Thus, CSO control remained a secondary concern and  
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Figure 4.1— Combined Sewer Overflow Locations. (Source: CH2M Hill/TOC.INC, City 






factored only minimally into the subsequent treatment facility upgrades and tunneling 
that took place as a result of the Three River program.
6
    
The 1980s proved to be an even less hospitable time for Atlanta to attempt a 
major overhaul of its sewer system. Instead of allocating more money to help urban areas 
repair their deteriorating infrastructure as many city leaders had hoped, the Reagan 
Administration actually reduced federal grants to cities by $14 billion through passage of 
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981. 
This new policy of ―beneficiary pays‖ also coincided with a general feeling among 
national policymakers that the previous decade‘s onslaught of environmental legislation 
promised more than could be delivered. Critics charged that the regulatory mechanisms 
stipulated in the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act—later named the Clean Water 
Act (CWA)—were not only inefficient, but that the Act‘s zero-discharge goals were also 
largely unattainable, had overemphasized single pollution-control measures at the 
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Local demographic shifts and political apathy also contributed mightily to 
postponing badly needed improvements to Atlanta‘s wastewater system. Between 1970 
and the mid-1980s, Atlanta‘s share of the total metropolitan population had declined by 
an estimated thirty-seven percent as some folks left the city and others settled into the 
suburban fringes of the metropolitan area. In addition, these suburbanites, as historian 
Kevin Kruse points out, not only resisted Atlanta‘s repeated attempts at annexation but 
also rebuffed many pleas to share in the costs of any ―metropolitan‖ approaches that 
linked the city and suburbs together, despite the fact that many of them were users of 
Atlanta‘s multi-county sewer system. Finally, even while faced with a diminished tax 
base, the City of Atlanta did itself no favors by consistently refusing to increase sewer 
service charges to the levels necessary to abate its pollution problems. Between 1978 and 
1983, for example, the city raised water and sewer rates only once. And while this forty-
four percent increase in funds was substantial, it was largely dedicated to meeting the 
financial obligations of the Three Rivers program.
8
       
 By the late 1980s, Georgia‘s environmental agencies informed Atlanta officials 
that the city could no longer ―make the Chattahoochee its toilet.‖
9
 In 1989, the state 
assembly established phosphorous control limits after EPA and Georgia Department of 
Natural Resources (DNR) water quality tests confirmed eutrophication had occurred in 
West Point Lake, the first major reservoir south of Atlanta. Recognizing that upstream 
treatment plants were the principal cause of algae blooms, reduced clarity, strong odors, 
and fish kills found in the lake, the EPD subsequently issued an Administrative Order 
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requiring all major WWTF discharges (larger than 1 MGD) between Lake Lanier and 
West Point Reservoir to reduce the average concentrations of phosphorous in effluent to 
0.75 milligrams per liter (mg/L) by December 31, 1991.
10
  
Similar directives were also issued regarding CSOs. In June 1989, the DNR 
instructed the City of Atlanta to initiate plans to control CSO releases after federal 
environmental regulators hinted that CSO discharges violated the Clean Water Act 
(CWA). Three months later the EPA made these musings official when it issued its 
―National Combined Sewer Overflow Control Strategy.‖ These federal guidelines 
reaffirmed that CSOs are point-source discharges subject to National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES) permit requirements under the CWA. In fact, the 
permitting process was the centerpiece of the CWA. It essentially sought to limit specific 
pollutants that were being discharged from point-source (specific municipal systems and 
industrial facilities and agricultural sites) as opposed to older water quality standards that 
tried to maintain the ambient characteristics of the stream. Specifically, the EPA 
attempted to ensure that CSOs occurred only during wet weather and that those discharge 
points be identified and brought into compliance with CWA standards for fishable and 
swimmable rivers and streams. Furthermore, it charged states with developing state-wide 
permitting strategies to reduce, eliminate, or control CSOs. The Georgia General 
Assembly then responded the following year with a series of laws to regulate CSOs. 
These acts cumulatively prohibited the operation of CSOs in the state for municipalities 
that had not obtained a permit from EPD by March 1991 and further stipulated that the 
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EPD could prescribe conditions on the permit for ―the achievement of effluent limitations 
in the shortest reasonable period of time.‖ In addition, the state required all CSO owners 
and operators to submit detailed plans to the EPD for the elimination or treatment of 
CSOs in order to ensure that all discharges complied with state and federal water quality 
standards by December 31, 1993.
11
    
With seemingly little wiggle room, city officials in Atlanta hunkered down with 
consulting engineers and the Bureau of Pollution Control (BPC) staff between late 1989 
and mid-1990 to produce plans for CSO abatement and phosphorous control. With regard 
to the former, the BPC floated a $20 million proposal to build ―mini treatment‖ plants at 
five of the city‘s most troublesome overflow points: the North Avenue and Greensferry 
CSOs on Proctor Creek as well the relief structures located on Tanyard, Utoy, and Clear 
Creeks. According to the BPC staff, these small treatment facilities would reduce 
pollution by providing primary screening to remove toilet paper, trash, and other visible 
signs of sewage from the water. In addition, disinfectants such as chlorine could then be 
added to kill bacteria, viruses and other microbes that harm fish and cause human 
disease.
12
   
The EPD accepted the broad contours of this proposal in 1990 but urged the city 
to submit a detailed course of action that would include sufficient self-monitoring 
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technologies. When detailed plans failed to materialize by early 1991, state 
environmental regulators grew increasingly impatient with the city‘s slow response. 
Aware that the EPA was looking over the state‘s shoulder, the EPD slapped the City of 
Atlanta with an administrative order in April 1991 that required the city to initiate 
construction on CSO projects no later than October 1, 1992 and to be in compliance with 
water quality standards by December 31, 1993. Failure to meet these deadlines, the state 
agency promised, would result in sanctions such as fines and sewer hookup moratoriums. 
This threat was further strengthened by a new state law that increased the civil penalty for 
violations from a maximum $25,000 per day to $50,000 for a first violation with 
subsequent violations over a twelve month period being subject to a $100,000 per day 
fine. Worse still, financial experts additionally warned that failure to comply with state 
directives on pollution control could lower the city‘s bond rating and thereby cause the 
city to pay higher interest rates on debt and lose the confidence of investors, all of which 
would potentially jeopardize Atlanta‘s ability to prepare for the 1996 Olympic Games.
13
 
 Atlanta pollution control officials objected to the state‘s timetable for the 
phosphorous limit compliance almost immediately. According to preliminary 
investigations by the consulting engineering firm of Brown and Caldwell, retrofitting 
Atlanta‘s WWTFs required a longer time horizon than that assumed by EPD regulators. 
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Their plan, which was essentially a revised proposal of that ARC‘s Wastewater Planning 
Task Force had developed two years earlier, called for the introduction of phosphorous 
removal equipment to the R.M. Clayton, Utoy Creek, and South River WWTFs. It also 
called for: 1) the Utoy Creek plant to be expanded to accommodate up to 200 MGD; 2) 
the R.M. Clayton facility treatment allotment to be reduced from 120 MGD to 66 MGD; 
and 3) the city to bore an 8-mile long combined sewage and water tunnel to convey the 
wastewater from the Clayton plant to Utoy Creek for treatment and discharge.
14
 
 With the consultant‘s report in hand, Atlanta officials asked the state in June 1990 
for relief from ―unreasonable limits‖ on its sewage discharges to allow ―more time to 
evaluate the impact of standards being imposed.‖ The DNR retorted several weeks later 
that not only was it "reasonable and practical" for Atlanta to comply with the 0.75 mg/l 
phosphorus discharge limitation by December 31, 1991 but that  federal pollution control 
officials may even impose more stringent measures than those which were in place. 
Despite this unequivocal declaration from the regulatory authorities, the Georgia General 
Assembly authorized the EPD to grant program extensions in August 1990, when the 
City of Atlanta produced the finalized design plans that indicated that it could not realize 
the state‘s phosphorous reduction levels until at least 1995. Armed with this legislative 
club, city officials negotiated a ―Consent Order‖ with the EPD in April 1991allowing for 
a delay in meeting the 0.75 mg/L limit until July 4, 1996. In return, the EPD extracted a 
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requirement that the city meet a more restrictive limit of 0.65 mg/L average phosphorous 
concentrations, to be accomplished by February 1997.
15
   
 The question remains as to why the City of Atlanta waited to take action on these 
remedial measures until after federal and state regulators stepped up their pressure. 
Evidence shows that the city‘s pollution control officials did not simply generate CSO 
and phosphorous abatement plans in response to state mandates but had worked out, at 
least conceptually, some program of action before the state pulled the trigger. Indeed, the 
BPC had identified the problems associated with CSOs since the 1970s and had even 
developed its CSO abatement but had failed to move forward in the absence of regulatory 
pressure. Similarly, the Atlanta Regional Commission produced a proposed solution for 
phosphorous reduction a full year before the state established its guidelines. Clearly, 
Atlanta officials could not claim that they were blindsided by the state‘s mandates.  
 The lack of funding and political resolve is unquestionably at the root of the city‘s 
delay. As explained, federal grants-in-aid programs developed during the 1970s 
essentially pre-dated the more focused concern on phosphorous control and did not 
include funding for sewage system problems. In any event, once federal assistance was 
phased out during the 1980s, city leaders were left with the responsibility of raising rates, 
which they were loath to do. Sewers, in short, are not sexy and hence offer little return for 
political capital spent. To be sure, there was little public clamor for these issues and there 
is evidence to suggest that Atlanta‘s citizens, after accepting the forty-four percent hike in 
1984, were reluctant to accept larger increases. In fact, the failure of a general obligation 
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bond issue in 1988 to upgrade city schools, fire and police facilities and repair or replace 
much of the city's failing infrastructure was widely interpreted as evidence of poor 




 Another issue to consider with regard to pollution abatement delays is that 
changes in treatment standards may have discouraged the adoption of capital intensive 
technologies. As previously explained, the CWA‘s zero-discharge goals were met with 
increased skepticism during the 1980s. In addition, the Act‘s emphasis on technology-
based standards for pollution control suggested to some water experts that the EPA was 
focusing too heavily on single technical solutions at the expense of other more 
comprehensive approaches. Indecision on how to treat non-point sources of pollution that 
mixed with municipal discharges only complicated the matter. Seen in this context, it is 
somewhat understandable that the City of Atlanta might wait until firm regulations and 
deadlines were established. In any event, state regulations and the BPC showed their 
willingness to trade time for more stringent limitations on phosphorous discharges. But 




DON‘T FLUSH ON ME: 
WATER POLLUTION, POLICY, AND PROTEST IN THE CITY OF ATLANTA, 
1990-1998. 
By April 1991 the City of Atlanta had presented the EPD with acceptable plans 
for both CSO abatement and phosphorous limitations. The city's CSO plan called for 
spending roughly $90 million to build mini-sewage treatment plants in five CSO 
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locations to remove solids, such as toilet paper and trash, from discharges, and add 
chlorine to kill viruses and bacteria. The treated wastewater would then be allowed to 
flow into the city creeks at supposedly reduced pollution levels. The phosphorous control 
plan, in contrast, called for the upgrading of the Utoy Creek WTTF to receive wastes via 
an 8-mile long underground tunnel.  
Work began on the CSO facilities in the summer of 1992. Then, events took a 
different turn, as grassroots activism on the part of neighborhood and public interest 
groups derailed the city‘s attempts to carry out the remainder of its pollution control 
proposals. The city‘s CSO ―mini treatment‖ proposal met with immediate uncertainty 
from the affected communities. Noting that the DNR‘s order did not specifically call for 
CSO elimination, environmental advocates argued that the city‘s plan failed to remove 
heavy metals, oil and grease and many other potentially hazardous substances like lead, 
arsenic, chromium, and cadmium that appeared in high levels from city discharges. The 
activists claimed, moreover, that substantial reliance on chlorine posed an environmental 
threat, and perhaps even a public safety hazard, to the surrounding neighborhoods 
because it would react with other chemicals in the water and produce cancer-causing 
substances. As a result, environmentalists charged that the city was simply applying a 
cheap ―band aid‖ to its own sewer problems. It would be far preferable, they suggested, 
for Atlanta to either attempt CSO separation as in Minneapolis or follow Chicago‘s lead, 
where plans were underway to build huge underground storage tunnels to hold excess 
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W. Marshall Sanders, an attorney with Research Atlanta, a public policy research 
organization out of Georgia State University, argues that the ensuing protests over 
pollution control in Atlanta followed a pattern that is recognizable in most successful 
examples of neighborhood activism. First, a small group of citizens—usually those living 
near a proposed facility site— are awakened to the potential harmful impacts of the 
development in its community. These perceived threats could range from relatively minor 
nuisances like traffic and noise to more profound, long-term threats to public health and 
safety. Next, these concerned citizens become convinced that the project must be halted, 
moved, or significantly altered.  Local officials then take steps to reassure the public 
about the safety and necessity of the project. These attempts are likely to be met with 
skepticism, at which point opponents begin to organize and seek political support against 
the project. Proponents may then respond by marginalizing or appeasing the opposition, 
but as tensions mount and positions become more entrenched, policy gridlock may follow 
until a resolution is achieved.
19
 
For some activists like Preston Mason, CSOs were inseparable from the 
phosphorous control problems. Mason, a landscape contractor, was environmental chair 
of the Atlanta Planning Advisory Board, a citizen group that was drawn from every 
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district of the city that advises local officials on goals and objectives relative to Atlanta's 
Comprehensive Development Plans.  He was convinced that sewer separation was the 
answer for all of Atlanta‘s sewer ills and he argued, for example, that tunneling and 
enlargement of the Utoy Creek WWTF would ―not be necessary if we stop mixing 
phosphorous-bearing sewer waste with millions of gallons of storm water. Rather than 
spend $360 million to patch expensive new systems onto an obsolete combined system, 
we need to look at the cost of modernizing by separating wastewater pipes from sewage 
pipes. After all, its storm water from old Atlanta (i.e., the 330-mile downtown area that 
retained combined sewers) that's overloading the entire system and causing both 
problems.‖
20
    
    Atlanta mayor Maynard Jackson and BPC staff countered this opposition by 
adamantly defending the $100 million treatment strategy as the most cost-effective and 
environmentally sound solution to CSO problems. "This is the solution to our problem," 
said George Barnes, the director of the city's Bureau of Pollution Control. "These 
facilities will allow our city to meet and comply with current standards and regulations, 
and our permit. Unless there's changes in the water quality laws, the city will not need to 
do anything else about this problem." City engineers deemed that sewer separation would 
require the construction of two 48-foot diameter deep rock tunnels and the digging up of 
streets to lay miles of new pipe. The BPC further suggested that costs could run as high 
as $1 billion and add an average of $105 per month to household water bills. Mayor 
Jackson, brandishing the BPC‘s 60 page report, warned that this cost represented an 
amount so great that it would produce a ―widespread, adverse economic and social 
impact on the residents of the city.‖ Small-scale CSO facilities, Jackson and the BPC 
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further contended, would screen garbage and disinfect pollution-laden runoff that 
otherwise would be discharged into creeks under separated sewers and would also better 
aid the city in meeting the state‘s deadline without incurring penalties.
21
 
 For Atlanta planners, engineers, and city officials, the benefits of their 
phosphorous plan were equally manifest. First, with treatment capacity of 120 MGD, the 
R.M. Clayton plant was considered overburdened and, due to site limitations, expansions 
to the plant were considered impractical. Second, a constructed tunnel would integrate the 
entire sewage treatments system and allow BPC officials to seek a single operating 
permit from the EPD that could be based on an ―average‖ discharge amount from the 
three plants. Third, the tunnel would serve as a ―flow equalization‖ device that could 
temporarily store partially treated effluent and thereby ensure that the system would not 
be overwhelmed during heavy storms.
 22
   
 Residents near the Utoy Creek and Clear Creek CSOs remained apprehensive. 
The Utoy Creek CSO, located in southwestern Atlanta, had been the site of over fifty 
overflow events a year where millions of gallons of untreated sewage and storm water 
was released into a section of the creek that traversed John A. White Park. After 
complaining for years about the unsanitary and unsightly conditions created by this relief 
valve, a coalition of roughly seventy people from the area organized in 1992 and called 
for alternative solutions to the city‘s CSO treatment plan. 
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The resistance to the Utoy Creek plant was also aided by a similar controversy 
that had erupted over the proposed location for the Clear Creek CSO facility in Midtown 
Atlanta. Whereas public health and environmental concerns had driven the Utoy Creek 
protesters to explore sewer separation or other options, opposition to the Clear Creek 
facility stemmed largely from aesthetic sensibilities. The BPC‘s original 1990 design 
proposal called for construction of a 22-foot-tall CSO structure along the Tenth Street 
meadow at the south end of Piedmont Park across from Grady High School. This $30 
million plan also suggested that the sewer system could be crowned with an office 




The private, non-profit Piedmont Park Conservancy, which planned its own $15 
million facelift for the city‘s premier green space, objected that the CSO structure would 
be an eyesore and that covering it with additional office space would further detract from 
the view. Protests continued as more neighborhood organizations from the midtown area 
joined the crusade. By 1993, neighborhood associations amalgamated under the 
Neighborhood Planning Unit (NPU) and environmental groups like Sewage Treatment 
Out of the Park (STOP) joined in to insist that the CSO facility should be removed from 
the park and re-located to a less conspicuous but adjacent area. "Sewage treatment has no 
place in a public park," said Bill Eisenhauer, a STOP founding member. "Piedmont 
already is grossly overused and under-maintained,‖ he added before warning that his 
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organization was ready to sue the city for clean water violations if heavy metal treatment 
was not included in the CSO clean-up.
 24
   
Although the activists in STOP did not file suit against the city, Eisenhauer‘s 
objections indicate the rift that was emerging among those concerned with local water 
quality. The city, as well as the state and federal agencies, wanted a quick but sufficient 
end to the city‘s pollution. City officials, of course, wanted to reduce pollution any way 
possible, at the lowest cost. EPA officials stated that they approved the city's CSO 
treatment concept, but they didn't dictate the specific technology the city should use. 
Likewise, the EPD approved the permits but stated that the responsibility for meeting the 
water quality standard ultimately rested with the City of Atlanta.  For some activists like 
Eisenhauer, a mechanical engineer and one-time director of Georgia Tech‘s Research 
Institute, the design of the CSO facilities would allow the continued discharge of 
untreated waste, provide only partial treatment of some biological pollutants, and not 
address other important pollutants such as ammonia, phosphorus, or heavy metals. For 
these activists, the city‘s mini-treatment facilities were a cheap stop-gap measure that was 
aimed at meeting an arbitrary state deadline. It would better, they believed, for the city to 
spend the money and time to get it right the first time. If the plans failed, activists would 
be ready to take court action if the state did not enforce federal laws.
25
   
 The presence of an organized, determined, and vocal CSO opposition was too 
much for the City Council to ignore. Recent events outside the council chambers no 
doubt imparted upon the members the need for greater sensitivity to community anxieties 
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over the fragility of the century-old sewer system. On June 14, the Orme Street combined 
sewer created an enormous sinkhole that swallowed three vehicles and drowned hotel 
workers Victoria Vaynshetyn and Oscar Cano. Although Mayor Jackson continued to 
back the BPC plan on the grounds that separation would be too costly and time-
consuming, the City Council proved more receptive to the protesters‘ passionate 
complaints. Less than two weeks after the tragedy, Utoy Creek citizens brought out their 
own arsenal—a well-researched, clear presentation with impressive maps, charts, cost-
analysis plans, and a box of petitions signed by thousands of neighborhood residents—to 
argue against the city‘s CSO plan for their area. The council responded by not only 
stifling the Utoy Creek mini-treatment plans but also by authorizing the sale of 
approximately $270 million in taxpayer guaranteed bonds to pay for sewer improvements 
that included up to $50 million for whatever system council members should choose for 
Utoy Creek. The City Council further demonstrated its resolve when it voted 




In September 1993, both the mayor and city council signed off on a three-year, 
$65 million Clear Creek project that was lauded as a ―solid collaborative effort between 
the city and the neighborhoods.‖  Under the plan, the city agreed to purchase a 12-acre 
site at the north end of the park where the 26,000 square foot overflow treatment plant 
was to be constructed in front of a 10-acre storm water retention area. At the entrance of 
the park, Clear Creek was to be restored with boulders and trees placed in the stream‘s 
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center. Its shorelines were also to be carved by bulldozers to make it appear ―more 
natural.‖ During heavy rainstorms, the brew of combined sewage and runoff was to flow 
through a culvert underneath Piedmont Park to the plant where the wastewater would be 
screened and sprayed. The treated sewage would then be discharged into the creek, where 
floodwater was to be prevented by a dam that could be closed to retain excess water in 
the 10-acre overflow area. Lastly, the entire 22-acre addition was to be landscaped and 
connected by paths to the rest of the park.
27
  
Commenting on the council‘s decision to back the Utoy Creek activists, 
councilman and 1993 mayoral hopeful Bill Campbell stated, "The community has spent 
considerable time and energy" and "their technical expertise has overwhelmed our own 
expertise. That raises questions in itself."  Councilwoman Mary Davis added, "I was truly 
impressed. This group really did its homework." She likewise gushed over the prospect of 
a relocated Clear Creek CSO plant: "It will be a beautiful addition to Piedmont Park and 
also fix a problem that had waited too long to be addressed," Ms. Davis said. "I think it's 
historic, and a model for citizen participation."
28
 
 This kind of ―civic participation‖ and ability of grassroots organizers to challenge 
the expertise of the city‘s pollution control officials is symptomatic of the emergence of 
an invigorated environmental perspective and relative decline in expert authority that 
occurred in the last four decades of the twentieth century. As historian Brian Balogh 
explains, modern environmentalism was an ecology-based, holistic outlook ―that 
epitomized the assault on specialized approaches‖ that were so crucial to the nation‘s 
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postwar technological, economic, and political development. It additionally engendered 
pointed, localized critiques of increasingly specialized and professionalized plans and 




Atlanta‘s neighborhood activists demonstrated that environmental policymakers 
were vulnerable to such disenchantment with expertise. CSO proponents argued that their 
plan was the most environmentally sound technique for solving the city‘s dilemma. "This 
program has been carefully developed by professionals who have done environmental 
work for their whole careers," said BPC director George D. Barnes. But as Bill 
Campbell‘s comment indicates, the council‘s lack of confidence in the city‘s plan 
stemmed from the CSO opponents‘ well-researched assault on the soundness of the 
BPC‘s technical and professional expertise. ―We were constantly hearing a one-sided 
argument," recalled Naeema Gilyard, a Utoy Creek resident and health administrator at 
Morehouse Medical School. "They kept saying `we have to get on with it and build the 
facility,‖ . . . ―but we felt it unfair to not explore the alternatives.''
30
 
 Sociologist Robert D. Bullard argues that many poor and minority residents have 
viewed the mainstream environmentalism that emerged from the 1960s as essentially an 
―elitist‖ movement that was overly concerned with leisure, recreation, wilderness, and 
wildlife preservation at the expense of social justice. Although there is no doubt that 
some collaboration existed among CSO protesters in Utoy Creek and Midtown Atlanta, 
and that quality of life, however that is defined, mattered to both groups, the stated 
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concerns from each campaign add some weight to Bullard‘s observation. For Utoy Creek 
residents, quality of life could be translated to mean public health, or as Ms. Gilyard 
stated, ―This concerns our lives, and it concerns our neighborhood, where we live.‖ "We 
didn't know what we wanted. We just knew we didn't want a facility like that in our back 
yard," said Armide W. Price, a registered nurse who helped organize the Utoy basin 
group. In contrast, aesthetics and recreation was clearly an important factor in resolving 
the Piedmont Park hullabaloo. "We're pleased with the plans, but the neighborhoods will 
continue to monitor the details of the landscaping," said Bob Enholm, chair of NPU-E. 
"We want to know about the kinds of trees the city plans to put in, the width of the new 
sidewalks, the kinds of pavers used and so on. In those details will be found the day-to-
day impact of this plan to the neighborhood."
31
      
  Bullard, moreover, argues that ―few environmentalists realized the sociological 
implications of the not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) phenomenon.‖ NIMBYism generally 
refers to community opposition to the construction of public or private facilities that 
ostensibly serve some vital, or at least valuable, public purpose but are perceived to be 
harmful to persons or property in a residential neighborhood. These locally unwanted 
land uses (LULUs) range from tall buildings, homeless shelters, and prisons to processing 
facilities, landfills and hazardous waste sites. Environmental justice activists claim, more 
importantly, that environmentally burdensome LULUs have been disproportionately 
placed in poor, powerless, minority communities rather in more affluent areas and that 
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public and industrial policies typically provide benefits for whites while shifting the costs 
or negative externalities to blacks.
32
 
 Nowhere in the Atlanta sewage saga was this issue of race and class more 
discussed than in the city‘s phosphorous control plan. Recall that the city‘s plan entailed 
boring a tunnel to link the R.M. Clayton plant to an enlarged Utoy Creek WWTF. Some 
activists, such as Preston Mason, the sewer separation advocate who lived 400 yards from 
where the tunnel would be constructed near the Clayton facility, opposed the project for 
fear that ―the tunnel will simply become an underground storage lake that could send 
methane and other pollutants up through cracks in the earth.‖ Others, including Professor 
Bullard, who teaches at Clark Atlanta University, denounced the city‘s $250 million plan 
as a clear case of environmental racism. "When one particular part of society is allowed 
to transport its waste to another, it's a form of inequity," said Bullard. "It's time for each 
community to bear the burden of treating waste, since all communities produce waste. 
Southeast and southwest Atlanta have already borne their share."
33
 
The charges of environmental racism stirred a great deal of debate. According to 
U.S Census figures cited by the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, the Utoy tract was 97 
percent black and fell slightly below Fulton County's overall levels of education, median 
household income and home values. But the area also had a lower poverty rate than 
Fulton County, which led the paper to conclude that ―the numbers hardly describe an 
impoverished community.‖ Bullard responded that this was a misapprehension of the 
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logic of the accusations: ―race, not income or education, determines racism.‖ Fulton 
County Commissioner Emma Darnell took it a step further, insisting that the R.M. 
Clayton tract, although predominantly white, is also the target of environmental racism. 
The Clayton census tract was 71 percent white and above the county levels in education, 
median household income, per capita income and home values. Clayton area residents 
noted that the plant straddles two census tracts - theirs and one that is predominantly 
black. It was the majority-black tract, they argued, that was attracting the polluting 
industries. "If you understand what racism is, this is obviously a case of racism," Darnell 




Atlanta officials said that they understood some of the neighbors' concerns, but 
they also disputed the charges of racism. ―The communities around Utoy Creek are 
minority, but they are not poor," said Atlanta Public Works Commissioner Douglas 
Hooker, who is black. "To call [the tunnel] environmental racism is unfair." Michael 
Lynch, a member of Mayor Bill Campbell‘s phosphorus reduction study panel, who is 
white and lived a mile from the Clayton plant, said panel members recommended the 
tunnel because they thought it was best for the city."
35
  
As with the CSO controversies, the barrage of protests convinced city officials 
that they would have to dispense with their original plan in favor of an alternative more 
amenable to local constituents. In May 1995, Mayor Bill Campbell, bowing to the 
activists‘ claims that the plan was environmentally unsound and would adversely impact 








mostly poor, minority communities, said the $250 million tunnel would not be built. 
More than five years after the proposal of the original program, the City Council 
effectively put the nail in the coffin with an ordinance that endorsed a new non-diversion 
phosphorous control plan that included the enlargement of and modifications to the R.M. 
Clayton plant. Meanwhile, EPD Director Harold Reheis, frustrated by the city's delay, 
notified Mayor Campbell in September that the state would impose an administrative 
order on Atlanta for failing to execute the 1991 consent order. Fearing fines of up to 
$100,000 per month and another threat of credit downgrading for failure to act, the City 
of Atlanta entered with the EPD into a second consent agreement on October 26, 1995 
that retained the earlier phosphorous limits and deadlines but deleted the tunnel option 
and replaced it with plans for Clayton WWTF enhancements.
36
 
Many Atlantans expressed dismay and anger over the non-stop protests and the 
city‘s apparent foot-dragging to resolve the sewer troubles. One such person was local 
writer Dick Williams. In a blistering editorial published in the AJC, Williams expressed 
his disbelief that city leaders, who were paying $9000 in daily fines for CSO violations 
and who had already spent $20 million in design plans and preparations for the tunnel, 
would choose to shelve that $250 million program for the $400 million Clayton 
expansion plan. This would lead to a $15 or 77 percent increase in water bills, only two 
years after a 35 percent rate hike. Williams also asserted that Atlantans, amidst their 
internecine bickering, had obviously forgotten that they were not the only users of either 
the Chattahoochee River or the WTTFs located on it. DeKalb County, he noted, had 
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previously issued $90 million in bonds to contribute to improvements to the metropolitan 
sewer system but were unsure how or where the money would be spent.   
Then Williams really cut loose: 
What we have here is a catch phrase – ‗environmental racism‘ - being used by 
residents of a relatively poor neighborhood to stop an unobtrusive tunnel deep 
underground, jack up sewer rates and maybe even property taxes and dictate 
terms to residents of three other jurisdictions. On Atlanta's overpopulated council 
of 18 members, representatives of a few districts have unwarranted power against 
the interests of the city as a whole .  . . The next time someone rants about 
‗environmental racism,‘ just ask them what a responsible government could do 
with $9,000 a day? Fix the leaning towers of Techwood? Put every unemployed 
teenager in town on a summer job? Send City Council on a permanent vacation? 
Move everyone near Utoy Creek to a pristine mountain stream? Instead, the 
money - and probably millions more - is being flushed from taxpayers' homes 




 The debates concerning pollution control strategies and technologies offer some 
insights into Atlanta‘s complex racial and class dynamics as well the role of technocrats  
in late twentieth century America. As Stanley K. Schultz and Clay McShane argue, urban 
infrastructure demands intricate planning, sophisticated technical solutions, and 
tremendous amounts of capital, and because of this, city leaders and residents alike have 
traditionally relied on experienced engineers and trained municipal administrators to 
define and fulfill system goals. The community opposition to the city‘s pollution control 
programs demonstrates, however, that Atlanta‘s residents were not content to allow 
engineers and other ―experts‖ to make all the public policy decisions. In a post-Vietnam, 
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environmentally conscious world city officials were forced to become more inclusive 
when deciding public policy issues.
 38
   
 This appeal to inclusiveness is also a function of what scholar Robert Kagan has 
labeled adversarial legalism. Arising from the relative weakness of bureaucratic 
alternatives for achieving policy goals, this lawyer-dominated litigation thrives in 
exceptionally fragmented governing structures like that of the United States and 
encourages justice claims where ―law is treated as malleable, open to parties novel legal 
arguments and pleas of extenuating circumstances.‖ Although adversarial legalism 
provides access to formerly marginalized groups, it also results in high financial costs, 
time delays, uncertainty, and the erosion of trust and good will. And with regard to 
economic development and environmental protection, Kagan 




 Although Atlanta‘s environmental activists won a seat at the planning table, the 
net environmental and economic effect of community protest has been mixed. On the one 
hand, the city was forced to think more innovatively about alternative wastewater 
solutions to address the longstanding and legitimate concerns of the neighborhoods 
surrounding the facilities. On the other hand, opposition led to delays which further 
exposed the city to fines and moratoria. Furthermore, the near-paralysis in public decision 
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making further eroded public trust in the ability of Atlanta‘s leaders to deliver credible 
pollution solutions.   
 At times the controversy even became personal. BPC director George Barnes, 
who became a lightning rod for critics after he helped push through the original proposal 
for ―mini treatment‖ plants, quit the BPC on January 9, 1995 over intense scrutiny and 
the city‘s decision to separate sewers in Utoy Creek. In his resignation letter, he wrote 
that the Utoy Creek separation solution is "environmentally damaging and a financial 




THE NOOSE TIGHTENS:  
LITIGATION AND NEGOTIATED POLLUTION CONTROL SETTLEMENTS, 1995-
1999. 
 Dick Williams was not the only one fed up with Atlanta‘s slow response to 
meeting its water quality obligations. In the summer of 1995, a coalition of Atlanta 
activists and downstream communities filed notice of their intent to sue the city for its 
laxity in keeping the Chattahoochee River free of pollution. "It's unfortunate that the 
situation has come to this," said Atlanta attorney David Pope, "but the city dragged its 
feet too long. Something needs to be done." "If state and federal agencies can't make [the 
city] move, then perhaps a federal judge will," said Sally Bethea of the Upper 
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 Organized by Rutherford and Laura Turner Seydel in 1994 and modeled after 
New York‘s Hudson RiverKeeper, the Upper Chattahoochee RiverKeeper (UCR) is an 
environmental advocacy organization with the stated mission of advocating for and 
protecting the Chattahoochee River, its tributaries, and watershed. Beginning with a small 
professional staff and several volunteers, the UCR quickly acquired momentum when it 
received funding from the CNN magnate Ted Turner‘s private foundation (the Turner 
Foundation) to hire a full-time legal staff. Then, as promised, the UCR, along with eleven 




 "The goal of this lawsuit is to force the city of Atlanta to properly address its 
sewage treatment problems," said David Pope, an Atlanta lawyer who represented the 
plaintiffs.  Specifically, the group alleged that the city failed to operate and maintain 
discharge standards for three on-line CSO facilities on Tanyard and Proctor Creeks, 
which they claimed entitled them to seek federal redress under the citizen-suit provisions 
of the CWA. In 1997, after the UCR asked for their expertise in negotiating a post-suit 
settlement, the EPA and EPD joined the litigation to seek injunctive relief for NPDES 
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 Pope stated that it was not the plaintiff‘s intention to advocate one solution over 
another. "Our goal,‖ he maintained, ―is to clean up the Chattahoochee River.‖ Instead, the 
coalition‘s aim was to have the federal court: 1) order the city to provide whatever 
improvements are necessary to the WWTPs and the CSOs to ensure that proper treatment 
is given to the effluent at those locations, 2) assess penalties against Atlanta for its prior 
failure to comply with requirements of the CWA and to ensure the city‘s future 
compliance with the law, and 3) impose a moratorium on new sewer hookups if the city 
fails to take appropriate steps in a timely and responsible fashion.
44
  
  Work continued despite the pending court decision. In 1996 the city spent $7.3 
million on sewer maintenance and $7 million on sewer construction. BPC engineers 
additionally allotted $161 million for the next five years to rebuild and upgrade twenty-
two major sewer lines. By the time Mayor Campbell appointed ―environmental czar‖ 
Larry Wallace as Barnes‘s successor in the spring of 1997, Atlanta had introduced 
enough modifications to its WWTFs to reduce their phosphorous discharges and prevent 
further EPD sanctions. Penalties had last occurred in February of that year when the city 
was fined $750,000 and hit with a three-month ban on new sewer hookups after it 
exceeded the state-mandated 0.75 mg/L limit. In addition, although sewer separation in 
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the Utoy basin was not expected to be completed until early 1998, the Clear 
Creek/Piedmont Park CSO plant became operational in October of 1997, an 
accomplishment that cut the city‘s $20,000 per day fines in half.
45
  
 Speaking of the execution of the Clear Creek CSO, Mayor Cambell said "This is a 
part of our efforts at rebuilding our old dilapidated wastewater system. It is cause for 
celebration, still with the recognition that there is a lot left to do."  Indeed, a five-month 
EPA and EPD  probe of Atlanta‘s sewer collection system confirmed in October 1997 
that not only was there still much left to do but that enforcement action might be needed 
to get it done. The agencies found that the operators at the R.M. Clayton plant, which 
treated about 55 percent of the city‘s sewage, diverted millions of gallons of poorly 
treated sewage into the Chattahoochee River during rainy weather up to 50 times a year. 
In the first three months of 1997 alone, routine plant discharges violated federal and state 
water quality standards nearly 200 times. Atlanta‘s urban stream also had the highest 
levels of sewage pollution in the eight-state area overseen by the EPA‘s regional office. 
One main reason was that overburdened sewer pipes caused over half of the city‘s 
manholes to overflow in what engineers called ―fecal fountains‖ at various points in the 
city, sending raw sewage into city streams and streets. Segments of city creeks were also 
strewn with garbage and polluted with high levels of coliform bacteria, indicators of 
disease-causing bacteria and viruses. And although Campbell blamed much of the 
problems on neglect by previous administrations, the federal and state agencies argued 
that management of sewer operations under the current mayor was ―totally reactive‖ and 
driven almost entirely by customer complaints. The agencies further suggested that the 
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BPC lacked sufficient support staff and resources to implement a ―proactive sewage 
collection system‖ that ―could maintain an aggressive program to prevent problems.‖
46
     
 One month later, U.S. District Judge Thomas Thrash effectively repudiated 
Atlanta‘s technological and management efforts to clean up its CSO discharges in his 
summary judgment for Upper Chattahoochee Riverkeeper Inc. v. City. Finding high 
amounts of metal discharges and fecal coliform concentrations that frequently exceeded 
the maximum level ―by magnitudes of many thousands of times,‖ the federal judge 
concluded that ―the evidence is undisputed and overwhelming that the discharges in the 
culverts from the CSO treatment facilities do not meet Georgia Water Quality 
Standards.‖ Thrash‘s decision also hinted at his distaste for what he considered to be 
Atlanta‘s duplicitous attempts to skirt its obligations and blame EPD for the city‘s own 
violations. Atlanta officials contended, for example, that they were unable or not required 
to obtain composite samples during many of fifty or more overflow events per year and 
that the EPD was aware that the BPC was not obtaining composite samples. Thrash 
responded, however, that the EPD permit required an approved sampling plan and that 
‗This is not a mere technicality that Atlanta can nonchalantly ignore.‖ He further argued 
that even if the EPD had turned a blind eye to Atlanta‘s lack of a sampling plan, ―the 
EPD's acquiescence is no defense to Atlanta's flagrant falsification of the monitoring 
reports,‖ which were public records that needed to make sure the city was in compliance 
with federal and state water quality standards. Finally, although Thrash indicated that he 
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would like to see the litigants work out a settlement on all sewer problems, he specifically 
ordered that a CSO settlement be reached by March 1, 1998.
47
     
 The resulting CSO Consent Decree, which was officially signed by the City of 
Atlanta and the government and citizen plaintiffs on April 13, 1998, contained several 
features for remediating the city‘s CSO violations. First, it established July 1, 2007 as the 
target date by which the city‘s combined overflows must meet all CWA water quality 
standards. The decree did not specify the methods the city was to employ in its CSO 
overhaul but instead provided a precise timeline for the city to evaluate and submit short-
term, interim, and long-term plans for plaintiff review and approval. Second, the 
agreement obligated the city to pay a $2.5 million civil penalty to the United States and 
the State of Georgia for previous water quality violations—the largest one-time fine in 
the 26-year history of the CWA—as well as an escalating schedule of fines for each day 
it failed to meet any of the milestones or requirements set forth in the document. Third, 
the Consent Decree directed Atlanta officials to carry out a two-part, $27.5 million 
supplemental environmental plan whereby the city was to a) purchase land for creation of 
a greenway corridor along the Chattahoochee River and its tributaries and b) conduct a 
one-time cleanup along Clear Creek, Tanyard Creek, Proctor Creek, Utoy Creek, 
Intrenchment Creek, and part of the South River.
48
  
 The UCR‘s suit signals not only the fruition of STOP‘s earlier threats to 
innovatively use federal courts as leverage by which citizens could enforce federal 
environmental law, but also highlights the most positive effects of adversarial legalism.  
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STOP, for example, pointed out that the city‘s mini-treatment plants would fail to treat 
adequately the heavy metal content that existed in the wastewater. But whereas STOP 
focused its attention on the expected shortcomings of the yet-to-be built Piedmont Park 
CSO facility, the UCR challenged water quality violations that occurred in those CSO 
basins that received less public scrutiny. Furthermore, the UCR‘s inclusion in the process 
for reviewing the city‘s forthcoming CSO abatement plans is consistent with Kagan‘s 
assertion that adversarial legalism, in its best guise, ―provides citizen watchdog 
organizations access to the rule-making process in government agencies and, through 
threat of judicial review, helps guard against administrative arbitrariness or ‗capture.‘‖  In 
fact, it was the UCR‘s instigation of court action that arguably pushed the federal and 
state agencies to follow through with the mandate as regulators.       
 In July 1999, Atlanta officials and the EPA signed the so-called First Amended 
Consent Decree (FACD) in order to avoid litigation for the chronic wastewater system 
problems unresolved in the original Consent Decree. The FACD focused on bringing 
Atlanta‘s WWTFs and its wastewater transmission and collection system into full 
compliance with the NPDES requirements for state and federal water quality laws by July 
1, 2014. It directed the city to create inventories and devise standardized procedures ―to 
ensure that preventative and corrective maintenance is conducted‖ on the equipment 
necessary for the proper functioning of the WWTFS and collection system. It further 
called for system-wide mapping and the development of a Sewer System Evaluation Plan 
to address the structural integrity of the sewers to improve system capacity and prevent 
infiltration into sewer basins.  Lastly, the FACD directed the city to submit, by March 1, 
2000, a System-Wide Sewer Prioritization Plan that would contain specific methodology 
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for determining how phased sewer rehabilitation, repairs, or replacement would 
proceed.
49
      
CLEAN WATER ATLANTA: 1998 AND BEYOND 
Although Mayor Campbell hailed the consent decrees as a ―substantial victory for 
the people,‖ questions remained as to how Atlanta would pay for this massive remedial 
effort as well as for needed upgrades to its water supply system that serviced nearly 1.5 
million customers. By the late 1990s the city shared ownership of a new 90 MGD 
treatment facility with Fulton County, but its more than 2400 miles of pipe and its two 
older plants, which had a combined capacity of 184 MGD, were beginning to show signs 
of old age. Moreover, reductions in water rates for out-of-city water users, contributions 
to the more than $17 million in pollution fines that accrued since 1990, and 20 percent 
leakage losses meant that the AWW struggled to fund its own repairs, much less serve as 
a golden goose for the city‘s treasury as it did decades before.
50
  Cognizant that federal 
enforcement of water quality laws would require the city to more than double its existing 
water and sewer rates to pay for needed capital improvements, Campbell sought ways to 
minimize the city‘s economic burden. Therefore, in January 1998 the mayor announced 
the city‘s intention to implement private contract management of the entire water system 
to offset these costs.
51
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Although Campbell expressed his philosophical opposition to privatization, he 
gravitated toward the strategy because it promised an environmental, financial, and 
political lifeline that would free up money for repairs and moderate rate increases. As 
Elizabeth Brubaker explains, privatization of municipal services generated a great deal of 
public enthusiasm during the 1990s as financially-stressed communities struggled to meet 
stricter environmental standards with outdated infrastructure. For aging cities searching 
for a way to meet these demands, privatization promised the benefits of efficiency, 
effectiveness, cost-savings, and competition that the free markets supposedly offered. "I 
predict every city in America will go to privately run water systems," Campbell said. "It's 
virtually impossible to finance the (necessary infrastructure) improvements without going 
to ratepayers, without privatization."
52
  
The decision to privatize was taken after consultants hired by the city to assess the 
water and wastewater operating systems recommended contract management for AWW 
operations could save Atlanta up to $30 million annually over a period of twenty years. 
Such an arrangement, the consultants argued, could be conducted quicker than an outright 
asset sale, which would have required more political discussion than the time frame for 
pollution control permitted, and would lower costs to a greater extent than the mere 
reorganization and re-engineering of operations and facilities.
53
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The process of privatization involved the invitation of a number of interested 
companies to bid for the delivery of water services. This was after the City had issued a 
combined Request for Qualifications (RFQ) and Request for Proposals (RFP) in March of 
1998. A number of companies responded to this request and submitted tenders for the 
contract, which was eventually won by United Water, a subsidiary of Suez International, 
in October 1998. United Water‘s success was attributed to its bid being the lowest among 
the five competitors. The 20-year contract was worth $21.4 million per year—44 percent 
less than the $49 million the city had previously spent running the system—and promised 
Atlanta leaders an annual savings of nearly $20 million. In all, the city was expected to 
save more than $400 million over the duration of the contract.
54
 
Under the contract, which was to begin on January 1, 1999, and was the largest of 
its kind in America, United Water Services Atlanta (UWSA) was expected to operate, 
manage, and maintain the water supply system, while at the same time being responsible 
for raw water supply, treatment and distribution, billing, collection and other customer 
services. As well, the company was to undertake certain capital repairs and 
improvements. The city, on the other hand, was responsible for capital improvement 
planning, rate setting, negotiating and providing legal support for all intergovernmental 
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and wholesale water agreements, developing and maintaining policy guidance, and all 
other related governmental functions.
 55
  
Reaction to the privatization plan was cautiously optimistic. Some observers, such 
as Metro Group, a self-appointed watchdog group on local government, raised concerns 
about the proposed 20-year length of the contract and the weight to be given to cost in the 
final analysis. Others worried about the status of AWW employees, the extent of possible 
corruption in the bidding process, and the general speediness of the selection. Despite 
these misgivings, most in the community believed that Atlanta‘s plan to use a private 
contractor to deal with its water and wastewater problems was an ideal solution, saving 
money and relieving the onerous task of service provision, in order to focus on 
governance. As councilwoman Clair Muller explained, ―I am encouraged that this will 
lead to a dedicated effort to get control of our environment.‖
56
   
With privatization of its water supply system ostensibly settled, city leaders then 
turned to the challenge of responding to the respective Consent Decrees. As explained, 
each decree stipulated that the city would implement interim pollution control measures 
while simultaneously conducting system-wide evaluations so that remedial measures 
could be proposed. On March 1, 2000, the City of Atlanta presented to the EPA and EPD 
its plan for rehabilitating its wastewater collection and transmission system. Prepared by 
CH2M Hill, a Colorado-based consulting engineering firm that designs infrastructure 
projects all over the globe, the report highlighted the status of ongoing sewer 
improvement projects as well as sewer mapping and SSO tracking programs. More 
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specifically, the plan divided the city‘s 2,200 miles of sewerage pipes into six ―sewer 
groups‖ and provided criteria for prioritizing the schedule of phased sewer repairs and 
rehabilitation that would be completed between 2009 and 2014.
57
  
In the summer of 2001 Atlanta officials submitted to the EPA and EPD their 
preliminary recommendations for CSO abatement. This report, also prepared by CH2M 
Hill, contained an extended discussion of three viable CSO control options that the city 
considered and ranked according to levels of public approval, pollution reduction, 
affordability, and their ability meet the July 1, 2001 deadline. The alternatives included 
sewer separation except in the urban core (Option A), tunnel storage and treatment plant 
modifications with no sewer separation (Option B), and partial separation with tunnel 
storage and treatment plant modifications (Option C), all of which were argued to be 
capable of reducing overflow frequency from about sixty to no more than four events per 
year, as per the Consent Decree requirements.
58
 
City officials ultimately selected Option C as the most cost-effective approach for 
resolving their CSO dilemmas. It preferred this strategy for a number of reasons. 
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Table 4.1— Comparison of CSO Control Options, 2001. (Source: CH2M Hill, CSO 
Remedial Measures Report (2001), Tables 4-9, 4-10, Section 4, 7) 
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Table 4.2 — Pollutant Removal at the Outfall for Viable Options. (Source: CH2M Hill, 
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of its 25-year environmental agenda, Option C could be completed by Consent Decree 
deadline of July 2007, whereas complete separation, which enjoyed the most public 
would provide pollutant reductions necessary to greatly reduce loading and thus improve 
downstream water quality and aquatic habitat conditions. Consolidated storage also 
provided the city with the flexibility to treat storm water and address expected future 
changes to the storm water regulations.  
The distinction between Option B and Option C came down to the citizen groups 
responses. Options B and C were each capable of capturing and treating 98% of sanitary 
sewage flow & 85% of storm water flow. But despite being capable of removing slightly 
more of the BOD, suspended solids, copper, phosphorous, and zinc found in Atlanta‘s 
effluent, Option B lacked significant public support from many environmental activists 
because it did not involve sewer separation.
59
 In July 2001 the EPA and EPD approved 
the city‘s plan to eliminate water quality violations from CSOs through a combination of 
tunnels and separation of selected sewer areas and instructed the city officials to proceed 
with creating more detailed design plans. Two months later, however, the EPA sent a 
sharply worded letter criticizing Atlanta‘s exaggerated cost estimates. From the 
regulators' standpoint, it appeared that the city was trying to show a larger-than-necessary 
impact on ratepayers in order to make a case for further delay.
 60
  
Whether or not officials inflated the cost estimates, the city had to find a way to 
raise upwards of $3 billion over the next 10 to 15 years to fix aging sewers and expand 
water and sewer capacity for new growth. On December 3, 2001, the City Council 
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responded by approving a resolution that authorized funding of $1,277,500 for the 
evaluation and conceptual design of sewer separation in the study area. The resolution 
identified this as funding for Phase 1 of a proposed two-phase approach for Sewer 
Separation Evaluation and Conceptual Design. But the brunt of funding and managing 
the necessary capital improvements fell upon the shoulders of Atlanta‘s new mayor, 
Shirley Franklin, who was elected in November 2001.
61
  
Dubbing herself the ―Sewer Mayor,‖ Franklin clearly recognized the seriousness 
of the watershed management problems facing Atlanta. Within six months of taking 
office, the former chief city administrator began to lay the groundwork for restoring 
confidence in the city‘s resolve. In June she created an independent review panel known 
as ―The Mayor‘s Clean Water Advisory Panel‖ to ―provide objective, expert advice for 
improving Atlanta‘s storm and wastewater systems.‖ The panel, which was led by former 
Georgia Tech president G. Wayne Clough, was made up of nine members recognized for 
their expertise in municipal water or wastewater issue, environmental engineering, civil 
engineering and public health related sciences. Their specific charge was to review the 
city‘s Authorized CSO Remedial Plan and assess the ―technical and scientific merit of the 
plan and any modifications, as well as the reasonableness of cost estimates and 
completion times‖ and provide a preliminary report no later than September 15, 2002.
62
 
Between June and September the Clean Water Panel held four day-long meetings 
and  reviewed extensive documentation provided by consultants, city engineers, and 
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interested citizens. In the process they considered the Authorized Plan as well as six 
additional refinement options that ranged from 0 to 100 percent separation. The panel 
immediately rejected plans that called for 40 percent or more separation. The reason for 
this decision is that anything that enters a storm sewer system is discharged untreated into 
the water bodies. Storm water is the result of rainfall washing across impervious surfaces, 
carrying with it the pollutants found on streets, parking lots, and rooftops. As the Clean 
Water Panel recognized, separation would increase the amount of pollutants entering 
local waterways because these plans contained no storm water treatment provisions.
63
 
Thus, by a process of elimination the panel confined their discussion to three remaining 
alternatives: 1) tunnel and storage (no separation); 2) the Authorized Plan (27 percent 
separation); and Refinement Option 1 (27 percent separation).     
Although the percentage of sewer separation for Refinement Option 1 was the 
same as that of the Authorized Plan, it would be achieved using a full basin separation 
where possible. The city‘s combined sewer system consisted of 11 CSO basins in two 
areas, the West Area CSO basins that drain to the north and the East Area CSO basins 
that drain to the south. Under the Authorized Plan, West Area and East Area tunnel 
storage and conveyance systems were to be constructed with dedicated CSO treatment 
facilities to service the entire 19 square miles of existing combined sewers. Through 
partial separation, this plan would achieve 90 percent separation of the city‘s total service 
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area but no CSO basin was to be fully separated. This was in contrast to Refinement 
Option 1, which would separate two full and one partial drainage basin and would 
eliminate two CSO facilities. It was for this reason that Refinement Option 1 would get a 
green light over the tunnel and storage (zero separation) option.
64
 
On October 15, 2002, the panel submitted its Final Report to Mayor Franklin. Its 
recommendation was for the city to pursue Refinement Option 1. This option, the panel 
argued, ―used well-established technology, exceeds the water quality expectations in the 
Consent Decree, can most likely be completed by 2007, has the second lowest cost of all 
options, and will cause a relatively low level of construction disruption.‖ In addition, the 
panel cited that, unlike the zero separation/tunnel and storage option, Refinement Option 
1 eliminates two full CSO facilities including the McDaniel CSO facility, which the EPA 
deemed the ―worst violator.‖
65
     
 Not everyone was thrilled with the Clean Water Panel‘s recommendation. Local 
environmental engineer Justin Wiedeman believed that the city was not devoting enough 
attention to storm water management. His strategy, known as the ―Wiedeman Plan,‖ 
pushed for 80 percent separation in order to eliminate the East area tunnel and reduce the 
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West area tunnel size, which he argued could subsequently be tied in with the R.M. 
Clayton plant for greater flood control. In his presentation to the mayor‘s panel, 
Wiedeman stressed that ―you have to look at storm water management upstream and 
downstream from the CSOs‖ because insufficient capacity within the combined system 
contributed to localized flooding, impacted public health and impaired quality of life by 
threatening economic development and real estate values. Others, like the Clean Streams 
Task Force, a group of academics, environmentalists, and neighborhood activists, wanted 
the city to spend an estimated $1.79 billion to replace combined sewers with separated 
ones and buy 600 acres for ponds and wetlands to naturally filter and clean polluted 
storm water. Preston Mason, ever the proponent of full separation, concurred, arguing 
that the city's plan "does not eliminate the problem. It only reduces the problem so that 
the engineers get to come back and design yet another multibillion dollar solution." He 
continued, "Why don't we bypass these self-serving engineers and do the right thing?" 
66
  
Despite these criticisms, the Clean Water Panel was unanimous in its 
recommendation: not only would full separation be too disruptive to downtown residents 
and business, it was extremely expensive and, most importantly, it could not be 
completed within the Consent Decree time frame for compliance. ―Atlanta is 20 years 
behind where it should be,‖ the experts wrote, ―and it stands out as an exception to other 
major cities that took action years ago.‖ "Some of these people are just misinformed," Dr. 
Clough said. "The city of Atlanta cannot go to 100 percent separation. Downtown Atlanta  
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Figure 4.2 – Combined Sewer Overflow Basins. (Source: City of Atllanta, Atlanta 




would come to a grinding halt. It's easy to criticize. But, you've got to have an alternative. 
You'd have to dig up 2 1/2 miles of sewers on the Georgia Tech campus alone."
67
  
One day after receiving the panel‘s final report, which her administration regarded 
as cost-effective and environmentally sound, Mayor Franklin announced the beginning of 
the Clean Water Atlanta initiative, a comprehensive, long-term plan to ensure clean 
drinking water for Atlanta, and clean streams and clean wastewater flows for Atlanta and 
its downstream neighbors. Echoing the Clean Water Panel‘s assessment of the state of 
Atlanta‘s environmental stewardship, Franklin was forthright about why the city needed 
to move forward in such an aggressive manner. ―When it comes to sewers and clean 
water . . . we‘ve avoided the tough decisions for too long in Atlanta.‖
68
  
Asserting that she was ―not interested in the easy answers,‖ Franklin put together 
a five point plan for improving the city‘s wastewater system. First, Atlanta would seek to 
implement the Clean Water Panel‘s Refinement Option 1 recommendation. This involved 
the complete separation of the Greensferry and McDaniel CSO Basins and the partial 
Stockade Sub-basin (Custer CSO Basin). It would additionally require the construction of 
the Southeast‘s largest deep-rock tunnel to capture and store combined storm water and 
sewage flow for conveyance to two new CSO treatment facilities for near-secondary 
treatment before discharge to the Chattahoochee or South Rivers. Second, to fulfill the 
FACD, city staff would construct the Nancy Creek tunnel to reduce SSOs in the North 
Atlanta/Dunwoody area. The city would also develop preventative and maintenance 
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strategies that included milestones for inspecting, cleaning, and relining sewer network 
and launch a full-scale grease management program.  Third, Atlanta would create a storm 
water ―Master Plan‖ to both maximize the use of green space and ponds to reduce storm 
water flooding and pollution and involve the public in the establishment of storm water 
utilities to assist in this cause. Fourth, the city would enter into a partnership with federal 
agencies such as the U.S. Geological Survey and watchdog groups like the Upper 
Chattahoochee Riverkeeper to create a water quality monitoring program to ensure the 
effectiveness of the Clean Water Atlanta program.              
The cornerstone of Mayor Franklin‘s program, however, was the reorganization 
of a city administrative department to create the comprehensive Department of 
Watershed Management (DWM). The DWM includes the city‘s two water-related 
bureaus—Wastewater Services and Drinking Water—along with Engineering Services 
and the proposed Stormwater Management Utility. This organizational structure allows 
DWM to plan, design, construct, operate and maintain the city‘s entire system of water 
and wastewater treatment, pumping, collection and distribution, and proposed storm 
water management facilities. Jack Ravan, former director of the Alabama State Docks 
and a former administrator for the EPA, was named as commissioner of the new 
department. Ravan‘s job, which he considered to be largely ―managerial,‖ was to be lead 
negotiator on consent decrees, to be the point person in dealing with an often skeptical 
public, and to represent the administration to the City Council.
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 Although pollution control remained a priority, one of Ravan‘s first tasks was to 
re-municipalize Atlanta‘s water supply operations. Over the course of its four-year 
tenure, United Water created a substantial amount of ill will among customers and city 
officials for its substandard performance. In August 2002, the City of Atlanta officially 
placed UWSA on a 90-day probation period to determine whether the company could 
meet the terms of its $21 million per year contract or whether the firm should be fired. 
After receiving a 4-inch-thick black binder containing detailed allegations regarding 
insufficient maintenance and staffing, tardy meter installation and leak repairs, poor 
collection of water bills and improper payment requests, UWSA‘s vice president Dave 
Montgomery issued a statement saying that his firm welcomed the review. ―We take the 
concerns expressed very seriously, and we look forward to demonstrating satisfactory 
performance in the days ahead," Montgomery said. "United Water views this correction 
period as an opportunity to present a clear and factual measurement of our performance." 
The mayor responded that she was willing to exercise the contract‘s ―termination at will‖ 
clause if the company did not perform. "I'm prepared to take whatever action is necessary 
to assure that we have a well-run water system," Franklin said. "They say they can do it. 
Now, we are telling them to show us." Noting that ―Franklin now has the opportunity to 
insert accountability into the process,‖ the editorial staff of the Atlanta Journal-
Constitution asserted, ―It‘s time to make these bozos do the work, or cancel their 
sweetheart contract and sue them.‖
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 City officials charged, for example, that United Water failed to flush the system twice a year as it was 
supposed to. This left sediment in the lines, causing discolored water and numerous boil-water advisories. 
Many buildings and attendant infrastructure appeared to be crumbling as well from neglect. Furthermore, 
throughout the contract period, the company was able to install only 750 meters per year, which the city 
claimed it had been able to do in a month. Despite being contractually obligated to collect 98.5 percent of 
all billings and remit that to the city, a review by Franklin‘s staff found that the firm only collected 94.2 
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Three months later UWSA made a final pitch to remain in business with Atlanta. 
It pointed to the arrival of new highly qualified managers as well as the high scores the 
firm received for water quality and customer service during its probationary period. And 
though the company claimed that Atlanta grossly underestimated how much work would 
be required to run its aging system, CEO Michael Chesser offered to guarantee no fee 
increases until at least 2006 despite the losses his company had incurred. ―We‘ve built up 
a lot of momentum,‖ a company spokesperson stated. ―We would be humble and hoping 
that the city would want to keep us around.‖
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Atlanta officials were not persuaded by Chesser‘s letter or the company‘s 
stepped-up performance. ―We still believe there are a significant number of items that 
have not been corrected,‖ stated Mayor Franklin‘s chief policy officer Greg Giornelli. 
―There are a number of areas in the contract that are not being met.‖ The city‘s own $1 
million audit of UWSA operations, in fact, showed that privatization had saved 
approximately $10 million per year, which was about half of what Atlanta was promised. 
Worse still, the audit claimed that UWSA owed the city‘s treasury $23 million for fees it 
had failed to collect, had billed the city for work on ―capital repairs‖ that was actually 
routine maintenance, and had shown reluctance to share information about how much 
water it withdrew from the Chattahoochee River.  After Jack Ravan concluded UWSA 
was in default and recommended that the contract be severed, City Hall gave the private 
                                                                                                                                                              
percent, which required the city to bill United Water to cover the shortage. Late in 2001, United Water also 
asked the City of Atlanta to pay $12 million for work the firm claimed to have done beyond the scope of its 
contract in the previous three years. The contractor, projecting the amount over the remaining 17 years, 
asked for an additional $68 million. ―Franklin Assails United Water: Atlanta May Rethink Deal,‖ AJC, 12 
June 2002; Our Opinions: United Water Deserves Dunking,‖ AJC, 13 June, 2002; ―Probation Begins for 
Atlanta‘s Water Firm,‖ AJC, 12 August 2002; ―Mayor Lets Criticism Flow in Water Tome,‖ AJC, 20 
August 2002.    
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 As ―United Water Offers Cost Freeze to Keep Contract,‖ AJC, 17 January 2003. 
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utility a choice: walk away or be fired. The firm accepted the city‘s decision and on 
January 24, 2003, the city and company jointly agreed to dissolve the 20-year contract.
72
   
 "I am absolutely confident the city can and will run an efficient water system that 
will provide high-quality, dependable drinking water for all of its customers," the mayor 
declared. She announced that the 346-person water department would be run by Director 
Chris New, a second-generation waterworks employee who had been overseeing United 
Water's operations. Jack Ravan, who was to provide direction and guidance for the 
department as DWM Commissioner, explained that ―public health drives this decision‖ 




 It is clear that the AJC’s editorial nod to Franklin‘s apparent competency could 
equally be understood as a dismissal of Bill Campbell‘s tenure as mayor. Campbell, who 
had been roundly criticized in the local press for his handling of the city‘s sewer and 
water troubles, would later be indicted on racketeering, bribery, and wire fraud charges 
and sentenced to a thirty-month prison sentence for tax evasion he committed while in 
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 And while most observers regarded Campbell as an individual who received the 
justice he deserved, some of the most diehard racial conservatives would invariably 
interpret Campbell‘s conviction as the latest confirmation that Atlanta‘s problems 
stemmed from black political control. Recall, for example, William Hartsfield‘s 1943 
letter to the ―gentlemen‖ of Buckhead and Druid Hills, when he pointedly asked the 
proposed area of annexation ―do you want to hand them [blacks] political control of the 
city?‖  Consider the late 1960s leaflet that stated, ―Under the one-man/one vote ruling, 
the lowest least educated and most irresponsible biped has the same vote as does the 
educated, responsible, and conscientious taxpayer . . .What kind of government will this 
give us in Atlanta?‖ And while evidence shows that environmental troubles pre-dated 
black political control, and some scholars suggest that black mayors had won a ―hollow 
prize‖ by inheriting cities with diminished tax bases and in desperate need of improved 
public services, it is not unfair to suggest that there was in Atlanta an undercurrent of 
white hostility toward black politicians during the post-Civil Rights era. 
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BROTHER, CAN YOU SPARE A DIME?: FINANCING CLEAN WATER 
ATLANTA 
Mayor Franklin‘s greatest challenge was finding ways to finance the staggering 
costs of upgrading both the water and sewer system. By the time the city had re-taken 
control of water supply operations in April 2003, DWM officials were suggesting that, in 
addition to the estimated $42-49 million required annually for operational costs, $799.2 
million would be needed for improvements to the network of pipes and treatment plants 
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 For the entire Hartsfield quote, see Chapter Two. The 1960s leaflet is quoted in Kevin Kruse, White 
Flight, 248; For a review of the Hollow Prize thesis, see Neil Kraus and Todd Swanstrom, ―Minority 
Mayors and the Hollow-Prize Problem,‖  Political Science and Politics, 34:1 (March 2001): 99-105.  
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in order to bring the water system back up to snuff. This was on top of the nearly $1.8 
billion required by the two consent decrees. In total, the mayor was seeking $3.18 billion 
to pour into the city‘s water and sewer infrastructure.
76
  
Obtaining federal and state aid proved tricky. In October 2003, Mayor Franklin 
requested $50 million in annual state grants over a ten-year period as well as Governor 
Sonny Perdue‘s assistance in getting a recalcitrant Congress to provide $1 billion in 
federal support. But the well was dry, so to speak. President Pro Tem of the state senate, 
Eric Johnson, responded to the mayor‘s entreaty by saying that he would not burden 
American taxpayers with Atlanta's problems by appealing to federal officials. "We didn't 
cause Atlanta's problems and we shouldn't have to bail them out, no more than we have 
the right to ask Atlanta to give us a half billion for our budget problem.‖ Governor 
Purdue was more diplomatic. Although he denied the initial request for the $500 million 
in state grants, by the end of the year he arranged for the same amount in low-interest 
loans to be provided by the state legislature over the next decade.
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 Jack Ravan drew up a business plan for the new water system, projecting annual costs of $41.1 million 
with 347 employees, plus $10.4 million in one-time start-up costs. City Auditor Leslie Ward, however, said 
when costs to other departments are added in -- new staff in purchasing, personnel, payroll, etc. -- the city 
operation will cost more than $49 million. ―City Vows Better Job on Water: But Costs May Go Up With 
Service,‖ AJC, 14 February 2003. The $2.38 billion that Franklin hoped collect from federal, state, and 
local sources was to be spent in the following ways. Nearly $700 million to upgrade the combined sewers 
would pay for an 8.5-mile tunnel on the city's west side and a huge wastewater storage tank on its east side.  
An additional $186 million would pay for digging up streets and lawns and laying pipes to separate about a 
quarter of the combined sewers in neighborhoods that include West End, Adair Park, Grant Park, 
Ormewood Park and Cabbagetown. Atlanta would spend about $963 million through 2012 to repair and 
replace leaky sewage-only pipes and add storage capacity. The remaining $550 million or so would go 
toward upgrading sewage treatment plants and adding capacity for future growth. On the total cost and 
breakdown of Clean Water Atlanta, see ―Atlanta‘s Sewer Woes: Billion-Dollar Question: 
How Best to Fix City's Infrastructure? Critics Say Mayor's Plan isn't Enough, AJC, 28 October, 2003. 
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Franklin also faced numerous city council and county commission members who 
expressed sticker shock over Clean Water Atlanta‘s price tag. Critics of the project 
pointed out that the consent decrees only required $1.8 billion worth of work while the 
mayor‘s plan called for $3.2 billion, much of which was to be raised by an increase in 
water and sewer rates and a one cent bump in the local sales tax. She responded to these 
detractors by pointing out that the improvements she was seeking to complete would 
ensure future compliance with state and federal environmental regulations. ―Is all of the 
$3 billion required by the consent decree? If you want to split hairs, you could say not. 
However, the reality is that both the unfunded mandates and consent decree orders must 
all be completed to provide clean water and eliminate future fines and court orders.‖
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 Franklin essentially sought annual increases in water and sewer charges that 
amounted to a tripling of rates over five years. After scores of citizens howled in protest 
over the proposal, the city council decided on December 1, 2003 for more modest 
increases. One week later Franklin vetoed the measure as insufficient and continued to 
push for her plan to be completed in its entirety. Resistance to Franklin‘s plan melted 
when Judge Thrash and the EPA renewed threats of fines and a receivership and three 
separate bond rating agencies downgraded the status of Atlanta‘s water and sewer revue 
bonds from A- to BBB+ over ―the political antics that are taking place.‖ The pressure 
worked and on January 5, 2004 the council adopted a three-tiered pricing structure, with 
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fees escalating with water use, which promised to raise $2.3 billion of the $3.2 billion 
Mayor Franklin sought. 
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 Several months later Governor Perdue showed his support for Mayor Franklin‘s 
plan when he signed a bill that gave the City of Atlanta the power to bypass Fulton 
County and call for a referendum to raise the local sales tax from seven to eight percent 
in order to avoid further water and sewer rate increases. Under Georgia law, only the 
state could approve sales tax increases and, what is more, only counties had the authority 
to call a referendum on the issue. Despite the possibility of such a special purpose tax 
generating between $70 million and $100 million per year, Fulton County had repeatedly 
denied city requests and had instead offered to purchase DWM water supply lines that 
extended beyond the city and into North Fulton County for $220 million. "Some might 
say that Atlanta sewers are Atlanta's problems," Perdue said, "but while the state can't 
bail out the city, we can help solve the problem." When Fulton County again refused to 
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call a referendum for the July 2004 primary elections, Atlanta asserted its new-found 
right and approved what became known as the Municipal Option Sales Tax (MOST).
80
  
 Despite the funding provided by the MOST, Atlanta‘s water and sewer rates 
climbed to among the highest in the country. But, these rates have been essential to the 
investment in the city‘s infrastructure, and what city residents have gotten in return is 
cleaner and safer rivers and streams for Atlanta and for downstream neighbors. ―It‘s a 
generational expense for a generational asset and generational benefits,‖ said 
Commissioner Hunter. ―Unless you want the water and sewer system to get in the 
condition they were in, you need to invest in it.‖
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 Although Atlanta reported receiving just $6.7 million in federal aid while 
spending $3.4 million lobbying for that aid, Mayor Franklin‘s Clean Water Atlanta 
program has largely been considered a success by those most involved. On the ten-year 
anniversary of the Upper Chattahoochee River Keeper lawsuit, UCR executive director 
Sally Bethea stated, "Without a doubt there are fewer spills of raw sewage and partially 
treated sewage into the Chattahoochee today than 10 years ago. . . . The river is definitely 
better off when it comes to the impact of the city of Atlanta." Regarding Shirley 
Franklin‘s efforts to end the decades of apathy and inaction by previous administrations, 
Bethea added, "This mayor has dealt with the problem head-on. She's learned about the 
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problems. From a political standpoint we are light-years [better off with the Franklin 
administration]."
82
   
CONCLUSION  
 While Atlanta‘s city officials were hardly surprised that federal and state 
environmental agencies began to enact ever stricter effluent control standards, few within 
municipal government were likely prepared for the determined response by local activists 
and organizations to the city‘s pollution abatement strategies. The opposition that 
emerged over the city‘s initial CSO and phosphorous control plans indicated how local 
citizens would resist both the short-sighted plans by engineering-experts the overly 
deliberate abatement proposals offered by the city and regulatory agencies.     
 The skepticism on display in Atlanta is characteristic of post-war opposition to 
piecemeal development programs that threatened communities with environmental harm. 
But the NIMBYism seen in Atlanta was also shrouded in issues of race and class that 
may be specific to this post-civil rights era southern metropolis. Community protests in 
Utoy Creek over the need for CSO separation and the enlargement of a nearby WWTF 
hinged on questions of environmental racism and the ability of seemingly marginalized 
black citizens to influence the course of technological development in their 
neighborhood.  Meanwhile, many affluent white residents of Mid-town Atlanta focused 
their ire on the efficacy and aesthetic consequences of the mini-treatment plant that was 
to be constructed within the city‘s premier recreation site.  Other whites, many of whom 
resided outside of the city, not only questioned the wisdom of community protests but 
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also seemed to interpret Atlanta‘s inability to address its pollution problems and its failed 
attempt to privatize its water system as an indication of the failures of black political 
leadership.       
 The loss of political legitimacy, together with Atlanta‘s slow response to 
regulatory imperatives, left the city vulnerable to millions of dollars in fines and to legal 
actions initiated by a second wave of environmental activism, who secured a court-
ordered. Mayor Franklin‘s response to the federally-mandated consent decrees, the Clean 
Water Atlanta initiative, eventually propelled the city down the path of achieving 
comprehensive management of local water resources, but at a dramatically increased cost 





THE BIG THIRST: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE TRI-
STATE WAR WARS 
 
The increasing and competitive demands for available water seem to indicate that the 
end to the days of ―easy water‖ may be approaching. There must be sophisticated 
management and conservation of the region’s water resources. It is increasingly difficult 
for unilateral decisions to be made regarding water resources. The resources and 
management requirements of water resources decisions will increasingly dictate the 
cooperation of local governments with one another, as well as with state and federal 
agencies and private utilities. 
       Atlanta Regional Commission, 1976 
 
During the second half of the twentieth century, the Metropolitan Planning 
Commission (MPC) and its successor, the Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC), 
consistently stressed the interrelatedness of the region‘s water and wastewater problems. 
Metropolitan Atlanta, the planning body recognized, relied almost exclusively on the 
Chattahoochee River to meet its expanding total water requirements. Increased 
withdrawals for water supply, however, reduced the stream flow needed for dilution 
purposes and consequently made higher degrees of wastewater treatment necessary. To 
remedy this, the ARC advocated for the coordinated control of water resources on an 
area-wide basis to ensure that the region‘s water quantity and water quality needs would 
be adequately met. In its 1969 Atlanta Region Comprehensive Plan, for example, it 
recommended that a single metropolitan authority be established to provide sewer 
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service, raw water supply requirements, and public water supply for all communities in 
the five-county metropolitan area.
1
  
Although the ARC would collaborate with the Army Corps of Engineers, the 
Georgia Environmental Protection Division (EPD), and local governments in setting 
withdrawal and effluent discharge permits for all water users within the region, the 
agency lacked the legislative authority necessary to compel metropolitan officials to 
transfer control of water and sewerage operations to a unified administrative body. As a 
result, integrated water and sewerage management practices largely remained an 
unrealized goal. Rather, individual jurisdictions continued to jealously guard their ability 
to independently determine their own service rates and infrastructural development 
despite the fact that a bulging metropolitan population, land use changes, energy 
demands, and recurrent droughts placed greater stress on the relatively meager 
Chattahoochee watershed. 
 By the twilight of the twentieth century the consequences of metro Atlanta‘s 
failure to achieve a cohesive water resource policy had become readily apparent. As 
explained in the previous chapter, despite the infusion of federal assistance that the city 
received during the 1970s and early 1980s to improve its water quality, Atlanta‘s local 
waterways remained in a terrible state due to the delayed implementation of effective 
pollution control technologies. In addition, the states of Alabama and Florida filed suit in 
1990 to stop the Army Corps of Engineers from reallocating portions of Buford Dam 
storage for the purpose of supplying Metropolitan Atlanta with greater amounts of water, 
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prompting a twenty-year legal battle in which Atlanta‘s economic future hung in the 
balance.  
This chapter focuses on Atlanta‘s ongoing attempts to secure more water from the 
Chattahoochee River. It first explores the post-Plan of Improvement activities of the 
AWW and its water-using metropolitan neighbors to provide context for understanding 
the emergence of the litigation known as the Tri-State Water Wars. It argues, unlike most 
accounts of the interstate dispute, that controversy began in the 1960s over water quality 
and evolved into concerns about water quantity as the region‘s decentralized suburban 
development and profligate water consumption, coupled with a series of severe droughts 
in the 1980s, created fears among downstream interests that Atlanta‘s continued growth 
would come at their expense. To that end, Chapter Five also explores the various short-
term and interim strategies that ARC and the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) 
implemented as they worked toward a long-term water solution for the region. Lastly, 
this chapter discusses the legal framework that has been historically used to resolve water 
disputes and how the various parties have ultimately relied on federal courts to determine 
whether Atlanta has the right to impound and divert more water for its own use. 
METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT AND DOWNSTREAM ANXIETIES, 
1950-1975 
As explained in Chapter 2, in the years following the Second World War, the City 
of Atlanta engaged in a two-pronged plan of attack to mitigate the deleterious effects of 
ongoing suburban sprawl. First, city officials tripled Atlanta‘s corporate boundaries and 
acquired 100,000 new tax-paying citizens through the annexation of portions of 
unincorporated northern Fulton County under the so-called Plan of Improvement. 
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Second, after interpreting land use patterns that suggested the possibility of self-
sustaining economic and residential development—population and markets clustering 
around industrial jobs that follow transportation routes— the City of Atlanta collaborated 
with its regional planning agency, the MPC, to bolster the area‘s network of highways 
and streets and attendant urban services to make sure that the City remained the economic 
and cultural anchor for the four-county metropolitan area.  
Obtaining adequate water for a metropolitan region that relied so overwhelmingly 
on surface water sources was among the planner‘s top priorities. The widely varying 
flows in the Chattahoochee River, the source of ninety percent of the area‘s water, were 
of particular concern. In 1954, for example, North Georgia‘s worst recorded drought 
reduced water levels reaching Atlanta to 148 million gallons per day (MGD), far below 
the 1034 MGD that the region‘s planners deemed necessary to meet the area‘s total water 
supply and wastewater needs. Adequate regulation of the Chattahoochee River was 
secured, however, during the late 1950s and early 1960s with the completion of Buford 




 Confident that the new reservoir system would meet the region‘s water resource 
needs for the foreseeable future, Atlanta and its metropolitan neighbors began to develop 
their respective water supply systems. Consistent with the mandates of the Plan of 
Improvement, the City of Atlanta embarked on a multi-year capital improvement 
program to supply water to its new ―citizen-customers.‖ By 1965 the city had expanded 
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Policies (Atlanta: July 1976), 17 [hereafter cited as 1976 WSP].  
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its distribution network to cover a service area of approximately 600 square miles and 
had completed the enlargement of its Hemphill Treatment Plant and the construction of 
the new 20 MGD Chattahoochee River Treatment facility, to bring its treated water 
capacity to 92 MGD. With these improvements the AWW supplied water to 
approximately 625,000 customers in Fulton County as well in the city of Forest Park in 
Clayton County. The relative growth in water system capacity in other metropolitan 
counties, where most residents had depended on wells or small streams until the mid-
century, was just as impressive. Cobb County, which had purchased water from the 
AWW until 1951, was able to produce 18 MGD of treated water by 1965, while DeKalb 
County, which established its water authority in 1942, had a total capacity of 48 MGD by 
the same date. All told, the municipally-owned AWW and the county-wide Water 
Authorities of Cobb, Clayton, DeKalb, Douglass, Gwinnett, and Rockdale Counties had a 
treatment capacity of nearly 188 MGD by the end of the 1960s.
3
  
But Metropolitan Atlanta did not exist in splendid isolation, and as its water 
capacity expanded in the post-war years, disputes over conflicting water demands quickly 
followed. Buford Dam was merely the northernmost of four federally-operated dams 
constructed between 1957 and 1963 to regulate the flow of the Apalachicola-
Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) River Basin. Support from communities south of Atlanta had 
been instrumental in securing Congressional authorization for these projects. For most 
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southern ACF water users, supplying Metropolitan Atlanta with adequate amounts of 
water was merely an ―incidental‖ function of Buford Dam. Far more important to them 
was the achievement of river regulation for purposes of power generation, flood control, 
and navigation.
4
    
Downstream citizens began to voice concerns by the mid-1960s and early 1970s 
about both the quality and quantity of water reaching their communities. Water treatment 
systems invite population growth but population growth also includes negative 
externalities such as greater amounts of wastewater discharges. As Metropolitan 
Atlanta‘s population and water use escalated, distressed citizens below Atlanta who also 
relied on ACF water supplies objected to the amount of raw pollution that the 
Chattahoochee River was forced to absorb before it arrived at their water system intakes.  
As explained in the previous chapter, these complaints were not lost on federal 
and state pollution environmental agencies that were attempting to establish stricter water 
quality standards following passage of the Water Quality Act of 1965. Therefore, when 
U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare declared that wastewater treatment 
facilities (WWTFs) in Metropolitan Atlanta were largely responsible for the gross 
pollution of the Chattahoochee for nearly 100 miles below Atlanta, the EPA and SWQCB 
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began efforts to force the City of Atlanta to upgrade its WWTFs to the level of secondary 
treatment in order to reduce the amount of biological contaminants it discharged into the 
river. 
Water quantity proved to be an equally troublesome and protracted issue. Unlike 
in the case of water pollution, aggrieved downstream water users initially directed their 
ire not at Metropolitan Atlanta but rather on the perceived negligence of the Army Corps 
of Engineers. Barging interests in southern Georgia and Alabama, represented by the Tri-
State Development Association, argued in 1971 that commerce along the river was 
hampered because the Corps had failed to release the necessary water to secure a 
promised nine-foot navigation channel between Columbus, Georgia and the Gulf of 
Mexico. After several years of remonstrations by local business leaders that the Corps 
had ignored its downstream duties in favor of satisfying Atlanta‘s thirst, the Corps 
responded by proposing a re-regulation dam in central Florida to allow for the channel to 
be operational at least ninety-five percent of the year.
5
  
Floridians were less sanguine about the prospect of another dam along the ACF, 
however.  In 1974 representatives from Florida‘s Pollution Control Board, its Game and 
Fresh Water Fish Commission, and Department of Commerce joined the Audubon Club 
and numerous civic associations in opposing the Corps‘ plan on economic and 
environmental grounds. These groups  insisted that while an additional dam or dredging 
would benefit southern Georgia and Alabama, the increased levels of fresh water caused 
by any structural modifications would  destroy Apalachicola Bay‘s delicate ecosystem—
one of the nation‘s largest nurseries for oysters and other seafood—as well as the 
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livelihoods that depended on the estuary. Intent in preventing further development, the 
state of Florida officially entered into the fray and petitioned the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in 1979 to designate the area as a national 
estuarine sanctuary (NES). It would not be the last time Florida would reach for 
unexpected environmental law in an attempt to stop river development that it considered 
anathema to its own interests.  
The Georgia and Alabama legislatures, who regarded Florida‘s use of the NES 
program as subversive to their own interests, quickly maneuvered to hamstring the 
―Sunshine State‖ from further engaging in supposed delaying tactics. In 1979 Georgia 
and Alabama legislators respectively approved resolutions for establishing the ―Tri-
Rivers Waterway Compact,‖ which would specifically allow any two states bordering the 
ACF system to join the compact and bind the third from taking unwanted actions with 
regard to the river basin. Georgia governor George Busbee vetoed his state‘s resolution, 
however, because he was both skeptical of the compact‘s constitutionality and certain 
that such an arrangement, even if legal, would hamper any future compromises over 
water use. In the end, fears regarding the NES application turned out to be overblown. 
When the NOAA granted Apalachicola Bay NES status later that year, it attached a 
federal Environmental Impact Statement which stipulated that ―the establishment of the 
estuarine sanctuary itself cannot prevent the continued operation, maintenance, or 
enhancement of a Congressional authorized project.‖ In addition, the governors of the 
three states agreed that further studies of ACF Basin management strategies would be 
conducted with the Corps of Engineers as future needs dictated. Thus, a temporary cease-
fire was declared over water allocation on the lower ACF as the proposed re-regulation 
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was discarded.  But the Corps was allowed to continue maintenance dredging of the 
Apalachicola River as long as it complied with water quality certificates issued by the 
state of Florida.
6
    
Independent of the brewing water war down south, planners with the Atlanta 
Regional Commission (ARC) continued to work actively with federal agencies and state 
and local governments to create plans and policies for managing Metropolitan Atlanta‘s 
water supplies. In 1973, they began participating with the Army Corps of Engineers, the 
DNR, its sub-unit the Environmental Protection Division (EPD), the Georgia Mountains 
Area Planning and Development Commission, and the EPA in the Metropolitan Atlanta 
Water Resources Management Study (MAWRS). This program of action, authorized by 
the U.S. Senate Public Works Committee in 1972, was to be a comprehensive study in 
which the participants were to examine the long-term wastewater management, water 
supply, water-based recreation, fish and wildlife conservation, and flood control 
problems and needs in the Atlanta region.
7
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 Ibid, 182-184, Florida Department of Environmental Protection, Apalachicola National Estuarine 
Research Reserve Information Page, http://www.dep.state.fl.us/coastal/sites/apalachicola/info.htm 
(accessed June 2, 2011); U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, ―Information Paper: Navigation on the 
Apalachicola‖ n.d.; http://www.sam.usace.army.mil/webdoc/apalachicola.pdf (accessed July 7 2011); U.S. 
Water Resources Council, ―Proposal to Study the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin Study,‖ 
(Washington D.C., 1980) Section III, Unit A: Documentation of Need for Study, EPD, Director‘s Subject 
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for the ACF River Basin. ―Memorandum of Agreement Among Alabama, Georgia, Florida, and the United 
States Army Corps of Engineers, Mobile District Regarding the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River 
System‖ (24 June 1983), 1-5, EPD, Director‘s Subject Files-1976-1983, RCB 7933, Box 40, File 4, 
Georgia Archives.        
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 Paul Kelman to Harris Goldwasser, 4 November, 1983, EPD, Director‘s Subject Files, RCB 19095, Box 
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as 1988 WSP]; ARC, Evaluation: Final Wastewater Management and Water Supply Alternatives (Atlanta, 
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In 1974 the EPD provided a baseline for all future water supply plans by 
establishing a policy that the flow of the Chattahoochee River at a point between the 
AWW intake and the river‘s confluence with Peachtree Creek should not fall below 750 
c.f.s, or 484 MGD. This minimum flow requirement was created so that there would be 
sufficient assimilative capacity in the river for treated wastewater discharges, combined 
sewer overflows, and urban runoff to meet state water quality control standards. This 
policy also prohibited the EPD from issuing permits for water supply withdrawals from 
the Chattahoochee River unless there was an assurance from the Army Corps of 
Engineers that an additional quantity of water, equal to the withdrawal increase, would be 
released from Buford Dam.
8
   
The implementation of maximum daily withdrawal limits of 222.4 MGD from the 
Chattahoochee River was sobering news for those concerned with Atlanta‘s future 
growth.
9
 The 1960 agreement between the City of Atlanta and Georgia Power for 
modifications to Morgan Falls Dam, for example, had only assured 750 c.f.s. above the 
AWW‘s intake, whereas the EPD‘s new policy now required 750 c.f.s below the intake. 
At the time the policy was issued, moreover, both the AWW and DeKalb County had 
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Georgia Archives; ARC, 1976 WSP, 7-8. 
 
9
 The EPD determined that 750 c.f.s was the minimum flow needed for creating acceptable concentrations 
of dissolved oxygen  and residential oxygen demanding materials below the AWW water intake at 
Peachtree Creek. The maximum daily withdrawal limits were the difference between the minimum flow 
and the Chattahoochee River‘s dependable yield, which was the flow guaranteed to reach the Atlanta intake 
as per the operation of Buford Dam and Morgan Falls Dam. River flow at the Atlanta gauging station 
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total treatment capacity. This calculation was then applied to upstream users, effectively locking their 
withdrawals into place- Cobb County (25.2 MGD); DeKalb County (80.4 MGD);Gwinnett County (10.8 




permit applications on file with the state agency to construct new water supply intakes on 
the Chattahoochee River between Buford Dam and Morgan Falls Dam. The EPD simply 
denied the permits until assurances that the 750 c.s.f requirement would not be violated.  
The EPD‘s effective withdrawal limits from the river posed a major problem for 
regional planners. Metropolitan Atlanta‘s population was growing, just as mid-century 
officials had desired, and its total water consumption was growing with it. By the mid-
1970s, the seven-county metropolitan population had swelled to roughly 1.7 million 
people, nearly double that of 1950. Water consumption during the period was equally 
dramatic. By 1975, the region‘s total water demands reached 253 MGD during peak 
summer months. In addition, regional gallons per capita per day (gpcpd) jumped from 
100 MGD to 143 MGD in the twenty-five years since the end of the War based on the 
combination of industrial and commercial growth and new home construction, the latter 
of which included greater water use by household utilities and heavier sprinkling loads.
10
 
In the City of Atlanta alone, where the cost of the AWW‘s water service was about 1 cent 
per barrel, gpcpd had skyrocketed to 168 MGD! With water producers boasting as late as 
1969 that ―the average family may use 200 gallons of water each day and still have a 
minimum charge of $1.57 per month,‖ there is little mystery as to why water usage 
increased as it did.
11
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 AWW annual records do not indicate the distribution between domestic, commercial, and industrial 
water use. In 1969, however, the ARC noted that the Atlanta region did not have many ―heavy industries‖ 
i.e., chemical petroleum, steel, because the region lacked the necessary water resources. As a result, 
Metropolitan Atlanta developed into a distribution and finance center that was supplemented by a ―large 
amount of light and assembly type manufacturing.‖ ARC, Water and Sewer Plan (1969), 7; The ARC  
water use figures for 1975 show: residential (130 MGD); commercial (48 MGD); Industrial (34). ARC 
1976 Evaluation, Table 3. 
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 Metropolitan demands were satisfied by direct withdrawals from the Chattahoochee River, its tributaries, 
Lake Lanier and Lake Allatoona, an impoundment of the Etowah River constructed by the Corps in 1950 
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ARC population forecasts in 1976, moreover, suggested that the water supply 
situation would become more serious over the next twenty-five years. According to 
planner‘s estimates, regional population was expected to reach 3.5 million in the year 
2000 with peak water demands in excess of 700 MGD.  Even worse was their prediction 
that the existing water sources and system of allocation would be inadequate to meet the 
region‘s peak demands as early as the mid-to late 1980s.  
With this in mind, the ARC began to offer numerous alternatives to increase the 
availability of supplies. These options included the dredging of Morgan Falls Dam to 
achieve a greater degree of storage capacity as well as the construction by water 
providers of high-rate pumps combined with off-stream storage. The ARC also fully 
endorsed local implementation of conservation measures such as stricter plumbing codes 
for water-saving appliances, recycling of water for non-potable purposes, and the 
alteration of water rate structure.  
Significantly, the ARC also recommended two possible alternatives for optimal 
management of the Chattahoochee River that would frame future discussions about water 
use in Metropolitan Atlanta. First, it proposed the construction of a re-regulation dam at a 
point several miles downstream from Buford Dam. Such a structure, the ARC 
maintained, would serve the same function as Morgan Falls Dam but would regulate 
flows upstream from where most local governments would locate future water intakes. 
                                                                                                                                                              
on the Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa Basin that provided approximately half of Cobb County‘s water. For 
population changes see, Ibid, 8;MPC, U.S. Census of Population: 1950, 11-9-11-17. ARMPC, An Inventory 
of Water and Sewer Systems, 3; ARC, 1976 Evaluation,  Table 3; City of Atlanta, Department of Water 
Works, ―Proposed Water Improvements to Provide Adequate Water Service for a Growing Atlanta: 1966-
1971 and Projected Long-Range Program‖ (April 1966), no pagination, Public Health, Water Quality 
Control Board, Wastewater Treatment Facility Engineering Reports, 1935-1970, RCB 38049, Box1, 
Georgia Archives; City of Atlanta, Department of Water Works ―The Story of Atlanta‘s Water Service‖  
(1969), no pagination.  
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Second, the ARC opined that smooth, continuous flows could be arranged for Atlanta ―if 
peak power releases from Buford Dam were eliminated.‖ While this option would require 
water supply beneficiaries to compensate the Southeastern Power Administration (a unit 
within the Department of Interior whose function it is to market hydroelectric power 
generated from Corps‘ projects) for losses of power generation, the regional planners 
argued that it would also preclude the need for re-regulation and allow the ―Atlanta 
Region to continue to grow and prosper.‖
12
   
WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT THROUGH RE-REGULATION AND 
REALLOCATION, 1975-1989 
 
Although water supply was included in the purview of the federally-authorized 
MAWRS, the ARC understood well that there was ―no legislative handle available‖ to 
local policymakers ―to persuade the Corps of Engineers to release water differently from 
the present system of releases.‖ The paramount question then for Atlanta officials was 
whether the federal government would recognize water supply as a significant function of 
Buford Dam. ―Over the past 20 years,‖ the regional planners argued, ―the uses of the 
lakes have varied to the point that the two unauthorized uses—water supply and 
recreation—appear to be at least as important as the authorized ones.‖ Furthermore, they 
rhetorically asked ―is power generation more important than recreation? Is recreation 
more important than water supply?‖ Accordingly, the ARC firmly insisted that Congress 
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must re-examine the original purposes of the federal projects and revise them in light of 
newly existing but competing water demands.
13
 
The Army Corps of Engineers‘ response to the EPD‘s restrictions indicate that the 
Corps had in fact come to consider water supply, water quality, and recreation to be 
among Buford Dam‘s basic purposes. According to the Corps, these functions were 
authorized by the 1958 Water Supply Act, 1948 Pollution Control Act amendments, and 
Section 4 of the 1944 Flood Control Act, respectively. Moreover, the Corps asserted that 
―no further Congressional action is required to authorize these three functions as full 
project purposes‖ but that ―any future changes in project operation must fully consider 
impacts and needs of all six project purposes . . .and any significant changes would 
require reconsideration of cost sharing requirements for the total project.‖
14
  
Consistent with this line of reasoning, the Corps issued an ―Interim Plan‖ as a 
component to the MAWRS in 1975 that offered the possibility of meeting additional 
water supply needs without violating the minimum flow requirements. Under the plan, 
the Corps agreed to guarantee minimum flows sufficient to meet water withdrawal levels 
of 327 MGD plus 484 MGD for waste assimilation during peak summer months. 
Sufficient water supplies would be accomplished through additional water releases from 
Buford Dam on weekends (peak water using days) and continued re-regulation through 
Morgan Falls Dam. This arrangement required Georgia Power Company‘s approval, 
however, because these off-peak, weekend releases entailed a loss of power revenues to 
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the local energy provider. Fortunately, after negotiations with the Southeastern Power 
Administration, Georgia Power agreed to manage the releases until January 1983, when it 
was believed that a long-range water plan could be implemented.
15
 
Furthermore, in 1981 the Corps echoed ARC suggestions when it published a 
feasibility report that recommended building a re-regulation dam 6.3 miles below Buford 
Dam. In addition to simply being more economical than raising the level of Lake Lanier 
or dredging Morgan Falls reservoir, the Corps of Engineers argued that constructing the 
2.7 billion gallon reservoir offered other tangible benefits. First, it would provide higher 
weekend releases that would allow for growth in river withdrawal amounts. Second, a 
second re-regulation dam would allow the water otherwise passing through Buford Dam 
on a continuous basis to be used for peak power generation.
16
 
 Although Atlanta‘s metropolitan leaders and representatives from the DNR and 
EPD rallied around the goal of re-regulation, winning the approval of the federal 
policymakers and upstream environmental and recreational groups for constructing the 
dam proved more difficult. In November 1984, re-regulation supporters received their 
first setback when President Reagan‘s Office of Management and Budget (OMB) refused 
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to extend federal support. Citing budget constraints and a general Reagan administration 
policy of referring all water projects back to local levels, the OMB stated ―the plan . . 
.appears to be a desirable project that would go a long way toward meeting supply 
demand in the Atlanta area. However…non-federal development of the same reregulating 
dam [is] the most likely alternative to a Federal project for water supply.‖
17
    
 But it was at the local level where the dam encountered its most intransigent 
opposition. Organizations such as the Georgia Conservancy, the Sierra Club, Georgia 
Wildlife Federation, and Trout Unlimited threatened lawsuits if construction moved 
forward. Objections to the dam were numerous.  Some groups believed that dam 
construction would exceed the estimated $25 million while others expressed doubt about 
the environment and recreational opportunities the impoundment was to create. Some 
opponents worried about the possible effects on the Chattahoochee River‘s population of 
recently stocked trout as stagnant water in the newly created reservoir might raise 
temperature levels, reduce oxygen content, and ultimately lead to fish kills. Others 
insisted that the fluctuating water levels would eliminate much of the weekend tubing and 
sporting activities as well as cause undesirable mud flats to build up during low water 
levels. Still other activists, like Robert Kerr, executive director of the Georgia 
Conservancy, suggested that the level of Lake Lanier could be raised by about one foot 
and the regulation of its water adjusted accordingly to prevent the area from being robbed 
of six miles of lush Chattahoochee shoreline.
18
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 Despite these criticisms, support for the dam grew in the spring and summer of 
1986 when North Georgia suffered from the least amount of rainfall in 100 years. Several 
metropolitan governments began imposing water use restrictions as local surface streams 
diminished and reservoir levels dropped precipitously. In July 1986, the City of Atlanta 
implemented its first ever outdoor watering restrictions, even though its large water 
system, which sucked up to 170 MGD, was capable of meeting the drought-induced 
demand. In fact, the AWW‘s huge capacity allowed the city to nearly double its 
wholesale water sales to outlying counties for a few weeks during the summer months.  
And, for a time the city actually served as Fayette County‘s sole water source, while 
county water providers there drilled wells to tap underground sources. Adding fuel to the 
fire was ARC predictions that local demand would rise from the current level of 327 
MGD to average demands of 515 MGD and peak demands of nearly 600 MGD by 2010 
on account of an expected population of 3.58 million. At that time, the ARC warned, not 
much more water would be available unless the flow of the river was increased.
19
   
 Those clay-cracked days of 1986 not only generated greater backing for the dam, 
but they also prompted spirited debates about what a future Atlanta might look like in the 
absence of better water resource management. For many the question boiled down to 
whether Atlanta would experience slow growth or no growth at all. Although dam critics 
continued to voice their concerns, their opposition was largely crowded out by the chorus 
of support for dam construction and dire warnings of inaction. ARC environmental 
planner Pat Steven suggested that if the dam was not built then the state would not issue 
permits necessary to meet future demands, which would result in moratoriums on 
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additional water hookups and year-round restrictions on water use. DNR commissioner 
Leonard Ledbetter added that construction moratoriums on office parks and shopping 
centers would be necessary within ten years unless improvements were made in the 
supply system: ―It‘s a very serious matter. If we are going to grow and have the quality of 
life we want, we‘ve got to have the resources out there to manage the water on an as-
needed basis.‖ To Bennett Brown, chairman of the Metro Atlanta Chamber of 
Commerce, overcoming the short-supplies of water required imagination and resolve. 
―What kind of city do we want to be? What do we want this city to be like when we step 
into the new century?‖ he asked before then stating, ―we won‘t just dream and talk about 
how wonderful it will be to have an abundance of fresh water on tap for this city. We will 




 In the summer of 1986, the Corps assuaged local fears with their announcement of 
a ―Short-Term Plan Water Supply Plan‖ (STP) to meet Metropolitan Atlanta‘s needs until 
at least 1990. Developed as a stop-gap measure that could suffice until a long-range 
solution was decided, the Corps‘ STP provided the framework to enable an additional 50 
MGD to be permitted for withdrawal from the river (up to 377) by eliminating weekend 
restrictions. STS implementation required the modification of Morgan Falls Dam and 
Buford Dam operations at the expense of power generation. Contracts were negotiated 
between the ARC, the Corps, the Georgia Power Company, the Gwinnett County Water 
and Sewage Authority, Fulton County, DeKalb County, the Cobb County-Marietta Water 
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Authority and the City of Atlanta whereby costs for special releases were charges at 
$5.79 per million gallons by the Corps of Engineers. Georgia Power agreed to provide 
services to the community at no charge with the understanding that the STP plan would 
be a temporary measure until the re-regulation dam could be constructed.
21
      
 In November 1986, the re-regulation dam was authorized in the Federal Water 
Resources Act with conditions that environmental concerns and economic issues be 
evaluated in more detail prior to construction approval. But after two years of further 
review, the Army Corps of Engineers abruptly changed course in early 1988 by 
suggesting that the $36 million re-regulation dam was possibly unnecessary. In 
September 1988, the Corps instead officially recommended the reallocation of storage in 
Lake Lanier from hydro-electric power to water supply as a potentially more efficient 
means to deliver water to Metropolitan Atlanta. Although the Corps acknowledged that ―. 
. .  both the reregulation dam alternative and the reallocation alternative would meet 
Atlanta‘s water supply needs and are economically feasible,‖ it listed a number of reasons 
why it embraced the latter option. The Corps estimated that the cost of the re-regulation 
dam had risen to $36 million, an increase of 60 percent since its 1981 projections, as a 
result of the inflated costs of purchasing land and the potential of fighting lawsuits. 
Reimbursement of power lost through reallocation would cost only slightly more, an 
estimated $40 to $50 million. Reallocation would be speedier than constructing a new 
dam, would save almost seven miles of the Chattahoochee River and approximately 600 
acres of land from inundation, and would stimulate Lake Lanier‘s recreation economy by 
keeping the lake at a higher level. Finally, reallocation could supply the region‘s water 
                                                     
21
 ARC, 1983 WSP, 8-9; ARC 1988 WSP, 9-10.  
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needs until 2015, whereas re-regulation was expected to meet water demand only through 
2010.
22
     
 Reaction to the announcement was decidedly mixed. Many local officials uttered 
resentment over the Corps reversal and questioned its credibility. As DeKalb County 
Chief Executive Officer Manuel Maloof explained, ―The Corps of Engineers led us down 
a primrose path and we bought—hook, line, and sinker—what they told us. For 
[supporting the re-regulation dam], we just got kicked to the scaffold. I had taken a lot of 
abuse for this.‖
23
 Others like Representative Ed Jenkins stated that he was ―at a loss to 
understand why they [the Corps] couldn‘t come up with this before now.‖
24
 But as 
revised ARC estimates predicted that peak summer demand, for which all water systems 
must be equipped, would increase from 592 MGD in 1990 to 844 MGD in 2010, area 
leaders ultimately got over disappointment at having to eat crow for their long-standing 
support of re-regulation. In a show of solidarity for the reallocation plan, metro 
governments in September 1989 pledged to cover the full $62.5 million that was now 
needed to reimburse the Southeastern Power Administration for the value of hydropower 
that would be lost through reallocation.
25
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 ―Corps‘ Report to Congress Confirms Hopes for Rereg Dam are Dim,‖ AJC, 6 June 1988. 
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 The Corps‘ 1989 plan to reassign 207,000 acre-feet of water from power 
generation for use by metro Atlanta generated a wave of protest among downstream 
water users in Alabama and Florida. With the extended droughts of 1986 and 1988 still 
fresh in their minds, barge operators, government and industry leaders, and homeowners 
in south Alabama charged that hoarding the Chattahoochee‘s water in Lake Lanier would 
create low-flow conditions, especially during dry spells, which would halt barge traffic 
on the river system. Others claimed that increased withdrawals would also lead to 
increased pollution downstream. This belief was based on EPD studies that indicated that, 
during critical low stream-flow conditions, there were approximately 6.4 c.f.s of river 
flow for every c.f.s. of wastewater discharged below Atlanta but that ratios of flow to 
pollution could be as high as 1:1 by the year 2000 if treatment techniques did not keep 
pace with withdrawal amounts.
26
 Floridians, in contrast, continued to express concerns 
about the potential demise of the Apalachicola Bay and the loss of its sizable oyster-
harvesting industry, which supplied one in every seven oysters consumed in the United 
States each year. Atlanta‘s plan to take 529 MGD—at least 50 percent more than what 
was currently withdrawing—would both increase salinity and deprive the Bay of the 
fresh water oysters needs to survive, they argued.
27
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land values as well as the potential for increased pollution that would stem from the Corps‘ re-allocation 
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Although Corps and Georgia officials insisted that increases in urban water 
withdrawals would have negligible economic or environmental effects downstream from 
Atlanta because the Three Rivers project had ensured that most of the water would 
returned to the Chattahoochee River, many in Alabama and Florida were not convinced.
28
 
Instead, they urged that Georgia‘s reallocation plans be postponed until a complete 
assessment of lower ACF Basin needs could be completed. ―A lot of the potential 
impacts of reallocation on navigation, downstream water supply and fish and wildlife 
have not been addressed . . .‖ argued Walter Stephenson, head of planning for the 
Alabama Department of Economics and Community Affairs. ―It will take months for us 
to review all of the information and come up with a final answer.‖ Thus, by the end of 
1989 the stage was set for a major confrontation between the three states over how ACF 






                                                                                                                                                              
Lanier‘s residents might suffer, Corps‘ official Ken Sims summed up the supporters basic premise: ―We 
think it‘s a very minor impact on recreation in return for what you‘re getting, and that‘s water. You need 
water to grow.‖ For examples of these localized debates, see, ―Corps Gird for Hearings on River Use,‖ 
AJC, 15 November 1989; ―Official: Regional Will Lose People Without More Water,‖ AJC, 16 November 
1989; For opposition arising in Alabama and Florida, see Apalachicola‘s Industry Threatened,‖ AJC, 26 
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THE POLITICS OF WATER ALLOCATION: THE TRI-STATE WATER 
WAR, 1990-1998 
In June 1990, after Georgia governor Joe Frank Harris suggested that his state 
might oppose plans by an Alabama nuclear power plant and a paper mill to withdraw 
more water from the Chattahoochee River, Alabama filed suit (Alabama Case) in federal 
court against the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Alabama sought an injunction to prevent 
the implementation of Atlanta‘s withdrawal plan. Shortly thereafter, Florida joined the 
suit to protect its own interest in maintaining the flows of the Chattahoochee, while 
Georgia and the ARC sought intervention as defendants on the side of the Corps.  
Alabama and Florida officials claimed that the Corps‘ plan to reallocate an 
additional 529 MGD for metro Atlanta threatened the water supply necessary to ensure 
their own expected growth. Specifically, Alabama claimed that such drastic water 
withdrawal upstream would curtail ―badly needed economic development‖ throughout 
southeast Alabama; it needed the river flow primarily for farming, industry, hydropower, 
and barge navigation. Florida claimed that the additional withdrawals upstream would 
disrupt the natural flow and cause significant damage to its multi-million dollar seafood 
and oyster industry. Additionally, Florida was concerned about losing the water source it 
needed for the potential future residential or commercial development of thousands of 
acres of pulp wood forests in the panhandle. Both plaintiffs based their legal action on the 
grounds that the Corps did not properly assess, as required by the National Environmental 
Protection Act (NEPA), the environmental impacts of water withdrawals from Lake 
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The National Environmental Policy Act, which was signed into law by President 
Richard Nixon on January 1, 1970, is an oversight mechanism that applies to all U.S. 
federal agencies and is supposed to apply to every agency action that significantly affects 
environmental quality. Its immediate purpose is to give federal agencies the statutory 
requirement and power to consider how their actions affect the natural environment and 
incorporate mitigating efforts through open public meetings and other avenues for 
comment. Although generally considered one of the most important pieces of 
environmental legislation ever enacted, it is also mired in controversy over the way in 
which it can be implemented. As Congressman James Hansen once observed, if the 
[current presidential] administration decides it wants a project to go forward, it greases 
the process. If the administration decides it doesn‘t like a project, it crushed the project 
with paperwork—a paralysis of analysis that can take years and years and millions of 
dollars.‖
31
     
Understood in the context of Hansen‘s assessment of NEPA implementation, 
Alabama and Florida‘s focus on the Corps‘ failure to follow NEPA‘s procedural 
requirements demonstrate an inventive attempt to use federal environmental law to bury 
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the Corps‘ reallocation plan. It also shows a keen understanding of court preferences for 
deciding environmental cases on the basis of law (did the Corps follow procedure) rather 
than on disputed fact (will re-allocation harm downstream communities), which usually 
deal with scientific and technical matters with which judges are not familiar.
32
 
The decision to pursue court action signified the increased complexity of 
determining water use rights between competing stakeholders in the eastern United 
States. Water law in the United States has developed along two very distinct paths. In the 
comparatively arid western states, water rights are based on the doctrine of prior 
appropriation. In the East, where surface water is considered more plentiful, riparianism 
has taken hold. Prior appropriation can be summarized as "first in time is first in right." 
Once a water user has acquired a water right under this doctrine, his or her right is 
superior to later-arising uses of the water, even during drought and at the expense of more 
socially beneficial uses. Typically, a prospective water user acquires the right from the 
state to withdraw and consume water. In determining whether to grant the water rights 




Riparianism starts with a very different assumption -- that water is available to all 
riparian and littoral property owners. The water laws of Alabama, Florida and Georgia 
are all based on riparian principles. Under this doctrine, which evolved from English 
common law, all uses, regardless of when they began, are allowed provided they do not 
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unreasonably interfere with other uses. The state does not determine whether a particular 
use is "reasonable"; instead, reasonableness is a question of fact that must be resolved 
through judicial review. This system takes full advantage of the benefits of water 
resources and serves well when water is plentiful. As water resources become scarce, 
however, the deficiencies of riparianism are exposed. Uses that are reasonable in normal 
years may appear excessive in dry years. This shifting standard vitiates the certainty 
necessary for almost every modern productive water use. The State of Georgia has 
attempted to address this problem by grafting a quasi-appropriation "permit" system onto 
the existing riparian framework. It did this through its 1977 statute requiring all new 
withdrawals of more than 100,000 gallons per day to obtain a permit from the state. 
Regulations implementing the program establish a hierarchy of uses—which gives 
preference, for example, to riparian landholders over non-riparian landholders—and 
allows the State of Georgia to maintain control over water consumption within the state 
in a fashion similar to the prior appropriation arrangement in western states. However, 
the state reserves the right to require adjustments to permitted water withdrawals during 
droughts. Moreover, historic riparian rights are still in place. The emerging ―tri-state 
water war‖ demonstrated the tension between the hybrid approach of the permit system 




According to legal scholar Jonathan Watts Hull, the states of Alabama, Georgia, 
and Florida had three settlement options available to them: legislative or congressional 
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apportionment; judicial apportionment; and interstate compacts. Although on occasion 
Congress or the Supreme Court has been called upon to resolve these disputes, an 
interstate compact is the preferred method of resolution. Compacts are more popular than 
judicial and legislative apportionment solutions because the latter are often based on 
incorrect or incomplete information. Further, courts and legislative bodies often lack the 




Shortly after the litigation was filed by Alabama, representatives of Alabama, 
Georgia, Florida, and the Corps began discussions seeking to resolve the conflicts. There 
was general agreement among the parties that litigation was the least desirable option of 
resolving the water resource conflicts. The State of Alabama and the Army Corps of 
Engineers requested the federal court stay the litigation while negotiations were pursued; 
the Court granted this request in September 1990. Furthermore, The U. S. Congress, 
aware of this regional disharmony, provided funding for the Corps to initiate a 
comprehensive water resources study to address the availability and anticipated long-term 
water needs as well as the potential ramifications of various water management options 
on multiple interests in ACF basin. After 18 months of dialogue and negotiations, on 
January 3, 1992, the Governors of the States of Alabama, Florida and Georgia and the 
Assistant Secretary of Army (Civil Works) signed a ―Memorandum of Agreement‖ 
                                                     
35
Jonathan Watts Hull, ―The War Over Water,‖ Regional Resource (Atlanta: Southern Legislative 
Conference, 2000), 4-6. 
264 
 
(MOA) committing to work together as equal partners through the Comprehensive Study 
process to seek resolution of water resource issues.
36
  
The signing of the MOA and initiation of the comprehensive study signaled the 
official beginning of a unique partnership approach among the three States and the Corps. 
The goal was to develop the technical and strategic information required to recommend a 
basin-wide management plan for the use of water resources. The study was designed to 
address four overarching issues: water resources demands, water resources availability, 
flood and drought management strategies, and coordination mechanisms. It was 
additionally to include analysis of data, estimated impacts, and demands over designated 
planning periods through 2050 and was to be completed by December 31, 1997.
37
 
As the study progressed, the states determined that the water resources issues 
should be resolved in the context of an interstate compact. During the 1996-1997 
legislative session, in anticipation of the study‘s completion, all three states introduced to 
their state legislatures a bill for an interstate water compact that would create a committee 
made up of one representative from each state (appointed by the state‘s Governor) plus 
one federal representative (appointed by the President) to analyze the results of the 
comprehensive study and negotiate each state‘s allocation accordingly. The compact was 
approved by all three states and subsequently by the United States Congress and 
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The heart of the ACF compact was an agreement to negotiate an equitable 
apportionment of the surface waters in the basin. The compact did not, however, contain 
an allocation itself; rather, the compact established a mechanism (a Compact 
Commission), which could approve an allocation formula for the next fifty years through 
a unanimous decision. Not surprisingly, unanimity was hard to come by.  The states 
began to bicker about principle for allocation and the methodology for arriving at a 
formula. Alabama and Florida maintained that consumptive uses should be defined and 
allowable limits on consumption should be set. In contrast, Georgia advocated state 
sovereignty, which argues against any external limits on consumption patterns, provided 
minimum state-line flows are delivered. The states also disagreed on how the 
negotiations should proceed. Alabama urged the states to adopt a framework for the 
allocation formula and proceed by establishing acceptable definitions. Georgia countered 
that the time pressures of the compact required the states to move straight to the heart of 
the major substantive issues -- reservoir releases and minimum river flows. According to 
Georgia, definitions and formalities could be worked out after the parties reached an 
agreement in principle. In an attempt to calm the uneasiness that metro Atlanta officials 
felt about the potentially negative ramifications of dealing with out-of-state parties, 
Georgia offered an allocation formula that suggested basing lake operations as if 
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―drought were imminent.‖ This effectively meant that Lake Lanier would be kept full 
until drought conditions required releases to supplement river flow.
 39
  
This was of course a more conservative approach than Florida and Alabama 
would have liked. Florida wanted assurances that it would receive a minimum flow only 
on very rare occasions and urged that the reservoir be operated as to mimic ―natural flow 
regimes.‖ Alabama, on the other hand, argued that the federal reservoir should be 
operated as Alabama claims it was originally intended, with navigation rather than water 
supply as a primary purpose. Therefore, Alabama‘s position was that the reservoirs must 
be operated as initially authorized and, that to the extent that such higher flows and 
reservoir releases are not preferable to Georgia, the latter state should be encouraged to 
build additional reservoirs to solve its water supply problems.
40
 
By December 1998, the three states had accepted a common document for the 
allocation agreement, and each state had issued a full proposal. Numerous issues 
remained unresolved, however, including whether to provide for: an interim allocation; 
compensation for adversely affected parties; verification and enforcement; and, basic 
reservoir operation questions. In addition, the states did not agree on how to represent 
water resources in their modeling efforts. With no agreement in sight, the states agreed to 
extend the compact deadline by another year with the understanding that litigation would 
resume if a consensus could not be reached. 
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A quick review of the water usage of each state helps explain the acrimony. 
Alabama‘s main concern is that Georgia will grab most of the water, limiting Alabama‘s 
growth, especially in the southeastern region. Of the 183 MGD that Alabama withdraws 
from the Chattahoochee, 62 percent goes for hydropower, 29 percent for industry, 5 
percent for drinking water, and 4 percent for agriculture. Alabama officials also want 
enough water for barge traffic on the lower Chattahoochee and are worried about water 
quality as metro Atlanta grows and dumps more wastes into the river.  
 Georgia was by far the greatest water consumer of the Apalachicola, 
Chattahoochee and Flint River basin, drawing an estimated 1.7 billion gallons per day. 
About 58 percent of that amount goes for power generation, 28 percent for drinking 
water, 10 percent for industry, and 4 percent for agriculture. Georgia‘s first priority was 
to ensure an adequate water supply for the next half-century for metro Atlanta and 
northwest Georgia. Its second priority: sufficient water for farm irrigation. Downstream 
demands for more water were perceived as a threat to the state‘s sovereignty. 
Florida‘s main interest was in sustaining a flourishing seafood industry in 
Apalachicola Bay, which produces 90 percent of Florida‘s oysters. The health of marine 
life is closely tied to the river basin system; oysters, for instance, need periodic flows of 
freshwater and nutrients from the Apalachicola River, which in turn depended on the 
Chattahoochee River and Flint River in Georgia. At the time Florida was withdrawing 
187 MGD from the river basin but maintained that irrigation by farmers in the upper 
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There was considerable handwringing in Atlanta over how the parties could come 
to an agreement. In the midst of another dry spell and awaiting Judge Thrash‘s decision 
on CSO remediation plans, metro residents were eager to not only find a way to ―drought 
proof‖ the region for water supply but also ensure that they would continue to have 
enough water for waste assimilation. Only a more detailed investigation can explain how 
much these conditions may have affected the positions each state took in their 
negotiations.  
 
Table 5.1— Freshwater Withdrawals by State in ACF River Basin, 1990. (Source: USGS 
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WILL THE WATER LAST? 
  Although the ACF Compact was originally set to expire on December 31, 1998, 
it was extended several times while the parties struggled to agree on an allocation 
formula. And although formal Commission discussions would continue until the 
Compact officially expired on August 31, 2003, a bevy of separate lawsuits that began in 
2000 signaled the seemingly inexorable end to negotiations.  In December of 2000, for 
example, Southeastern Federal Power Customers, Inc. (SeFPC)—a consortium of electric 
power suppliers who purchase hydropower generated at Buford Dam on Lake Lanier—
filed suit against the Corps in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (D.C. 
Court). SeFPC alleged that the Corps was without authority to allow the withdrawal of 
water from Lake Lanier for local and industrial usage because water supply benefits were 
not an authorized purpose of the Buford Dam project. SeFPC also argued that the Corps 
was overcharging for hydropower generated by Buford Dam because the prices had not 
been adjusted to reflect the increased withdrawals for water supply, which diminished the 
amount of water flowing through Buford Dam to generate hydropower. Further, SeFPC 
sought an injunction compelling the Corps to limit the uses of Buford Dam and Lake 
Lanier to those authorized by statute or, in the alternative, to grant SeFPC financial 
concessions to make up for the inequity in its payment schedule.
42
 
 In February 2001, Georgia, the ARC, and local water supply providers moved to 
intervene and in January 2003 the parties executed a settlement agreement (the D.C. 
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Agreement) that provided compensation to the hydroelectric customers and interim 
contracts to meet present needs for the local water supply providers. In the same month 
that the D.C. Agreement was filed, Alabama and Florida revived the 1990 Alabama case 
when the states asked the Alabama Court for a preliminary injunction and declaration that 
the D.C. Agreement was null and void in violation of the 1990 stay. Alabama and Florida 
then moved to intervene in the D.C. Case to challenge the D.C. Agreement, claiming that 
the Corps lacked the necessary statutory authority to enter into the D.C. Agreement 
because it constituted a ―major operational change‖ to Lake Lanier operations and 
subsequently violated a number of federal statutes, including NEPA and the Endangered 
Species Act. After a full trial on the merits, Alabama and Florida‘s objections were 
overruled and the settlement agreement was declared to be ―valid and approved.‖ The 
states refused to honor the federal court‘s decision and in late 2004 appealed to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The federal appeals court 
initially dismissed Alabama and Florida‘s claims for lack of appellate jurisdiction based 
on the fact that the D.C. Agreement was not yet finalized. After the D.C. agreement was 
completed in 2006, Alabama and Florida again appealed. 
 Meanwhile, in 2000 Georgia asked the Corps to set aside more water from Buford 
Dam until the year 2030 to assure a reliable municipal and industrial water supply to the 
Atlanta region. The Corps failed to act on Georgia‘s request and in February of 2001, 
after waiting approximately nine months for a response from the Corps, Georgia filed suit 
(Georgia Case) against the Corps in the Northern District of Georgia seeking both a 
declaration that Lake Lanier should be operated to meet Georgia‘s future water supply 
needs and an order to the Corps to meet those needs. Florida and Alabama immediately 
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intervened and filed a motion to ―abate‖ the case on the same grounds as those used in 
opposition to the D.C settlement. SeFPC also intervened as a defendant with Florida and 
Alabama, alleging that, unlike hydropower, municipal and industrial water supply was 
not an intended purpose of Buford Dam. Then, in April 2002, the Corps denied Georgia‘s 
water supply request, saying it lacked ―legal authority to grant Georgia‘s request without 
additional legislative authority, because the request would involve substantial effects on 
project purposes and major operational changes.‖ Subsequently, motions to intervene by 
the Lake Lanier Association and the Water Supply Providers were granted, and the 
Georgia Case was abated and administratively closed pending final judgment in the 
Alabama Case. In March 2007, the suit was transferred to the Middle District of Florida 
for consolidation with the D.C. Case and four other related cases in the Tri–State Water 
Rights Litigation. 
The Corps and Georgia‘s defendants firmly contended that the plaintiff lacked 
standing on the grounds that the WSA of 1958 did not require the Corps to seek 
Congressional authorization for reallocation and because Florida and Alabama had failed 
to demonstrate that reallocation may adversely impact the environment and economy 
downstream in the ACF Basin. The Corps argued, for instance, the reallocations would 
cause only a one percent reduction in hydropower generation. In addition, the Metro 
Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, who was also invested in the Tri-State case, claimed that, 
on average, total water supply withdrawals for metropolitan Atlanta reduced flows at the 
Florida state line by just one to two percent. U.S. District Judge Paul Magnuson, 
nonetheless, ruled on July 17, 2009 that the Corps interim water plans and its reallocation 
constituted a ―major operational change‖ and that the Corps had overstepped its 
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Congressional mandate.  He argued, ―Contrary to the Georgia parties‘ argument, taken 
together the relevant statutes and legislative history point to only one conclusion: water 
supply, in the form of withdrawals from Lake Lanier and large-scale withdrawals from 
the Chattahoochee River, was not an authorized purpose of the Buford project. The 
Georgia parties‘ argument that a combination of authorities allows the water-supply 
withdrawals is without merit.‖
43
  
  With this decision, Magnuson stayed the litigation for a period of three years to 
allow the parties to obtain Congressional approval for the operational changes the water 
supply providers requested. During the stay, the parties were allowed to continue to 
operate at current water-supply withdrawal levels but could not increase those 
withdrawals absent the agreement of all parties to the matter. Furthermore, Magnuson 
ruled that at the end of the three years, ―absent Congressional authorization or some other 
resolution of this dispute,‖ operations at Buford Dam would return to mid-1970s levels, 
meaning that off-peak flow would return to 600 c.f.s. and only the towns of Gainseville 
and Buford would be allowed to withdraw from the lake.
44
  
 Magnuson‘s decision was a major blow to Atlanta, which now faced a potentially 
devastating cutback in its water supply if a decision could not be reached by July 2012. 
Georgia and metro Atlanta officials expressed their disappointment with the district 
court‘s ruling and stated their intent to seek an appeal while negotiations resumed. They 
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continued to press the claim that because Metro Atlanta returns a higher percentage of 
water, net consumptive use is roughly equal to the combined level of Middle 
Chattahoochee and Lower Chattahoochee (see Table 5.2). In September 2009, The State 
of Georgia, the other Georgia parties (ARC, Cobb County Marietta Water Authority, the 
City of Atlanta, DeKalb County, Atlanta-Fulton Water Resources Commission, the City 
of Gainesville and Gwinnett County) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers made their 
formal appeal to the Eleventh Circuit Court, which subsequently accepted the case.
45
 
The findings of the three-judge panel were a rebuke of Magnuson‘s interpretation 
and a major victory for Metropolitan Atlanta water users. Noting that returning metro 
Atlanta‘s water withdrawals in three years to mid-1970s levels would present a public 
health and safety threat to the 3 million people who depend on Lake Lanier for water 
supply, the Eleventh Circuit concluded on June 28, 2011, that downstream water supply 
is an authorized purpose of Lake Lanier. The court of appeals found that the 
1946legislation authorizing the construction of Buford Dam also authorizes the Corps to 
operate Lake Lanier to support metro Atlanta‘s water withdrawals from the river 
downstream of Buford Dam. The Court further rejected Judge Magnuson‘s analysis of 
the Water Supply Act of 1958, arguing that the Water Supply Act provides additional 
authority, over and above the authority provided by the original legislation, to operate the 
reservoir for water supply. The appeals court ruled that the case should be remanded to 
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Table 5.2—Net Consumptive Use of Chattahoochee River [during non-drought years]. 
(Source: Stakeholder's Briefing Georgia's Water (Gov. Perdue's Presentation to 
Stakeholders Downstream of Metro Atlanta, August 5, 2009), 
http://www.atlantaregional.com/File%20Library/Environment/ep_Gov_Presentati
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The river systems involved in the so-called Tri-State Water Wars support a wide 
variety of uses and activities, including municipal and industrial water supply, 
hydroelectric power, fisheries, navigation, recreation, and waste assimilation. The rivers 
also support a complex ecosystem of flora and fauna. Many uses depend almost entirely 
on the network of dams and reservoirs that controls the flow of the rivers through 
manipulation of the various reservoir release schedules. The existing ecology, however, 
depends heavily on the natural cycle of high and low river flows. Uses that rely on the 
dams and reservoirs, moreover, may demand conflicting operating procedures. Lakeside 




These diverse interests have coexisted, however imperfectly, for many years 
under the reservoir management efforts of the Corps of Engineers as well as the "riparian 
rights" legal framework. Over time, however, development pressure, episodic droughts, 
new environmental legislation, and shifting priorities and consumption levels have 
severely tested this governance system. Legal scholars and policymakers have had to 
revise previous assumptions regarding water abundance in the Southeast and resolve new 
ways for resolving allocation disputes there and elsewhere in the eastern United States. 
With the Supreme Court and Congress reluctant to become directly involved in the issue, 
states, environmental advocates, and the Corps have been left to work out interstate 
compacts. In the case of Atlanta, that process of negotiations failed. Georgia, Florida, and 
Alabama were left with little recourse other than to pursue innovative legal strategies and 
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ultimately allow federal district judges to resolve the competing claims. And while the 
Eleventh Circuit Court has recently ruled in Georgia‘s favor, further water conservation 
and planning efforts in all three states will be required to meet future demands. 
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In many ways Atlanta‘s water problems are typical of those other American cities 
have faced. Like many large urban areas of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, Atlanta developed municipally-owned, capital intensive sanitary systems that 
were capable of producing potable water and providing at least primary treatment of 
wastewater. Similarly, as metropolitan population fanned out from the urban core and 
water resources needs grew more regional in scope, these local services became 
entangled in jurisdictional disputes. And, like many of its counterparts, Atlanta eventually 
found itself constrained by the technological choices made during the city‘s early period 
of development and financially un-prepared to make the needed infrastructural 
improvements that a new ecological paradigm demanded.
1
 
Although Atlanta shares these similarities with other urban areas, its water 
troubles remain instructive. Unlike Los Angeles, San Francisco, Boston, and New York, 
Atlanta was unable to tap into distant water sources. And in contrast to Chicago, which 
siphons off Lake Michigan, and Houston, which has been able to supplement its 
groundwater resources by drawing upon the San Jacinto River, Atlanta has been forced to 
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The mid-twentieth regional planners and geologists associated with the city were 
clearly aware of Atlanta‘s rather exceptional development and the challenges this posed. 
As previously explained, in 1952 the MPC pointed out in Up Ahead that Atlanta was only 
one of four major cities in the world to be situated on a continental divide, a fact that 
made each of these cities vulnerable to water shortages. One year before, geologists R.W. 
Carter and S.M. Herrick made an equally keen observation regarding Atlanta‘s past and 
future development. ―Economists,‖ they noted, ―credit Atlanta‘s greatness to its 
location.‖ ―Atlanta,‖ the researchers concurred, ―does have a strategic location close to 
the southern edge of the Appalachian Mountains where several ridges that make excellent 
railway routes intersect.‖  But the city‘s lack of harbors and river navigation led Carter 
and Herrick to conclude that ―the availability of water had little to do with its growth‖ 
and to warn local officials ―that there will be water-supply problems in the area.‖
3
  
  Carter and Herrick‘s warning came in the midst of Atlanta‘s full court 
press to ensure federal construction of Buford Dam. Like Mayor Hartsfield, Carter and 
Herrick believed that the impoundment created by Buford Dam would ―provide enough 
water in the river to supply the growing city‖ and ―almost any type of industry that 
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wishes to locate in the area.‖
4
  But as we have seen, the regulated releases could only 
temporarily satisfy Atlanta‘s thirst (measured in per capita consumption) and were 
insufficient to dilute Atlanta‘s municipal effluent without greater pre-treatment.   
Moreover, sixty years of continued metropolitan growth suggests blind faith in 
river regulations was overly optimistic.  In May 2009, just one month before Judge 
Magnuson erroneously declared that Metropolitan Atlanta was illegally withdrawing 
water from Lake Lanier, state officials released a disturbing report for those concerned 
about the area‘s future water supplies. According to the Metropolitan North Georgia 
Water Planning District, the advisory body created by the Georgia General Assembly in 
2001 to establish policy, enact plans and promote intergovernmental coordination of all 
water issues for the 15 counties and over 90 cities within metro Atlanta, the region will 
exceed its permitted water withdrawal amount (882 MGD) before 2025 unless aggressive 
planning and conservation measures are taken. Worse still, local governments will be 




Constraining though it has been, the physical environment did not determine 
Atlanta‘s course of development. Of greater import were the ways that social values and 
political priorities affected the appropriation and use of available water resources. All 
available evidence suggests that Atlanta‘s political and civic leaders clearly wanted to 
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facilitate economic growth. This intent runs straight through the successful lobbying for 
the construction of Buford Dam and as well as in the AWW slogan ―Atlanta Grows 
Where Water Goes.‖  Though the Metropolitan Planning Commission advocated for 
coordinated water planning— and had the distinction of being the first publicly supported 
regional planning body—it did not oppose growth per se and had no legally binding 
authority over the metropolitan governments it counseled.   
This weakness of the MPC in relation to the metro governments it served is 
consistent with Sam Bass Warner Jr.‘s contention that metropolitan planning offered a 
feeble challenge to the American tradition of land management. The latter, which was 
derived from old common-law concepts, treated ―land as the basis for personal freedom‖ 
rather than as a social resource. City and regional planning, he argues, was typified by 
zoning, which was ―aimed not at disturbing existing conditions but projecting current 
trends into the future.‖
 6
  
Such was the case with the MPC and its successor agencies, the Atlanta Region 
Metropolitan Planning Commission (1960) and the Atlanta Regional Commission (1975). 
Although the MPC recognized Atlanta‘s future vulnerability vis-à-vis its water resources, 
its raison d‘être in the immediate post-war years was to accommodate Atlanta‘s 
downtown business core to the future decentralized population base. It did this through 
the promotion of regional plans that emphasized construction of expressways to facilitate 
―the movement of people and goods‖ into and out of the central city. As Warner explains, 
―metropolitan planning became a compulsory adjunct to highway design‖ when ―no other 
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agencies or rules for adjudicating the opposing economic and land-development interests 
were forthcoming. Instead power was handed over to administrative bodies of mixed 
government and business interests‖ and suburban sprawl ensued.
7
  
 Atlanta‘s construction of expressways anticipated the onset of federal interstate 
construction during the mid-1950s and imprinted the ―rim and spoke‖ pattern that 
describes Atlanta‘s spatial dimensions today. The phenomena of the ―spreading city‖ had 
major consequences for managing metro Atlanta‘s water resources. It produced a 
tendency to overdesign water systems to accommodate future demand, which in turn 
created a vicious cycle where populations started to leapfrog ahead, become increasingly 
decentralized and drive up water use in the process. Decentralized population required 
more water treatment facilities and higher withdrawals to meet the expected future 
demand, which in turn increased the pollution load on the Chattahoochee River.  
Despite their advocacy of integrated water and sewer planning, regional planners 
did little to stem sprawl and confront its looming the consequences. In 1964, for example, 
the ARMPC stated that ―public water supplies are now available within an area of almost 
1,300 square miles; this is enough land, theoretically, to accommodate the expected 
growth of the region for the rest of this century.‖
 8
  The ARC would begin during the 
1970s, moreover, to work with the Corps of Engineers to find ways increase rather than 
conserve the region‘s water supplies.  
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 The consequences of pro-growth policies and lack of determined political 
leadership with regard to environmental policy is perhaps most evident in the realm of 
pollution control. Since the mid-1960s, the ARC consistently called for the creation of 
unified Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Authority that would oversee all sanitary 
operations, planning, and billing within the service area. Local political leaders resisted 
these recommendations and instead remained contractual partners in the Metropolitan 
Sewer System. Completed in the late 1930s, it serves three counties and numerous 
political sub-units but is owned and operated primarily by the City of Atlanta. Much to 
the chagrin of its sewer partners, the City of Atlanta has demonstrated a willingness to 
postpone improvements until forced by either federal and state regulators or federal court 
judges. Atlanta‘s record of under-achievement in pollution control has prompted its 
partners to frequently accuse the city of mismanagement. City officials have responded, 
however, that its partners should share more of the financial burden. Evidence shows that 
Atlanta‘s delinquency in upgrading its WWTFS has often been the result of the city‘s 
reluctance to raise sewer rates. The city did not even have a sewer service charge until the 
late 1960s. Subsequent rate increases, prior to the consent decrees of 1998 and 1999, 
were far and few in between.  
Atlanta‘s policy of deferring sanitary improvements is understandable, to a certain 
extent. Sewer construction is an expensive drain on the public treasury and garners far 
less enthusiasm than revenue-generating endeavors such as stadium constructions or 
airport expansions. Few ribbon cutting ceremonies or photo opportunities are held for 
repairing a leaking sewer trunk line, despite the benefits they may raise for local 
ratepayers.  In this context, the temptation to defer investment in environmental 
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infrastructure, and hope that catastrophe can be averted beyond one‘s own term in office, 
is powerful and often irresistible. Sewer problems were often passed to the next 
generation as a result. 
 In all likelihood, Atlanta would have neglected its sanitary infrastructure 
indefinitely, if not for the intervention of the federal government. In fact, the federal 
government has played a prominent role in the development of water policy in 
metropolitan Atlanta during most of the twentieth century. It began as a passive 
stimulator of economic development, providing the funding for both the Metropolitan 
Sewer System during the late 1930s and Buford Dam in the 1950s. As a new ecological 
paradigm took hold, the role of the federal government evolved into an active promoter 
of environmental quality. As the federal regulatory state expanded and Atlanta was 
placed under increased pressure to make necessary improvements to its sanitary systems, 
the federal government provided seventy-five percent of the funds needed to complete the 
Three Rivers Water Quality Management Program. 
 Delays continued, however, and Atlanta‘s continued neglect of its water and 
wastewater infrastructure had serious consequences. Not only did Atlanta‘s lack of action 
lead to millions of dollars in fines for violating state and federal water quality laws;  it 
also engendered deep resentment and distrust of not only Atlanta‘s political leadership 
and technological expertise upon whom the city had long relied. Agitated citizens began 
to mount aggressive protests over city proposals, which further delayed pollution 
abatement projects. Some Atlantans have viewed grassroots organizing and their 
influence on City Hall as a triumph of participatory democracy and an affirmation of the 
value of citizen participation in the formulation of environmental policy that is socially 
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equitable, financially responsible, and ecologically sound. Others have countered this 
notion, arguing instead that tens of millions of dollars were wasted when city leaders 
abandoned their original control plan as a result of community protests. Atlanta‘s 
continued political indecision and foot-dragging also prompted other activists to seek 
court action, using the federal framework of environmental law in unexpected but 
effective ways to bring about substantive change. 
 The full complexity of these disputes and the accompanying controversies over 
privatization of the municipal water supply system remain unexplored. The racially 
charged nature of the Combined Sewer Overflows (CSOs) and phosphorous pollutions, 
for instance, invites further investigation into the ways that race and class influenced 
Atlanta‘s environmental development. The erosion of public trust in engineering 
expertise, and the regional character of environmentalism, including possible southern 
antipathy toward federal intervention and strong anti-urban bias in state legislatures, also 
remain beyond scope of this dissertation but are equally deserving of greater scrutiny.  
 In recent years, Atlanta has come a long way towards developing a more 
integrated water management approach. Mayor Franklin‘s Department of Watershed 
Management unified water and wastewater services into the same administrative body 
after spending most of the twentieth century separate. But the city is not out of the woods 
yet. While the Eleventh Circuit Court has ruled that water supply is an authorized 
purpose of Buford Dam, negotiations must continue between the three states for future 
allocations even as the Corps makes a final determination of its authority to operate the 
federal dam. Likewise, although Mayor Franklin‘s Clean Water Initiative completed the 
mandated CSO remedial measures within the Consent Decree‘s stipulated time frame, the 
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city has recently indicated that it cannot complete the SSO improvements by 2014 due to 
lack of money and intends to ask for an extension until 2029. Meanwhile, Atlanta 
residents are paying some of the highest water and sewer rates in the nation and the city 
has proposed adding a stormwater fee that is expected to cost homeowners between $64 
and $120 per year.
9
    
  With expected population gains of over two million new people over the next 
twenty years, metro Atlantans would do well to consider lessons that may be gleaned 
from the last half-century. For most of them, the subjects of water supply and sewers are 
remote and uninteresting. Yet these issues should merit their attention for a number of 
reasons. Both are important elements of the larger infrastructure that provides the 
foundation for economic growth. They are essential for preserving public health and the 
environment. 
 Water and wastewater systems also represent a major public investment and the 
costs of failing to make timely and informed decisions regarding their performance can 
be considerable. Some of these costs may be dramatic, as in the case of multi-million 
dollar fines or the possibility of a court-ordered reduction in withdrawal amounts. Other 
costs may be expressed more subtly, like lost opportunities for economic development 
that stem from sewer moratoriums and fear of water shortages, or recreational and 
aesthetic enjoyment of waterways due to stream pollution.  As history shows, the blind 
ambition that creates progress can also bring about potentially devastating consequences.  
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